Winterveld(t)

Despite being a once forgotten folk with existing challenges...
people are coming back home!

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Box 1.1: Methodological comments
1. INTRODUCTION

Government policy has played a significant role in the way that South African urbanisation has been structured (Davies, 1986). Many informal settlements have emerged in South Africa since the 1960s. According to Stickler (1990, p. 330), this was the cause of extensive rural-urban migration, as well as government policies of forced removals and the relocation of black squatters and other black tenants.

Squatter settlements in South Africa during the 1980s showed manifestations of apartheid and the struggle against it. Winterveld (prior to assuming its current peri-urban status) was a typical example of deprivation (Horn et al., 1992, p. 123). Winterveld is a settlement situated 40 kilometres to the northwest of the Pretoria city centre and close to the decentralised formal ‘black’ towns of Mabopane and Soshanguve. It is an example of the constitutional and functional complexity of the formation of urban areas in the apartheid era (Horn et al., 1992, p. 113). This area is typical of a rural community in a large agricultural setting in South Africa, but is tied up with an urban economy near Pretoria (Simone, 2004, p. 68). Apart from the Pretoria city system being comprised of several Group Areas components, it was also ‘internationally’ divided into two sections falling within the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and the Republic of Bophuthatswana respectively. The links with Bophuthatswana included the black towns of Ga-Rankuwa, Mabopane and Winterveld. Even though the development of Winterveld was influenced by apartheid practices, it was also an experiment in testing the bilateral cooperation between Bophuthatswana and the RSA. The residents of Winterveld ‘believed that they were the lost and forgotten children of oppression’; and the settlement was known as the ‘dark city’ (Hlahla, 2004). Therefore, the area has represented the challenges of socio-political empowerment and reconstruction and development since the democratisation of South Africa after 1994.

Winterveld has a long history of neglect and discrimination (Hlahla, 2005). According to Simone (2004, p. 90), many of the challenges and opportunities experienced by residents can be attributed to this singular history, ‘which combines great pride, the legacy of continuous black land ownership, and the social diversity that ensued from this status’. Most of the original inhabitants were South Africans excluded from South African citizenship because of their race. Ethnically, despite residence within the former homeland of Bophuthatswana, the Winterveld inhabitants were not of Tswana origin. They were therefore also not acknowledged as ‘citizens’ of Bophuthatswana by the Tswana rulers. Since 1994, the South African residents have acquired full citizenship and democratic rights and have advanced from the status of ‘outsiders’ to that of ‘insiders’; and have progressed to new forms of inclusion (Reitzes & Bam, 2000, p. 81).

This research report forms part of an investigation comprising four case studies of hidden urbanities. According to Hyett, Kenny and Dickson-Swift (2014), case study research entails an investigation and analysis of a single or collective case, intended to capture the complexity of the object of study. Researchers who use case studies seek out both what is common, and what is particular, about the case in question. This involves careful consideration of the nature of the case, the historical background, physical setting, and other institutional and political contextual factors (Stake, 1995). The research that was conducted in Winterveld was guided by three primary questions:

- How have the socioeconomic profiles changed over the past two to three decades, and what drove these changes?
- How have certain key policies (at the local, provincial, and national government levels) impacted positively/negatively on Winterveld?
- What are the main drivers of change in Winterveld?
In the light of the above research questions (see also Horn, 1997; Rogerson, 1999; Simone, 2004), the overall argument that will be advanced in the study is that, despite evidence of the continued spatial deprivation created under apartheid, the Winterveld community has undoubtedly experienced general improvements in both infrastructural development (agriculture and education sectors) and the provision of basic services (water, electricity, and housing) – particularly since its incorporation into the City of Tshwane in 2001. In particular, the effectuation of the improved provision of basic services (water and electricity), as well as school infrastructural and small-scale agricultural development in Winterveld, is an example of what the municipal Integrated Development Plan (2011) refers to as 'sound' intergovernmental relations coupled with a willingness (as revealed by community interviews) amongst both ordinary community members and emerging farmers to further privately finance certain aspects of these joint initiatives by the government.

Box 1.1: Methodological comments

Both secondary data sources and qualitative research methods were utilised with a view to answering the above questions. In respect of the qualitative method, one focus group discussion and several in-depth qualitative interviews were used to compile the Winterveld report. In respect of the focus group discussion, a session was conducted with eight plot owners who are also executive members of the Winterveld Plot Owners’ Association. For the in-depth interviews, one of the target groups was comprised of the senior managers, officials, and councillors for the City of Tshwane who work directly with the Winterveld community. Despite the commitment by the team of officials from the city’s research and development directorate to ensure that relevant senior managers and councillors would participate in the study, they ultimately did not do so. This was because the researchers were requested to first complete and sign a non-disclosure agreement form with the City of Tshwane. The researchers could not agree to the city’s request, which led to the refusal by the city’s officials to participate in the study. However, despite the failure on the part of the city officials to participate even after researchers had guaranteed them anonymity, the qualitative interviews were conducted with the following respondents, representing particular categories of people:

- Six school principals (from three primary schools and three secondary schools).
- One senior education official from the Tshwane West District Office.
- Two senior managers from two bus companies operating in Winterveld.
- Two senior managers from two non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
- Two former residents of Winterveld.
- One resident who once left, but has since returned to Winterveld.
- Three tenants in a 5-morgen area.
- Two tenants in a 10-morgen area.
- Two landlords in a 10-morgen area.
- Two landlords in a 5-morgen area.
- Two business persons.

Furthermore, we obtained statistics on Winterveld from StatsSA and Global Insight. Throughout this report, we have made a conscious effort to make the voice of the Winterveld respondents heard.

The history of the area will be discussed first to establish a clear picture of how the area developed. Policy will then be considered at national, provincial and local level. Thereafter, we will elaborate on the current socioeconomic changes of the past two decades pertaining to Winterveld. These include population trends, housing, basic services, and the economy of the area. The case study will be concluded with final broad deductions.
2. HISTORY

The history of the origin and development of the Winterveld area (from political and government policy perspectives) is, to a large extent, no different from that of former R293 towns or settlements in South Africa. In the main, the area was founded with the sole purpose of regulating and redirecting black urbanisation from the main white apartheid urban centre (Pretoria) to the undeveloped and segregated peripheral locations (Smith, 1992). However, Winterveld not only accommodated outflows of blacks from urban centres, but also black farm workers who were forcefully removed from white commercial farms following the introduction of mechanisation, which led to redundancy (de Clerq, 1994). The evolution and thus the history of Winterveld can be traced over six distinct phases:

- The area evolved as farmland that was occupied by African tribes.
- Probably owing to colonisation and dispossession of land by whites, the area was converted and used exclusively by white pioneers or farmers to provide grazing for their livestock during dry winter seasons.
- This was followed by further conversion of this 10 386-hectare winter grazing farm, after it was bought by the Jan Smuts government, into more than 1 600 agricultural smallholdings that were (in a move that was unprecedented at the time) later sold to black Africans between 1938 and 1945 (Smith, 1992).
- Black people were subsequently relocated from black squatter camps in and around white proclaimed areas in Pretoria, and dumped on the streets of the Winterveld squatter settlement (1968 – 1975).
- Winterveld became an official part of the ‘independent’ Republic of Bophuthatswana.
- The last phase comprises what is today referred to as a peri-urban settlement located on the outskirts of former white Pretoria (Rogerson, 1999).

Contrary to the initial declaration of Winterveld as an agricultural village for blacks to practise small-scale agriculture in terms of the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936 (between 1938 and 1945), the area gradually started to assume the role and status of a fast-growing squatting settlement rather than an agricultural village (Anon., 1979; Anon., 1979; Smith, 1992). In 1950, the area was still sparsely populated; but according to Hattingh (1975, p. 51), with more and more black people being relocated from black squatter camps in and around white proclaimed areas in Pretoria and dumped on the streets of the Winterveld squatter settlement, the population rapidly began to increase from 1968 to 1975 (Anon., 1979; Anon., 1979; Smith, 1992). Thereafter, pressures from below began to shape policy, starting (as indicated above) with the growth of squatting in Winterveld in the late 1970s. The demand for land prompted ‘shack farming’ and subletting of land because of the financial profitability of these practices (Horn et al., 1992, p. 115). Despite this financial profitability, the conversion of these transients into ‘tenants’, as they became widely known, was, in principle, never discussed and agreed upon by the government and the property owners, nor was such an option accommodated in the original title deeds, which refer to the 1 658 plots in Winterveld as agricultural smallholdings, and not as residential properties or sites.

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1 Mabopane, not Winterveld, was a formal R293 town; but displaced urbanisation coincided with the creation of what were known as R293 towns. This process by which black urbanisation was redirected is described as follows by Morris (1981, p. 144): “It seemed that the overall intention was to make urban African townships as unattractive as possible, both to discourage further settlement and to encourage a reverse movement to the Bantustans.”
Eighty-five per cent of the initial 1 142 plot owners in Winterveld were from non-Tswana ethnic groupings. Those people from the Pretoria townships of Lady Selborne and Eastwood who were not accommodated in the white or the Tswana establishments were labelled ‘throwaway people’ (Anon., 1990, p. 11), and settled in Winterveld (see discussion below). Winterveld became a sanctuary for homeless, unemployed Africans caught between rural landlessness and urban illegality (Horn, 1997, p. 113) This was never a homogeneous African community as intended by the Nationalist plan. Instead, the residents were of different socioeconomic backgrounds and statuses (there were business persons, plot owners, tenants, farmers, and squatters), had different political allegiances, and hailed from different urban and rural environments with modern or traditional features. ‘Yet, despite these differences, Winterveld became living proof that residents of a multi-ethnic, diverse African community could coexist and live together’ (de Clerq, 1994, p. 381).

In 1977, the Winterveld was to become an official part of the ‘independent’ Republic of Bophuthatswana comprised of Mabopane, Ga-Rankuwa, and Temba. Although this is not a subject of discussion in the report, it is worth noting that particular historical relations and roles came into play in, and between, areas such as Temba, Soshanguve, Mabopane, Ga-Rankuwa, and the Rosslyn industrial area which the report could not afford to ignore; and thus, a brief reflection is provided on this issue.

The relationships between Winterveld and the areas of Mabopane, Ga-Rankuwa, Temba, Soshanguve, and the Rosslyn industrial area have a particularly unique history and should therefore be understood within the context of efforts by the apartheid government to encourage black urbanisation in the ‘homelands’ (Chidi, 2011). Within the historical context of Winterveld, such efforts by the apartheid government were first realised through the displacement of blacks from Greater White Pretoria into two exclusively Tswana-speaking areas, namely Ga-Rankuwa in the early 1960s and Mabopane in the late 1960s (Simone, 2004, p. 71; Lemon, 1991). Once the Bophuthatswana homeland, which was initially comprised of Ga-Rankuwa and Mabopane, had gained independence in 1977, both the Bophuthatswana homeland and the South African government were faced with two respective challenges: in the first case, that of having to deal with the South African apartheid government’s dumping of non-Tswana people in Bophuthatswana (Anon., 1979; Anon., 1979; Smith, 1992; Lemon, 1991); and in the second case, a need for the South African government to create an economic foundation which would serve as a mechanism to sustain the homeland system on the periphery of white South Africa (Lemon, 1991). An attempt, particularly by the apartheid government, to resolve these challenges led to three further developments.

Firstly, there was the establishment of Winterveld to accommodate non-Tswana people who were rejected both by the South African government on the basis of race and the Bophuthatswana government on the basis of ethnicity (Lemon, 1991; Reitzes & Bam, 2000; de Clerq, 1994). With neither of the two governments being prepared to take responsibility in terms of governance in Winterveld, a leadership vacuum was created. Under the pretext that arrangements would be made to find an alternative area for the permanent relocation of these black people who had been removed from ‘black spots’, the South African government continued to dump more people in Winterveld (Smith, 1992). One landlord who witnessed the dumping of people on the streets of Winterveld by the South African government described the action in the following words: ‘You know, I was there when the apartheid government came with trucks full of people from black spots removals … literally dumping them in the streets next to our plots … because of Ubuntu, we could not just ignore our brothers and sisters who literally had nowhere to go, and we invited them to come and stay with us … that is how this thing of tenants started in Winterveld’ (Landlord Seven, 2014). Eventually, a compromise was reached by the two governments in terms of how to jointly govern Winterveld. Crucial to such a compromise was, _inter alia_, the establishment of an intergovernmental management committee that was tasked with overseeing the smooth implementation
of all bilateral agreements reached by the two governments regarding Winterveld (Anon., 1979). However, it seems that more needed to be done by the two governments if total control and thus full implementation of their respective racially and ethnically driven programmes was to be realised in the Winterveld area. Thus, with the Winterveld community not having been fully incorporated and accepted administratively either by the South African apartheid government on the basis of race (Anon., 1979; Anon., 1979; Smith, 1992), or by the former Bophuthatswana government on the basis of ethnicity (Anon., 1979; Anon., 1979; Smith, 1992), the intergovernmental management committee became unpopular and, to some extent, sparked some unhappiness and resistance amongst community members. In an attempt to counter any possible resistance that could be caused by the social distance between the community on the ground and the intergovernmental management committee, the Bophuthatswana president then cautiously decided to grant permission to the Winterveld community to form a representative structure (Anon., 1979; Anon., 1979; Business person, 2014; Landlord Seven, 2014) that would be run by land or plot owners themselves; and the structure was called the Winterveld Community Authority (WCA). As alleged during community interviews, both by a prominent business person and former activist and by one long-serving member of the WCA, the sole mandate of WCA was to govern Winterveld on behalf of the Bophuthatswana government (Business person, 2014; Landlord Seven, 2014). One specific mandate of the WCA (in consultation with the Bophuthatswana government) was to facilitate the involvement of the community in the development of the area (Anon., 1979; Landlord Seven, 2014). Given the non-Tswana background of the Winterveld community, the Bophuthatswana government used Winterveld as a resettlement area for people whom it regarded as ‘incomplete’ Tswnas, and denied them privileges afforded to Bophuthatswana citizens such as business, grazing, and land occupation permits (Reitzes & Bam, 2000, p. 83). Tenants were refused work permits, non-Tswnas were refused the payment of pensions, and informal traders were refused trading licences (de Clerq, 1994, p. 384). These households experienced the worst cases of malnutrition, poor health, illiteracy, and unemployment. No concessions were granted regarding education – by virtue of being non-Tswana, residents of Winterveld found it extremely difficult to enrol their children in public schools under the Bophuthatswana government; and were thus left with no option but to introduce their less-resourced concept of ‘private community schools’ (Anon., 1979). Resistance against public schools by residents of Winterveld was sparked by, inter alia, unaffordable school fees and the compulsory and exclusive use of Setswana as the medium of instruction in the early primary years and as the sole vernacular subject offered at secondary schools (de Clerq, 1994). The introduction of ‘private community schools’ was used as a community mechanism to collapse the public school system in the Winterveld area; however, it was not long before these schools, too, were shut down by the Bophuthatswana government (Anon., 1979; Anon., 1979).

Secondly, there was the establishment of Temba, which, despite being used to accommodate non-Tswana ethnic groups in the former Bophuthatswana, also served as a dormitory for white Pretoria (Simkins, 2010). Although they were two separate areas, the incorporation of Temba and Winterveld into Bophuthatswana presented the government with two areas which were not only non-Tswana, but also different from Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa in terms of their socioeconomic profile. For instance, despite their small geographical extent, Ga-Rankuwa and Mabopane seemed more densely populated, with their residents relying more on a combination of rural and urban economic activities, while on the other hand, Temba and Winterveld were more rurally oriented in this regard, being the farthest in relation to the former white urban centres, with their residents relying more on rural economic activities, including small-scale farming and work on large plots in Winterveld. This was because the South African government was eager to hand over the responsibilities of Winterveld, whereas (as discussed above) the Bophuthatswana government was reluctant to absorb the non-Tswana residents and land owners of Winterveld.
Thirdly, the ever-growing number of non-Tswana people who were being dumped in Bophuthatswana by the apartheid government, as well as those who were ejected from both Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa, further necessitated the extension of Mabopane into a new area that was initially called Mabopane East (Lemon, 1991; Business person, 2014). Thus, despite being located in Mabopane, which was part of Bophuthatswana, Mabopane East was later reincorporated into South Africa and was renamed Soshanguve – a name which reflects the Sotho, Shangaan, Nguni, and Venda origins of the inhabitants (Lemon, 1991). Confirming this, one community member said: ‘Due to enforcement of ethnicity in Bophuthatswana, those who were not Tswana by birth were forcibly moved to Mabopane East which later became known as Soshanguve … an acronym for Sotho, Shangaan, Nguni, and Venda. In fact, they created Soshanguve as an independent entity under the council rather than Mangope’ (Business person, 2014).

In a nutshell, had it not been for the apartheid government’s action in dumping non-Tswana people in Ga-Rankuwa and Mabopane – areas meant exclusively for Tswana people – and the subsequent failure of the Bophuthatswana government to either accommodate or assimilate these non-Tswana people, the areas known today as Winterveld, Temba, and Soshanguve would probably not have existed – since in one way or another, they owe their development to the failure of Bophuthatswana and, to some extent, of the South African government, to impose the incorporation of non-Tswana people with Tswanas living in Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa (or even to consider the possible naturalisation of the non-Tswana inhabitants). The lack of economic opportunities, and thus of any effective independence for a nominally independent Bophuthatswana homeland – which was comprised of Mabopane, Ga-Rankuwa, Temba, and Winterveld – not only led to reliance on the informal economic sector, but also seems to have posed a serious threat to government policy on separate development through the homeland system. To avoid any possible reversal of black urbanisation into different areas in Bophuthatswana, including Winterveld, the government created an economic foundation through the establishment of the Rosslyn border industries (Lemon, 1991). Thus, despite a growing informal economic sector, the economy of Winterveld in particular seems to have greatly benefited from its close proximity to the employment market of the industrial centres of Rosslyn, Brits, and the PWV region (de Clerq, 1994). To facilitate access to these industrial areas, the government subsidised an efficient bus service for daily commuters to the industrial areas (Pillay, 1984).

It seems that the cross-border status that was assumed by Winterveld when it was first governed jointly by Bophuthatswana and the South African apartheid government through an intergovernmental management committee, continued even into the post-apartheid era. Prior to its final incorporation into the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (situated in Gauteng) in 2001, Winterveld continued to remain a cross-border area which was functionally part of the Tshwane Metropolitan area, while constitutionally comprising part of the North West province (Hlahla, 2004; Palmary & Ngubeni, 2003; Moiloa, 2007). The implications of the evolution of Winterveld as discussed above shall be the focus of the discussion in the next section in terms of policy considerations, population trends, housing and basic services, as well as the economy of the area.

### 3. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND PLANS

Since 1994, the different spheres of government – national, provincial, and local – have invested in numerous initiatives to improve the socio-economic well-being of residents in Winterveld. The role of the various spheres of government in this respect will be discussed next.
3.1 From national government

The evidence gleaned from the literature and the media indicates two distinct ways in which the national government continues to sustain its development agenda in the Winterveld area. The first entails the continuation of a bus subsidy which has been in operation for more than two decades between Winterveld and Pretoria and its surrounding townships, including certain areas in the former PWV region (Pillay, 1984; Bus Company One, 2014; Bus Company Two, 2014; Pillay, 1984). There are currently two main bus operations: PUTCO and Batswana Gare (Bus Company One, 2014; Bus Company Two, 2014), which are being subsidised by the government. While the primary goal of this subsidy was to make travelling costs affordable, particularly for poor working-class people employed as migrant labourers in former white Pretoria and its surroundings, the latest research reveals that the opposite has occurred in practice. A concern was expressed during community interviews with officials from the two bus companies regarding the fact that, unlike the previous subsidy which was based on the number of commuters on the bus (tickets sold) per trip, the current subsidy (DORA) is based on the number of kilometres travelled per trip. To a large extent, this has made daily commuting between Winterveld and Pretoria and its surroundings increasingly unaffordable for both the commuters and the bus operators (Bus Company One, 2014; Bus Company Two, 2014). Thus, instead of helping to sustain current operations, the current subsidy model has largely contributed to the gradual demise of a bus system which was generally affordable, efficient, and reliable pre-1994. According to these officials, the negative impact of the current bus subsidy funding model is twofold. Firstly, the number of daily commuters is in decline, since a significant number of these commuters seem to have avoided the ever-increasing travelling costs by permanently relocating to areas such as Soshanguve. Confirming this, one manager said: ‘The current subsidy is subsidising bus companies and not individual commuters and because the funding is not enough, bus fares [have] had to be hiked from time to time ... this has to some extent contributed to a decline in the number of our clientele, most [of whom] have decided to relocate to Soshanguve and other places closer to their work places’ (Bus Company Two, 2014). Secondly, a decision was taken by the two bus companies to reduce their bus fleets significantly over the past few years. One of the managers made the following remarks in this respect: ‘We used to have about 15 buses operating between Winterveld and Soshanguve, but today, due to, amongst other [factors], a decline in the number of commuters, we have only five buses on a daily basis’ (Bus Company One, 2014). The negative impact of the current state funding model on the bus fares has significantly narrowed the price difference between taxis and buses, thereby subjecting bus operators to stiff competition with taxi operators and inducing individuals to opt for lift clubs (Bus Company Two, 2014).

The second measure taken by the government relates to the decision that was made by former state president Thabo Mbeki to declare Winterveld a ‘Special Presidential Lead Project’ (Anon., 2004). One of the flagship projects linked to this national initiative is the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project, which was officially launched by a former Gauteng premier in 2010 (Hlahla, 2010; Bateman, 2010). The emphasis and focus of the national initiative on the ‘urban’-spatial aspects of Winterveld seems, _inter alia_, to have overshadowed the fact that, by its nature and origin, Winterveld was conceived as a rural village for black farmers to practise small-scale agricultural activities – a spatial function that continues to exist, but which, for various reasons, is not flourishing at the desired rate. Some of the key objectives or targets pertaining to the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project were land redistribution to landless tenants (through the purchase and expropriation of existing land owned privately by plot owners); the provision of RDP housing; provision of solar water-heating systems; upgrading of public schools; and the upgrading of primary health clinics (Masemola, 2010a, p. 6). Apart from the impact and strides made in other focus areas of the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project, one area that was widely commended for its remarkable
success during community interviews is the school upgrading project. The following observation is typical of some common remarks made by principals and other stakeholders in the education sector to express the impact made by this initiative: ‘Today all our schools [that] did not have sanitation, administration blocks, and enough classrooms … have since been provided with all these’ (Principal One, 2014).

3.2 From provincial government

In addition to the leading role played by the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in the implementation of one of the national flagship projects, the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project, this Department has displayed some commitment – outside the scope of the urban renewal project – in funding several community projects to revive agriculture in the remote rural parts of Winterveld (Mashala, 2011; Xaba, 2010; Hlahla, 2009). For instance, community interviews indicate that, in addition to regular training and workshops, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development has, amongst other measures, supplied emerging farmers in Winterveld with 10-morgens with resources ranging from poultry houses to pack houses, citrus trees, and tunnels (Landlord One, 2014; Principal Six, 2014; Business person, 2014). The following remarks were made by a prominent business person regarding government support: ‘Lately, the national government has through the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development donated R4 million [in] machinery for our pack houses’ (Business person, 2014). Thus, owing to the government’s support, the Winterveld Citrus Project has subsequently grown from strength to strength – with annual tonnage increasing from 3 tons in 2005 to 1 000 tons in 2009 (Business person, 2014; Hlahla, 2009; Masemola, 2010b). Yet, market accessibility still remains a challenge faced by most of the emerging farmers, with the majority of them still selling their produce directly to the local community members and local businessmen; especially spaza shops and the few operational supermarkets in Winterveld. Another challenge that was raised during the community interviews with business persons was the need for emerging farmers to create local beneficiation or manufacturing opportunities. Confirming the absence of manufacturing, a problem which in the long run could pose a significant obstacle to the growth of the local agricultural sector, one business person remarked: ‘Production is still a big challenge for farmers in Winterveld … we earn money on Friday and by Monday we take the same money back where it comes from because our people are not producing food locally … we should stop being known for selling hands [rather than for selling] the products we produce and we could only do that provided we go into manufacturing’ (Business Person, 2014). In terms of value judgements of the government’s investment in the area, the community interviews revealed that several farmers, in their personal capacity, have raised bank loans to further finance and supplement the government’s initiatives. The following remark was made by one business person running a poultry farm: ‘The government donated only 1 000 chickens, while I raised a bank loan to buy the two poultry houses and install the bore hole you see here’ (Business Person Two, 2014). To a large degree, the community interviews and physical visits to several agricultural projects revealed that projects that were funded jointly by government (subsidies) and individual farmers (bank loans and personal savings) were more successful than those that depended entirely on the state subsidy (Business Person, 2014). Another provincial department which seems to have consistently supported community social programmes and projects in Winterveld is the Department of Social Development. Evidence from the media and community interviews suggests continued support to NGOs across various sectors. For instance, several NGOs seem to have received grants and to have benefited from various skills and development programmes such as the Employee Volunteering Programme, organised in partnership with a local organisation called The Momentum Volunteers Programme (Molema, 2008; Anon., 2013). In reflecting on the reliable support from the Social Development department, one official responsible for an NGO mentioned: ‘Despite a disappointing lack of support both by City of Tshwane Health Services and the provincial Department of
Health, our OVC programme is one of the largest and most successful in Winterveld following 110% support by the provincial Department of Social Development (Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), 2014). To a large degree, the successful implementation of the various national and provincial initiatives in the Winterveld area should be understood within the context of successful intergovernmental relations across the three spheres of national, provincial, and local governments. The commitment by the City of Tshwane to work in collaboration with the other two spheres of government is not just lip service, but has been incorporated as an integral part of the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) document. According to the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality IDP (2011), one of the key performance areas for the City of Tshwane is that of sound intergovernmental relations. Furthermore, the IDP also highlights the emphasis placed by the City of Tshwane on the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the provincial government; one practical example being an MOU that was signed regarding the provision of Primary Health Care and Emergency Medical Services (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2011).

3.3 From the local municipality

The commitment of the City of Tshwane to improve the inherent poor level of infrastructure and basic services in Winterveld and other former Bophuthatswana areas such as Mabopane, Ga-Rankuwa, and Temba became evident shortly after the incorporation of these areas into the then Tshwane Local Municipality in 2001. For Winterveld in particular, this commitment was evident when the Tshwane Local Municipality commissioned a research study to assess the state of overall infrastructural development in the area. The research report by Maluleke Luthuli Consultants in the early 2000s revealed, inter alia, that an estimated amount of R1.3 billion would be required by the Tshwane Local Municipality if Winterveld was to be brought up to the standard of other surrounding urban areas in and around Pretoria (Hlahla, 2004). Thus, it was probably within the context of this key study finding that the then Tshwane Local Municipality played a leading role in the funding and implementation of the Winterveld Reconstruction and Development Project that was launched in 2002 (Hlahla, 2004; Peete, 2006). Over the years, the municipality seems to have made a particularly great impact on the lives of residents in Winterveld through the provision of electricity. The significant improvement in the provision of electricity from 33.4% in 2001 to 81.1% in 2011 can be attributed to the municipal refurbishment projects which saw an investment of R43 million in the 2011/12 financial year to rebuild the Nonyane sub-station in the vicinity of Winterveld (Hlahla, 2012). To a large degree, the improved provision of electricity can also be ascribed to a successful partnership between the City of Tshwane and Eskom; a collaboration that is endorsed throughout the 2011 - 2016 IDP document (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2011). According to the IDP (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipal Municipality, 2011), one of the major projects planned for the 2010/11 financial year was the roll-out of 2 734 solar water heaters to Winterveld, in partnership with Eskom. Another noteworthy aspect of the commitment by the City of Tshwane in particular to elevate Winterveld to the standard of other surrounding urban areas in and around Pretoria is the basic principle of ensuring adequate services, along with the intent to provide for the area at the same level as others forming the metropolitan municipality. Thus, in contrast to some of the former R293 towns which are still being referred to (in policy and planning documents) as dormitory towns, both the IDP (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2011) and interviewees have consistently referred broadly to Winterveld as ‘Region One’ of the seven regions in the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. Yet, from an agricultural perspective, evidence from community interviews suggests that despite the adoption of the ‘Tshwane Agricultural Strategy’ (see also Hlahla, 2007), the city has never shown much commitment to the revival and funding of agricultural projects in the Winterveld area. This, despite the fact that in the municipality’s Mid-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), rural development, food security and land reform were prioritised (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2011). Pointing to a lack of consistence and thus also of continuity in municipal
support from one administration to another, a prominent businessman mentioned: ‘In 2003 the former mayor, Rev. Mkhatswa, did not only express interest but demonstrated municipal support by donating 7 000 citrus trees to our citrus project with emerging farmers, so to some extent, the current municipality is yet to demonstrate their expressed support beyond just words but through some practical means’ (Business person, 2014).

3.4 Synthesis

In the next section of the report, policy imperatives and their implications will be discussed in detail. However, a noteworthy aspect of the community interviews is a widely expressed view that while more still needs to be done, the current state of infrastructural development in Winterveld demonstrates undisputable commitment by various government spheres to ensure that Winterveld becomes a different place from what it was before 1994 and before its incorporation into the City of Tshwane in 2001. This view came to light on the basis of two specific questions that were deliberately posed to all interviewees — firstly: ‘When it comes to municipal services, some of [the] residents in Winterveld are of the view that they are living in a “forgotten” area. What is your view on this?’ and secondly: ‘Do you think Winterveld as part of the City of Tshwane is being treated [in] the same [way] as others like Soshanguve, Mabopane, Mamelodi and Atteridgeville when planning and budgeting is done by the municipality?’ Interestingly, almost all of the 29 interviewees disputed the notion that Winterveld was a ‘forgotten’ area owing to, inter alia, unfair distribution of resources between the townships by the City of Tshwane. One respondent mentioned: ‘Maybe it is a biased judgment because I am always in that community [rather] than in other areas … but with me seeing a rapid growth in the number of paved streets, electrified houses, new community centres and a whole lot of other infrastructural development which was never there before, I would always be of the view that Winterveld is getting its fair share if not more than other areas’ (Education Officer, 2014); while another community member said: ‘I think the City of Tshwane is treating us the same because we are now getting services such as street lights that in the past one could only find in Soshanguve … yes, I think they are in the process of addressing the previous imbalances’ (Landlord One, 2014). The implementation and positive impact of the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project and Winterveld Reconstruction and Development Project, in particular, have demonstrated the strength and potential of projects run through intergovernmental and joint initiatives. The improvement in the school infrastructure and in education, the improved provision of water, electricity and housing, and the funding of small-scale agricultural projects comprise some practical examples that demonstrate the extent to which intergovernmental and joint initiatives are successful. Furthermore, despite widespread criticism by local bus operators, it is appropriate to note that the national government continues to provide financial support through its revised post-1994 bus subsidy funding model called DORA, while the provincial government, through the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, continues to invest in agricultural projects meant to revive agriculture in Winterveld – an area which, from its inception, was never designed nor expected to one day assume urban status along with residential properties, but rather to remain an agricultural village for small-scale farming by Africans (Business person, 2014). Thus, it could justifiably be argued that the implementation of projects through intergovernmental and joint initiatives in Winterveld did not come as a surprise or coincidence, but rather as the result of a successful implementation of councils’ resolutions as expressed and documented in the IDP (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2011). According to the IDP (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2011), one of the key performance areas for the City of Tshwane is sound intergovernmental relations. As mentioned earlier on, the City of Tshwane attaches great importance to the signing of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with the provincial government, such as the MOU on the provision of Primary Health Care and Emergency Medical Services referred to above (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2011). However,
despite the success, one of the key shortcomings of both the IDP document and the current intergovernmental relations and joint initiatives across the three spheres of government is the lack of alignment of these projects to any integrated planning and intergovernmental coordination between these three spheres of government. For instance, the South African Cities Network (2011) states that unless new housing developments are integrated more effectively in relation to public transport, municipal housing development plans (MHDPs) are unlikely to contribute substantially to the establishment of more efficient cities and to spatial transformation. Thus, for some initiatives such as agricultural projects in Winterveld, the lack of integrated planning and intergovernmental coordination, particularly between the City of Tshwane and the national Department of Transport, still remains a challenge, with most residents complaining (as revealed during community interviews) about the lack of public transport. Other than that, the status quo in terms of the subsidised bus system in Winterveld and the initiative of the provincial Department of Basic Education to provide school transport (buses and bicycles) to learners residing in 10-morgen areas and those obliged to walk more than 5 km, reflects another strength of the current intergovernmental relations. In a nutshell, while more is needed in terms of government-funded projects to further improve the living conditions of the community in Winterveld, it is probably reasonable to conclude that, in contrast to most government initiatives, the investment by various government departments and spheres in Winterveld seems to have provided the basis and means for the community members to further invest their personal resources in order to sustain these government initiatives. For instance, across various projects (agricultural and education sector projects), housing project community members seem to have assumed the individual responsibility of personally financing certain aspects of these initiatives. For example, about nine buses and several taxis are being organised by parents through the respective schools that their children are attending, while evidence suggests that a number of emerging farmers have raised personal bank loans to supplement government funding.

4. POPULATION ATTRIBUTES AND TRENDS

Having focused on the historical, conceptual and policy aspects, the report now turns to a discussion of some of the main population trends associated with the Winterveld area.

4.1 Changing population movements and commuting trends

Over time, the demographic profile of Winterveld, particularly in terms of its population size and growth, seems to have followed several developments. Many of the consequences of the population trends have already been mentioned. Reference has been made to census data available for Winterveld prior to the independence of Bophuthatswana in 1977 because it had always been incorporated into the peri-urban areas of the Pretoria Metropolitan Area (Horn, 1997). The bulk of the population influx into Winterveld took place between 1960 and 1980 (Vermaak, 1987, p. 13). The Bophuthatswana government conducted an official census of this ‘homeland’ area in the mid-1980s; but academics regarded these figures as incorrect, and therefore several estimates were made (Horn, 1997). Horn et al. (1992, p. 117) estimated that by the late 1980s, the population of Winterveld together with that of the Klippan farm, based on dwelling density and occupancy, was between 180 000 and 200 000. Unofficial sources even postulated that the population in Winterveld could exceed 400 000 (Anon., 1982). In 1989, approximately 70% of the population had lived in the Winterveld area for more than 10 years, and 33% for longer than 20 years (Horn, 1997). Most residents tend to remain in Winterveld for long periods because, according to Simone (2004, p. 77), they develop several relationships with landlords, neighbours, and traders in order to
reduce the cost of living and share resources. Horn (1997) estimated that the population of Winterveld was between 200 000 and 230 000 by the end of 1996.

Evidence from the literature, secondary data, and community interviews indicates that during 1996 – 2001, more than one-third of the Winterveld population left the area (see also Palmary & Ngubeni, 2003), while about 40% indicated their desire to relocate to townships in and around Pretoria, because these townships were perceived (amongst other factors) to be better serviced and closer to job opportunities. People in formal employment and a significant component of the long-term immigrant populations, particularly from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi, have started leaving the area (Rogerson, 1999, p. 526). Only a few areas are densely populated; rural plots tend to be subdivided, with several households built on them.

However, the post-2001 period, in particular, seems to have marked a further interesting turning point for the area, with significant growth in the population of Winterveld. Various factors are responsible for the above two scenarios. Figure 1 provides a more detailed overview of the population numbers in this respect.

Figure 1: Changing population trends in Winterveld, Soshanguve, Mamelodi, and Atteridgeville: 1980 – 2011

On the basis of Figure 1, it is possible to make the following comments:

- Despite a decline in population growth between 1996 and 2001, Winterveld has shown continuous and consistent population growth. An interesting factor regarding the decline in the population numbers from 122 551 in 1996 to 118 523 in 2001 is that this decline took place while population
growth in three other Pretoria township areas (Soshanguve, Mamelodi, and Atteridgeville) showed an increase, suggesting that the migration of Winterveld residents contributed to the population growth in these areas, particularly Soshanguve.

- According to the national census of 2011, the population of the Winterveld area was 137 436 compared to 122 551 persons in 1996; an increase by almost 15 000 persons during the previous 15 years. Furthermore, despite its historical lack of development, evidence from Figure 1 and (to some extent) community interviews suggests that after 1996 (particularly during the period between 2001 and 2011), Winterveld experienced a significant population increase, with its annual growth rate rising from -0.67% (1996 – 2001) to 1.49% (2001 – 2011). To a large extent, this population growth can be ascribed to the positive impact of the government’s investment in infrastructural development in the Winterveld area. Also interesting in respect of the population growth in Winterveld is the fact that this happened within the context of a slight decline in the annual population growth of other townships around the Tshwane area that were older and better-serviced, with the annual growth rate in Soshanguve dropping from 4.55% (1996 – 2001) to 2.07% (2001 – 2011); while Atteridgeville saw a decline from 3.22% (1996 – 2001) to 1.19% (2001 – 2011). While acknowledging infrastructural and service-delivery backlogs that still exist in Winterveld, almost all the informants interviewed across various sectors shared the view that Winterveld is not only growing fast, but is now a ‘liveable’ space, following – in particular – government investments which have led to improved infrastructural development and provision of basic services. Hence, in their opinion (whether rightly or wrongly), Winterveld is now able (particularly since 2007) to attract back more and more of its former residents, as well as new ones, not only from the Pretoria townships but also from other parts of Gauteng such as Tembisa, Alexandra, and Sandton. Confirming this, one community member said: ‘We worked and stayed in Alexandra for many years until my husband lost his job and because it was more expensive to continue living there than here in Winterveld, we then took a decision to come back to a house we inherited from our late parents … at least here life is still difficult but not like in Alexandra’ (Community Member One, 2014); while a school principal observed: ‘Meneer, let me tell you that people are coming back home … actually it is like somebody had asked them to embark on a come-back-home campaign. Watch the space, at the current pace, all the vacant big plots around 10-morgen here would be occupied’ (Principal Six, 2014). Community interviews largely suggest that the majority of people who ‘are coming back home’ fall mainly into three categories: firstly, the low-income former tenants who never abandoned their unserviced properties while seeking permanent ownership of alternative accommodation in the so-called developed townships of Soshanguve, Mamelodi, and Atteridgeville in the early 1990s. It was widely alleged during community interviews that encouraging the mass return of these former tenants is part of the latest initiative of the City of Tshwane to expropriate land and redistribute it to tenants. One community member confirmed this as follows: ‘Tenants who left because they could not own the land they were occupying are amongst the people who are now coming back to Winterveld because they are aware that those who stayed behind are now being assisted by the municipality to get full ownership of these plots … so land ownership is bringing them back’ (Principal Two, 2014). The second category of tenants who are returning is comprised of the middle-income group who are buying land to build luxurious second homes in what is widely perceived to be the only former Bophuthatswana area where people can still find fairly large sites for residential properties, and where the provision of basic services is much cheaper. Confirming this, one resident mentioned that ‘one of the reasons why people are coming back to Winterveld is that services and life in general are much cheaper than in areas such as Soshanguve’ (Landlord Two, 2014). The third category consists of a group of rightful plot owners and/or their heirs who (particularly since the
investment by the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in several agricultural projects) are now returning to establish full-time agricultural businesses on remote rural 10-morgen plots. Confirming these allegations, one community member said: ‘I am made to understand that through the support of the provincial Department of Agriculture several agricultural opportunities are now being created on most 10-morgen plots, and this is the one main reason why people are in particular coming back to this remote rural part of Winterveld’ (Principal Six, 2014).

Community interviews also confirmed that some of the people ‘coming back home’ hail not only from the Gauteng areas, but also from as far as the neighbouring Madibeng Local Municipality in the North West province. A community member who had left Winterveld for a nearby settlement in Madibeng Local Municipality said: ‘Most of us left Winterveld and are now living in Madibeng Municipality in the North West province because there was no development … there was no water, no electricity, but things have changed now; some people have since come back because things that made them leave Winterveld then are now available’ (Community Member Three, 2014).

It seems that there are two ways in which the notion of ‘people coming back home’ should be understood, as expressed by both current and former residents of Winterveld during community interviews. Firstly, as discussed above, there are the former residents and other occupants who are making a permanent return from various areas to Winterveld. Secondly, there are former residents and strangers who, despite currently residing permanently in Ga-Rankuwa, Mabopane, Soshanguve and parts of the Pretoria North suburbs, are now sending their children to schools in Winterveld, mostly through daily commuting, while a few children seem to have been accommodated by relatives and friends. Thus, the notion that ‘people are coming back home’ could, to some extent, be ascribed to changing trends in respect of daily commuting, particularly between Winterveld and Soshanguve. Contrary to previous years when, through daily commuting, the Winterveld school community was losing local learners to schools in areas such as Soshanguve, community interviews with the two bus companies, school principals, and senior education officials revealed that the period between 2007 and 2014 was marked by a rapid increase in the number of school children commuting daily to Winterveld schools from Ga-Rankuwa, Soshanguve, and certain parts of the Pretoria North suburbs. Confirming this latest sudden turn of events, one school principal remarked: ‘Seeing buses full of school children leaving Winterveld [for] Soshanguve and other areas is a thing of the past … Winterveld schools have risen, we now have buses and taxis [transporting] learners from that side to this side’ (Principal One, 2014). Another principal said: ‘The number of children commuting daily from Mabopane, Soshanguve, and Ga-Rankuwa to Winterveld clearly tells you the extent to which parents in those areas believe in the standard of education in Winterveld … in my school only, about 85% of learners come from outside Winterveld and together with parents, [most] of whom are middle-income class, have made a special private arrangement for nine buses with North Star bus company and five buses with PUTCO’ (Principal Six, 2014). Further corroborating these views, one bus company manager said: ‘Unlike before, the majority of our commuters today are school children, teachers, municipal employees, and those doing general work in Winterveld … they all reside permanently in Soshanguve and commute daily to Winterveld. Let me say about 80% of our commuters are residents of Soshanguve coming to Winterveld daily’ (Bus Company One, 2014). Furthermore, there is also evidence that suggests that improved education in Winterveld has also attracted a significant number of children from beyond the Gauteng borders, especially those within walking distance from the Marikana informal settlement in Madibeng Local Municipality, which, despite its proximity to Winterveld, remains part of the North West province. Confirming the preference for, and reliance on Winterveld’s schools by Madibeng residents, one principal said: ‘Early this year parents from Marikana went to the District Office and met with senior officials where
they made it clear that, despite being in the North West province, they wanted their children to be admitted, not to any other school but our school … they first made this clear when they invited me during the second anniversary of their settlement. They told me that the school with blue uniforms is their school and no one should deny their children admission on the basis of not being in Gauteng’ (Principal One, 2014). To a large extent, the preference for Winterveld schools on the part of residents of Madibeng Local Municipality could probably be an indication of the significance of the amalgamation of small municipalities with larger ones; in other words, the establishment of wall-to-wall municipalities.

- However, while the improvement in social services such as education seems to have contributed to the decline in the number of daily commuters leaving Winterveld, and thus also to the sudden emergence of the popular notion that ‘people are coming back home’ in Winterveld, the same cannot be said with regard to the overall decline in the number of daily commuters working in Soshanguve and Pretoria Central. Contrary to the widespread notions expressed so far – citing some possible reasons for the reduction of PUTCO’s bus fleet between Winterveld and Soshanguve from the original 15 buses to the current five buses after more than 25 years of operation and the closure of two bus depots affiliated to the North West Star Bus Company (of which Batswana Gare is also an affiliate) – the two senior bus managers cited, amongst other factors, the permanent relocation of former working commuters to Soshanguve and other surrounding areas around Pretoria.

- In a nutshell, despite the exodus of some Winterveld residents, particularly daily commuters working in various areas around Pretoria, two issues are noteworthy. Firstly, there are more people (whether with good or bad intentions) who are now coming to reside permanently in Winterveld than the number of people permanently relocating to elsewhere in the Tshwane Municipality. Secondly, three factors are responsible for the latest influx of people into Winterveld: the improved and competitive education sector in Winterveld; the improved infrastructure and level of basic services (water, electricity, sanitation) along with the redistribution of expropriated land to tenants by the City of Tshwane; and the increasing funding of agricultural projects by the City of Tshwane and the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.

4.2 Population distribution and composition

In this section, the focus shifts to an analysis of various key aspects related to the population attributes of Winterveld. In the late 1980s, the age structure of the residents in Winterveld revealed that almost 50% of the residents were under 20 years of age (Bophuthatswana, 1985), reflecting the general black South African population composition (Sadie, 1988). Palmary and Ngubeni (2003) similarly noted that in 2001, 42% of the residents of Winterveld were below the age of 20. This has implications for the educational levels in the area, as well as the economic well-being of the community, with a low component of the populace being economically active.

Table 1 provides an overview of the age distribution of Winterveld, Atteridgeville, and the Tshwane Metropolitan area for the periods of 1996, 2001 and 2011.
Table 1: Population distribution in Winterveld, Atteridgeville, and the Tshwane Metropolitan area: 1996, 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>0–14 (%)</th>
<th>15–34 (%)</th>
<th>35–59 (%)</th>
<th>60–64%</th>
<th>65+ (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (1996)</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (2001)</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (2011)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (1996)</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (2001)</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (2011)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane Metropolitan area (1996)</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane Metropolitan area (2001)</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane Metropolitan area (2011)</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In view of Table 1, a number of comments can be made:

- The percentage of the population below 15 years of age in Winterveld has shown a decline since 1996 (from 33.2% in 1996 to 29.1% in 2011). The irony of the above scenario is that this decline has taken place amid reports, as contained in the official learner statistics by the Department of Basic Education, of a significant growth in the number of school children in Winterveld between 2007 and 2014 (Gauteng Department of Basic Education, 2014). The discrepancy should probably be understood in the light of the fact that some Winterveld schools have registered more learners commuting not only from areas such as Soshanguve, Mabopane, and Ga-Rankuwa, but also from as far as the Marikana informal settlement in Madibeng Local Municipality, than the number of learners residing permanently in the area.

- In contrast to the decline amongst those below 15 years, the significant growth across all age categories of the economically active population groups is noteworthy: the population in the age group of 15-34 increased from 38.8% in 1996 to 41% in 2011; while the percentage of the population aged between 35 and 59 years increased from 21.3% in 1996 to 23.6% in 2011. The sudden increase in the above two age groups could be attributed to various factors, but most importantly, as revealed in the interviews with various informants, to the growing number of former residents of Winterveld who are, according to key informants, ‘coming back home’ from different areas in and around Gauteng and beyond.

Despite Winterveld’s historical role as a labour-sending area, the latest census data (2011) provide an interesting picture in terms of the changing profile of the area’s gender composition. A factor that could probably be indicative of the return of former migrant labourers (particularly the male component) to Winterveld, is the increase in the percentage of males from 49.7% in 1996 to 50.9% in 2011. This contrasts with the situation in one of the neighbouring black townships, namely Soshanguve, which remains largely reflective of its historical past as a labour-sending area, with a current male population of 49.3%.

4.3 Employment and unemployment

In the late 1980s, the residents of Winterveld predominantly sold their labour to the metropolitan area of Pretoria. These labourers were mostly unskilled (55%), while 25% were semi-skilled (e.g. carpet fitters, barmen, etc.) and 20% skilled (e.g. teachers, plumbers, electricians, etc.). Therefore, unemployment levels were high, with at least a third of the households falling below the subsistence level of R570 per
month (Horn et al., 1992, p. 118). According to Palmary and Ngubeni (2003), only 32% of the population of Winterveld were employed in the late 1990s, which means that the household income obtained supported a large number of people.

This section furthermore underlines the changes in employment and unemployment figures, as well as in the economically active population in Winterveld between 1996 and 2013. The employment situation in Tshwane improved significantly over the period 1996 – 2012. According to Ramokgopa (2014), Tshwane has one of the lowest unemployment rates in South Africa. The number of employed people has increased during the last decade by 52%; and Tshwane’s level of youth unemployment is some 17 percentage points lower than the national average, even though 65% of its population is under the age of 35. Figure 2 provides more specific details on employment in the Pretoria and Winterveld Magisterial Districts.

Figure 2: Changing patterns in respect of the economically active population, and the employed and unemployed population for Winterveld, as well as the black population in Pretoria: 1996, 2001, 2007, 2011, and 2013 (1996 figures taken as 100%)

Source: Global Insight (2014)

The following key points should be noted in respect of Figure 2 (also refer to Annexure B):

- The black economically active population in the Pretoria Managerial District increased from 1996 to 2001. This trend continued till 2007, and again until 2011. Ultimately, the increase in the number of economically active people between 1996 and 2013 amounted to 240%.
- In contrast, the corresponding increase for the economically active population in the Winterveld Magisterial District for the 17-year period was marginal.
• The percentage of the black population employed in the Pretoria and Winterveld Magisterial Districts diverged in 2011; the percentage of black employed people in Pretoria increased, while the percentage of those employed in Winterveld decreased.

• A similar pattern occurred with regard to the unemployment scenario, because the percentage of the black population increased significantly after 2007; whereas the corresponding figure dropped in the Winterveld Magisterial District.

It can therefore be concluded that, even though the black population in the Pretoria Magisterial District is increasing, the percentage of those who are unemployed is also rising (also see Annexure A). This means that very few of those who are migrating to the city to find employment are succeeding in doing so.

The Winterveld unemployment and poverty situation has changed minimally over the past two decades. There has been a considerable decline in the percentage of employed people – this relates directly to the difficulty experienced by people in finding work.

In 1989, half of the households in the area were earning an income of less than R500 per month. Furthermore, over 80% of the residents were unemployed. Those who were employed spent 30% of their income per month on transportation (averaging three hours of travel time per day) (Simone, 2004, p. 76).

Moreover, two-thirds of the population were not economically active; and of those who were economically active, 50% were involved in the informal sector as car repairers, shoe repairers, coffin builders, etc. (Simone, 2004, p. 77). The growth of the informal sector in Winterveld was very similar to that of other areas across South Africa at this stage. Those engaged in informal sector activities in Winterveld were people who had either been displaced in the formal industry, or who were accustomed to a rural way of life. By means of informal economic activities, persons with a rural background are at least able to raise money for basic needs. According to Otto (2013), the area in Pretoria with the most black residents who are not earning an income is Winterveld. People seem to be moving back to Winterveld owing to the improvement in infrastructure and services. Properties are still relatively inexpensive; and the area still has a rural ambience with a more relaxed atmosphere.

Approximately one-quarter of the formal-sector workers were employed in the manufacturing sector; two-thirds of the women were domestic workers; and one-fifth of the workers were employed in the construction sector in Pretoria. According to Simone (2004, p. 77), most of the durable goods were purchased in the large shopping centres in Pretoria or Mabopane. Spaza shops and other informal trading enterprises were becoming important components of the trade industry in the area. Informal economic activities also included “in-kind” services in exchange for access to consumer goods.

Table 2 provides an overview of the proportional contribution of employment per sector to the Pretoria and Winterveld economy in 1996 and 2013.
Table 2: The percentage of people employed per economic sector for the Pretoria and Winterveld Magisterial Districts: 1996 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>30.50</td>
<td>18.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>13.05</td>
<td>15.57</td>
<td>20.78</td>
<td>19.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>30.61</td>
<td>24.46</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>11.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community services</td>
<td>23.01</td>
<td>25.85</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>31.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector</td>
<td>41 284</td>
<td>121 889</td>
<td>4 152</td>
<td>1 850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 2, it is obvious that employment within the manufacturing sector of Winterveld decreased from 30.5% in 1996 to 18.30% in 2013. The establishment of Ga-Rankuwa was coupled with the establishment of ‘border industrial areas’ such as Rosslyn and Babelegi. Together, Rosslyn/Babelegi and Ga-Rankuwa/Winterveld constituted a black labour-cum-industrial complex that exemplified the thinking of the then government on ‘separate development’ (Berstein & McCarthy, 1998). In contrast, the contribution to community service increased from 19.2% in 1996 to 31.2% in 2013. This is probably owing to the high dependency on government services (social services) and the improved infrastructural investment in education in the area. Although the employment contribution of the trade sector increased in the Pretoria Magisterial District, the corresponding contribution in the Winterveld area dropped slightly. The drastic decrease in the population employed in the informal sector in Winterveld can also clearly be seen. This undoubtedly indicates a greater need for welfare services amongst the population in the Winterveld Magisterial District, resulting in more employment opportunities in this sector as well.

The employment contribution of the financial and households sectors increased slightly (from 9.68% in 1996 to 11.87% in 2013, and from 3.89% in 1996 to 5.16% in 2013, respectively). This is probably due to the increase in property ownership, as well as the increase of freedom and convenience that has enabled people to travel to the city for ‘piece jobs’. Additionally, some services are possibly also provided from home enterprises and spaza shops, rather than through formal business links to other areas such as Mabopane, Soshanguve, and even Greater Pretoria.

Plans were put in place in 2010 to build a youth enterprise automotive hub in Winterveld so that youths would be able to establish automotive clusters for car-body and spray repairs, as well as wheel and tyre repairs or replacements and sound fitment. Other planned enterprises included Internet cafes, hair salons, laundries and furniture shops (Indaba, 2012; Magome, 2012). The hub has the capacity to accommodate 50 trainees every day (Masilela, 2014). The Winterveld United Farmers Association (WUFA) has established an agricultural secondary school on the site of three abandoned school plots, thereby assisting the youth in the development of farming skills to further augment the already successful Winterveld Citrus Project (Mashala, 2011; Xaba, 2010; Hlahla, 2009). It would be interesting to see whether this intervention will increase the employment opportunities in the trade, transport, and agricultural sectors.
4.4 Development indicators

In this section, the focus falls on a number of development indicators. Clearly, at the turn of the century, Winterveld was an area in economic decline, with a community dealing with high levels of poverty (Rogerson, 1999). Figure 3 provides an overview of the main trends in the growth of the number of people living in poverty between 1996 and 2013 in the magisterial districts of Pretoria, Soshanguve, and Winterveld.


Figure 3 confirms that there has been a drastic increase in the number of people living in poverty since 2001 in the Pretoria Magisterial District. If the 1996 figure is taken as a starting point, the total number of people living in poverty increased by 350% between 1996 and 2013. In comparison, the number of people living in poverty in Soshanguve increased by almost 60%, and those in Winterveld, by 80%. These figures should also be viewed in the context of a percentage ratio. In 2013, 43% of Winterveld residents were living in poverty. The comparative figure for Soshanguve was approximately 40%. It would also appear that the impacts of the global financial crisis had been more severe in Pretoria than in Winterveld, and that there was a substantial growth in the percentage of people living in poverty in Pretoria. This is corroborated by the fact that the number of people living in poverty in Pretoria skyrocketed after 2001, whereas the percentage remained fairly stable in Winterveld. This can probably be attributed to the fact that many people migrate to the city from rural areas in search of employment, without success. The average annual household income of the black population in the Pretoria Magisterial District was R139 226 in 2013, compared to only R96 225 for the people living in Winterveld.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure to rank the social and economic development of an entity according to life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and...
The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The results in terms of the Gini coefficient are very similar for the entire population of Pretoria (0.59), the African population (0.58) and Winterveld (0.53) in 2013.

5. Social Infrastructure and Influence of Landlordism on General Development

5.1 Changing patterns in respect of education

According to the literature and media sources, there seems to be a common perception that prior to 1994, schools in the area were generally below standard. However, the current situation reflects a different picture. An item of social infrastructure that is a source of great pride to the community of Winterveld is their school infrastructure – this, despite a high rate of illiteracy amongst adults (Palmary & Ngubeni, 2003). To some extent, this illiteracy is indicative of the failure of two previous education systems: first, the Bophuthatswana education system which, despite being imposed on the non-Tswana residents of Winterveld, was rejected by these residents for being inconsiderate and insensitive towards their values and needs (Anon., 1979; Anon., 1979; de Clerq, 1994); and secondly, community private schools which, despite being rejected and thus not subsidised by either the Bophuthatswana government or the apartheid government of South Africa, could also not succeed, owing to, *inter alia*, the appointment of unqualified voluntary educators and a lack of proper facilities, with trees and shacks being used as classrooms (Principal Two, 2014; Motou, 1979). Thus, in contrast to what some long-serving current school principals referred to as ‘the past difficult times in the history of education in Winterveld schools when most Winterveld children were schooling in Mabopane and Soshanguve’ (Principal One, 2014; Principal Two, 2014; Principal Five, 2014), the latest official statistics (Gauteng Department of Basic Education, 2014) indicate that the total number of school-going children in Winterveld has significantly increased from 16 081 in 2007 to 28 184 in 2014. This has occurred despite the closure of some schools in remote rural parts of Winterveld, especially in areas known as “10-morgens”. Further confirmation of a significant increase in respect of school-going children was provided during the community interviews, in which schools in Winterveld were widely advocated as alternatives to schools in other areas – not only in Ga-Rankuwa, Soshanguve, Mabopane, and certain parts of former white suburbs of Pretoria North, but also in the Madibeng Local Municipality in the North West province. Interviews with a senior district education official and several school principals indicate that ‘schools in Winterveld are no longer losing learners to schools in areas such as Soshanguve, Mabopane, and former Model C schools in former white suburbs … instead, there are some good performing schools in Winterveld which through their performance have led to a closure of some schools in Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa … parents of those children had decided to bring them to Winterveld’ (Education Officer, 2014). In respect of the influx of Madibeng children to Winterveld schools, one principal said: ‘We have a few children from Mabopane and Soshanguve at our school but a lot of our learners come from Madibeng Local Municipality in a newly established area called Marikana’ (Principal Two, 2014). Amongst the factors cited (in the media and during community interviews) as being responsible for the sudden improvement in the education
standard, and thus for the growing number of school-going children in Winterveld schools, is the impact made by the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project (see also Hlahla, 2012). This project made great strides in the provision of sanitation, extra classrooms, and administration blocks to all schools that did not previously have these facilities (Education Officer, 2014). Other factors cited include the feeding schemes currently operational in almost all local schools, the declaration of almost all schools as non-fee-paying schools, the donations of bicycles by the provincial Department of Basic Education to all learners travelling more than 5 km, and a joint initiative for the provision of school transport (buses and taxis) by the provincial Department of Basic Education and the parents themselves (Principal One, 2014; Principal Three, 2014; Principal Four, 2014; Principal Five, 2014; Principal Six, 2014; Education Officer, 2014).

5.2 Health care

In contrast to the positive remarks and observations made about schools and the standard of education in Winterveld during the community interviews, there is a widespread sense of disappointment with the standard of health infrastructure, particularly with regard to Public Primary Health Clinics. On the basis of evidence from community interviews, it seems that (except in the case of remote rural 10-morgen areas) the challenge faced by the health sector is not a shortage of clinics but a shortage of nurses, doctors, and medication. Expressing concern about poor service in local clinics, one community member said: ‘I am one person who always travels to the area called Block BB in Soshanguve for clinic visits … unlike here in Winterveld where, despite being in the queue as early as 4 am, you would come back at 4 pm without having been helped because there is always an excuse of staff shortage’ (Landlord Two, 2014). Further complicating matters within the health sector are allegations of undue interference by ward councillors in the affairs of NGOs, including those operating within the health sector, and a widespread lack of support of NGOs both by Health Services in the City of Tshwane and the Gauteng provincial Department of Health. Regarding the challenges faced by NGOs operating within the health sector, the following comments were made during a community interview: ‘While we were still under North West, our laboratory services and supply of medication were not only financially supported but also morally supported by the North West Health Department, with our staff also receiving their monthly stipend … all that has without any proper explanation disappeared into thin air; it’s like we never had a fully functioning health NGO (Non-Governmental Organisation) (NGO Two, 2014). The widespread lack of support by the Health Department in Gauteng is also held responsible for the collapse of once successful and effective NGOs such as Hope for Life (Mkize, 2013). In a nutshell, it seems that while some schools in Winterveld are now perceived as alternatives to those in areas such as Soshanguve, Mabopane, and Ga-Rankuwa, the same cannot be said about the primary health sector. Local clinics in Soshanguve, in particular, are still regarded by most residents as alternatives to those in Winterveld.

5.3 Tension between landlords, tenants, and the City of Tshwane

One other issue that featured in various newspaper articles (Motou, 1979; Anon., 1979), the literature (Makwela, 2003), and almost every interview, is the long-standing history of increasing tension between plot owners and their tenants and the government – recently, the City of Tshwane. A significant aspect of the current tension is its twofold implication for social life and infrastructural development in affected areas such as Ward 24 in Winterveld. Evidence from the media (Anon., 1979) and community interviews suggests that the growing tension between these stakeholders – particularly plot owners and the government – has a long-standing history of causing unnecessary delays in the provision of public housing and basic services such as water, electricity, and sanitation (Makwela, 2003). Another implication could be inferred from the allegations of growing tension, which has recently culminated in criminal acts,
with plot owners either being physically assaulted – allegedly by disgruntled tenants (with one person reportedly having been killed so far) – or their properties destroyed. Also related to this are allegations of widespread conflicts between residents who have recently been allocated RDP houses by the City of Tshwane, and those who have been tenants on the plots where these houses are located and who are currently residing in old collapsing and decaying housing – with these homeless tenants alleging that acts of bribery and corruption are perpetrated during allocations. Thus – more than 35 years after the former president of Bophuthatswana, Mr Lucas Mangope, predicted possible tension between plot owners and the government (and possibly their tenants) unless both the government and plot owners work closely together to curb the ever-growing influx of new tenants and address the lack of vital and basic services such as water, sanitation, and electricity (Anon., 1979) – these tensions (as revealed by the community interviews) have now gained momentum and have become a grim reality faced by the community and the City of Tshwane. Before the impact of the tension regarding the provision of basic services is explored, the causes of this tension will firstly be considered.

The causes of the current tension should perhaps be understood within a particular historical context. Firstly, it would probably be feasible to argue that the tension amongst various stakeholders (plot owners, tenants, City of Tshwane) is one of the unintended consequences of massive government investments in infrastructural development and land reform programmes conducted by the City of Tshwane, particularly in 5-morgen areas in Winterveld. Through urban renewal and reconstruction and development initiatives, the government seems to have not only presented Winterveld residents with life-changing opportunities such as security of tenure and housing ownership, but also with opportunities that have triggered competition, and therefore also conflict, relating to resources and amenities such as the allocation and occupation of RDP housing (see also the comments and remarks below). Secondly, evidence from the literature (Reitzes & Bam, 2000, p. 81) and community interviews suggests that the current tension can probably be attributed to an inherent historical failure by the apartheid state to honour its undertaking to finance the further resettlement of the then non-property-owners regarded by that government as transients living temporarily in Winterveld. While acknowledging the need for a collective effort to curb the growing slum conditions, particularly in Ward 24, several interviewees blamed the City of Tshwane for the current tensions, and claimed that it had resorted to apartheid-like tactics and unethical tendencies such as unilaterally imposing their non-negotiable land prices on plot owners, while threatening them with land expropriation if they were not willing to cooperate and accept these offers. One plot owner mentioned: ‘Our rights as plot owners in Winterveld are being seriously violated by the government … they would just come here and tell some of us that they are going to build RDP houses and have decided to compensate us with an RDP house for the land that they would require for such housing development. If they decide to offer you money, it would be something far less than the value of your land’ (Landlord Five, 2014). Similarly, a prominent business person described the unfair treatment of plot owners by the City of Tshwane as follows: ‘The City of Tshwane has taken over the land on the basis and terms that were determined by government rather than the plot owners … personally I feel that there should have been greater room created for negotiations between plot owners and government than the current imposition of government decisions. The land was in fact literally grabbed because the prices the government was giving people did not satisfy many plot owners’ (Business person, 2014). Thus, in several cases, the refusal by plot owners to accept the so-called ‘imposed cheap prices’ of the City of Tshwane has led, in practice, to land expropriation without compensation. Corroborating allegations made during community interviews, evidence in media reports exposed forceful land-grabbing by the City of Tshwane (Bateman, 2007; Ndaba & Monama, 2013a). About 131 plots in Winterveld were expropriated between 2004 and 2005 (Mahamba, 2007).
Vermaak (1987) noted that 90% of all households in Winterveld were tenants renting from landlords. This included only the site; the tenants had to construct their own houses. Most of the population were living in shacks (Pillay, 1984, p. 10). The houses were mainly mud blocks with no foundations or ceilings. Roofs, doors, and windows were built from second-hand corrugated iron or wood. In terms of the impact of the current tension on community relations and on the provision of basic services and infrastructural development, and particularly the provision of RDP housing to current homeless tenants in Winterveld, the following issues were raised during community interviews:

- Plot owners and some members of the community alleged that the City of Tshwane had directly and indirectly incited tenants to boycott the payment of their monthly rent. One plot owner remarked: ‘These people (tenants) never had a problem with the initial agreement they had with their landlord to honour their monthly rent … the problem of non-payment of monthly rent started in 1996 but got worse when the City of Tshwane told them not to pay any more’ (Landlord Four, 2014); while a resident who had no documentation to prove the transfer of land that she claims to be hers, observed: ‘It’s true that most people are no longer paying rent to plot owners … people would always hear stories from other areas that they have stopped paying rent and then wondered as to why should they pay if others are being allowed to stay free of charge’ (Community Member Five, 2014). Further evidence of the growing incidence of non-payment of monthly rent by tenants is the increase in the percentage of dwellings occupied rent-free from 15.3% in 2001 to 20.9% in 2011 – especially in Ward 24, which saw an increase from 22.9% in 2001 to 25.8% in 2011.

- Allegations of increased land invasions, especially by former tenants coming from as far as the Tembisa and Alexandra townships wishing to benefit from the City of Tshwane’s programme of land expropriation and redistribution to tenants. In 2007, between 100 and 1 606 of the plots in Winterveld were earmarked for expropriation by the City of Tshwane. This was done ‘for the benefit of many of the people in Winterveld’ and not the individual property owners (Mahamba, 2007).

- Allegations of growing violent tension between plot owners and tenants, caused mainly by the tendency of the City of Tshwane to deliberately by-pass the rightful plot owners in order to negotiate land expropriation and redistribution, as well as the implementation of municipal settlement programmes, directly with tenants. The following observation is typical of the remarks made by interviewees in this respect: ‘Be it provision of water, electricity or RDP housing, the City of Tshwane and the councillor speaks directly to the tenants and we, the plot owners, it’s like we no longer exist … this is painful’ (Landlord Six, 2014).

- Allegations of a lack of consensus, which has also increased the resistance of plot owners against land expropriation and redistribution to the tenants. This seems, in one way or another, to have delayed not only the provision of basic services, but also the initiation of new RDP housing projects and the allocation of several RDP houses that were completed as early as 2011/2012. Personal visits made by the researchers to these project sites, as well as evidence gleaned from community interviews, confirmed the widespread vandalisation of these houses, with some being in a state of total collapse. Confirming this, one plot owner whose plot was expropriated for RDP housing development in 2011/2012 had the following to say: ‘More than 20 RDP houses are still standing empty with most of them being vandalised by Nyaope addicts since they were completed somewhere in 2011 or 2012 on expropriated land … and the reason why these houses were built on my plot, [like] those built [on] many other plots such as one for Mr X and Mr B, is that there was never an agreement between us plot owners and the City of Tshwane to build these houses on our plots, they did that without our consent’ (Landlord Three, 2014). In another related incident involving several completed RDP houses that are still standing empty and are being vandalised despite having been completed in 2011/2012, nearby homeless residents attributed the situation to
the corruption and bribery of some municipal officials. To a large extent, interviews with these homeless residents, some of whom literally reside next to these vandalised unoccupied RDP units, revealed that the reason why some of the RDP houses still remain unoccupied lies in the violent clashes between the homeless residents and those who were allegedly identified fraudulently as the rightful owners (after paying bribes) by certain corrupt municipal officials. One resident confirmed: ‘The reason why most of us are still living in these houses that could at any time collapse despite some RDP houses being without occupants since 2011/2012 is that we are all unemployed and are not able to afford the minimum bribery amount that these officials would request us to put inside our IDs if we want to be given RDP houses’ (Community Member Six, 2014). Another resident said: ‘The people that you see in some of these RDP houses are … from Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, and even outside South Africa … unlike us, they were able to pay exorbitant amounts of bribery [money] to municipal officials. I have been living here since I was born in 1968, so we know each other well and we know who has been with us all along … so the reason why some of us tried to forcefully occupy these houses is because we were tired of seeing strangers taking over our area and housing through bribery’ (Community Member Five, 2014).

Yet, contrary to allegations of growing tension between plot owners, tenants, and the City of Tshwane regarding 5-morgen plots, plot owners and tenants residing on 10-morgen plots did not make such allegations. Instead, interviews with both plot owners and tenants in this more rural part of Winterveld revealed a mutually beneficial relationship (to some extent) between the two groups, with tenants still honouring their contractual obligations of monthly rent payments ranging between R10 and R20. This was confirmed by a plot owner who said: ‘One reason why we still see people who left before now coming back is that our services and monthly rent [are] still the cheapest around here … currently my eight tenants use their child grants or state pension to pay their monthly rent of between R10 and R20’ (Landlord Two, 2014); while a community member who is currently a tenant said: ‘Here we have a different arrangement for our monthly rent … we pay a once-off annual rent of R120 to our landlord who currently resides in Soshanguve and we know that for the year we are sorted’ (Community Member One, 2014). Furthermore, in contrast to the situation regarding 5-morgen plots, no incidents of illegal land invasion or land expropriation by the City of Tshwane were alleged in the case of 10-morgen plots; instead, both the City of Tshwane and the Department of Rural Development were commended for their consultative efforts to invest in infrastructure development and agricultural projects. This was confirmed by an interviewee as follows: ‘The reason why our 10-morgen plots are not being expropriated by the City of Tshwane is that when we heard that they were planning to expropriate the land in Winterveld, we then formed the Winterveld United Farmers Association (which I currently serve in as deputy chairman) to engage them about possible revival and government support for agricultural projects … following that engagement, the City of Tshwane started to support us by supplying us with seeds and other resources’ (Landlord One, 2014).

In a nutshell, a twofold conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the discussion above:

- Firstly, except in the case of the 10-morgen area, the community interviews and media (to some extent) confirm a growing threefold tension largely related to issues of land tenure in the more urbanised parts of Winterveld – One: the tension between plot owners and their tenants due to widespread rent boycott by tenants who are supporting the City of Tshwane’s land redistribution programme. Two: tension between plot owners and the City of Tshwane owing to allegations of illegal land expropriation, which in turn seems to have encouraged diverse claims of rightful land ownership, leading to illegal land invasion by current and returning former tenants whom plot owners regard as opportunists and illegal land-grabbers abetted by the City of Tshwane. Three: the
tension amongst homeless tenants and residents following allegations of bribery and fraud during the allocation of RDP housing.

- Secondly, there is enough evidence to suggest that a differentiated approach is currently being followed by the City of Tshwane in respect of land redistribution issues on predominantly urban residential plots around 5-morgens, on the one hand, and the predominantly rural 10-morgen areas in Winterveld, on the other. Given some of the comments, such as: *plot owners failed to convince the High Court to rule in their favour* (Business person, 2014), and: *we cannot afford the high legal costs we require to successfully challenge the City of Tshwane* (Landlord Six, 2014), it would be feasible to conclude that the City of Tshwane seems to have taken advantage of the decision by the High Court, which (as alleged during community interviews) ruled in its favour, thereby undermining the value of further processes to engage the affected plot owners (particularly those in 5-morgen areas) in terms of reaching consensus on appropriate and fair market-related land prices. Instead, the City of Tshwane has allegedly resorted to forced land expropriation and redistribution as a quick solution: a practice which, to some extent, seems not to have achieved the desired outcomes, as a result of, *inter alia*, widespread resistance by the affected plot owners and those likely to be affected in the future.

6. **HOUSING AND SERVICES**

This section considers two main issues: firstly, the changing housing landscape in Winterveld; and secondly, the level of access to services in Winterveld.

6.1 **Changes in the housing landscape**

This section analyses different housing typologies, as well as changes that occurred over time in the housing landscape and in the services available at household level in the Winterveld area.

Vermaak (1987, p. 15) pointed out that in the late 1980s, the majority of the people residing in Winterveld were there of their own free will because land and home ownership was not as important as employment. Notwithstanding the progress made in terms of the provision of state-funded RDP housing in the Winterveld area, media reports, in particular, indicate that there are still a significant number of inhabitants currently residing in dilapidated, decaying, and crumbling housing (Ndaba & Monama, 2013a; Hlahla, 2010). Therefore, if we can be guided by a speech made in 2013 by the Gauteng MEC for the Department of Local Government and Housing, Ms Ntombi Mekgwe, during a visit to residents of Winterveld, the various state-funded projects had to date delivered just over 12 500 RDP houses, out of the initial total target of 34 000 units in Winterveld (Monama, 2013). Figure 4 provides information on the changing nature of the housing stock in Winterveld.
On the basis of Figure 4, it is possible to make the following comments:

- Clearly discernible in Figure 4 is the decline in the percentage of formal housing units between 2001 and 2011, after a steady growth between 1996 and 2001. Despite an increase in the percentage of formal housing units from 87.9% in 1996 to 90.6% in 2001, Winterveld experienced a decline in the percentage of such housing units from 90.6% in 2001 to 84.8% in 2011. To a large extent, the decline can probably be ascribed to the rapid increase in the number of households from 28,394 in 2001 to 38,508 in 2011 (representing an annual growth rate of 3.09%, as against 1.68% between 1996 and 2001) – a growth rate which probably overtook the rate and pace at which formal housing could be provided, particularly by the government. Furthermore, this increase should also be understood within the context of what the community interviews revealed to be a very popular notion: ‘People are coming back home … Like someone who was born and bred in Winterveld, I can tell you that the Winterveld you see today is totally different from the one we lived in 20 years ago … despite challenges in some areas, generally there is huge improvement with people now having water and electricity’ (Principal One, 2014). Another explanation for the decline in the percentage of formal housing units in the post-2001 era, as discussed in the previous section, might be found in the conflict between plot owners and the City of Tshwane in respect of several unresolved issues related to RDP-housing projects undertaken on the expropriated land, as well as the conflict between homeless residents and those who are alleged to have obtained and occupied their RDP houses through bribery and corruption.

### 6.2 Access to services

Following the housing assessment in the previous section, the emphasis now shifts to an assessment of service levels and how they have changed over the past two decades (see Table 3).
In the late 1980s, one of the disturbing problems in Winterveld was the lack of water and waterborne sewerage systems. According to Horn et al. (1992, p. 118), most of the water was sourced from boreholes and wells. This led to an outbreak of cholera, and boreholes needed to be chlorinated. Vendors started selling the chlorinated water as a profitable venture that caused sabotage and boycott of the water schemes. In 1997, Markdata (Simone, 2004, p. 75) found that 40% of the residents disliked the area and would have preferred to relocate to a nearby urban area because Winterveld was poorly serviced. Only one-fourth of the respondents had access to on-site water and only 2% to waterborne sewerage.

In the late 1990s, according to Rogerson (1999), 40% of the residents in Winterveld indicated that they wanted to relocate to other townships in Pretoria, owing to the better services available there. Ndaba and Monama (2013b, p. 4) also made reference to the fact that even 20 years into democracy, the people of Winterveld were still living in dilapidated houses and using pit latrines.

Table 3: Water access in Winterveld and in the Atteridgeville township: 1996, 2001, and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winterveld/Atteridgeville</th>
<th>Piped water inside the dwelling</th>
<th>Piped water inside the yard</th>
<th>Piped water from access point outside the yard</th>
<th>No access to piped water</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (n = 1996)</td>
<td>5410</td>
<td>3579</td>
<td>12873</td>
<td>4106</td>
<td>25968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (% = 1996)</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (n = 1996)</td>
<td>12451</td>
<td>3069</td>
<td>5321</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (% = 1996)</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (n = 2001)</td>
<td>5806</td>
<td>6501</td>
<td>14285</td>
<td>1801</td>
<td>28393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (% = 2001)</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (n = 2001)</td>
<td>7081</td>
<td>14675</td>
<td>6398</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>29174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (% = 2001)</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (n = 2011)</td>
<td>11508</td>
<td>17269</td>
<td>7829</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>38509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld (% = 2011)</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (n = 2011)</td>
<td>13643</td>
<td>16225</td>
<td>8159</td>
<td>2917</td>
<td>40944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atteridgeville (% = 2011)</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of points should be noted in respect of Table 3:

- The percentage of households in Winterveld with a water supply either on the stand or in the house has increased significantly over the past 15 years: from 34.6% in 1996 to 74.7% in 2011.
- In Atteridgeville, one of the oldest townships, the percentage for 1996 was 74.3%. Instead of growing, the percentage dropped by one percentage point to 73% in 2011, 15 years later.
It is noteworthy, from the figures above, that not only had the gap that existed between Winterveld and Atteridgeville in respect of water access been eradicated over the previous 15 years, but more households in Winterveld than in Atteridgeville now (2011) had a water supply either in the house or on the site. To a large extent, however, this should be understood within the context of the rapid development and mushrooming of more informal settlements around the Atteridgeville Township than in the Winterveld area. This may explain the increase in the percentage of households in Atteridgeville whose water supply was obtained from access points outside the yard – or who had no access to water at all – from 25.7% in 1996 to 27% in 2011.

Although pit latrine toilets still remain a challenge for Winterveld, with the figure at 56.7% in 2011, some improvements have been made in respect of the provision of waterborne sanitation (flush or chemical). The percentage in respect of waterborne sanitation increased slightly from 25.1% in 1996 to 36.7% in 2011: an indication that more still needs to be done. While residents acknowledged the government's commitment to improving their living conditions, and the progress made since 1994, the most common complaints made during the community interviews, especially by residents in the more remote and rural parts of Winterveld called “10-morgens”, pertained to the lack of sanitation and of a reliable water supply, and also – although unrelated to basic municipal services – the lack of transport and clinics. Backlogs in these basic services were cited as the main reason why so many people are permanently relocating to more urbanised and better-serviced parts of Winterveld in the 5-morgen areas. The following remark made by a community member confirms this: ‘If you go to most of the 5-morgen areas in Winterveld you find a lot of improvement in the provision of basic services by government but not here in our area … I am not sure whether you saw the many plots which are being left vacant mainly by the tenants who felt they could not cope without basic services, particularly water and electricity, and like many, they have now added to the problem of overcrowding in 5-morgen areas’ (Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Two, 2014). Another reason for the depopulation of rural 10-morgen areas is the revival of agriculture, with some plot owners evicting their tenants to make way for agricultural activities. One tenant said: ‘We are about seven tenants and our landlord lives in Soshanguve … he told us that we should now find ourselves new accommodation as he … intends to come back and start with farming soon’ (Community Member One, 2014).

Another area in which provision has increased significantly is that of electricity supply. Electricity access for lighting in Winterveld increased from 19.9% in 1996 to 81.1% in 2011. Although the percentage is still slightly higher than in Winterveld, the decline experienced in the percentage of households using electricity for lighting in Atteridgeville from 88.8% in 1996 to 82.9% in 2011, is noteworthy. This is probably due to the higher number of growing informal settlements in the Atteridgeville area in comparison to Winterveld.

Of great significance is the fact that almost all community respondents were of the opinion that the provision of most basic services has improved remarkably since the incorporation of Winterveld into the Tshwane Metropolitan Area (Community Member Two, 2014; Community Member Three, 2014; Principal One, 2014); this, in spite of the fact that concerns were raised regarding, in particular, poor sanitation and roads, which require urgent attention.

In a nutshell, contrary to concepts such as ‘folks living in a forgotten area’ which were used both in the literature and the media, the interviews across various sectors revealed a community characterised by a great sense of belonging, following improved service delivery by the local government and some provincial departments. Furthermore, if media reports on current government projects in Winterveld are to be given credence, it is feasible to suggest that the standard of basic services and infrastructure in Winterveld is likely to improve in the future. Amongst the government initiatives that have thus far made
an impact, and are likely to continue to do so, are the declaration of Winterveld as a ‘Special Presidential Lead Project’ by former state president Thabo Mbeki (Hlahla, 2004); the Winterveld Reconstruction and Development Project that was launched in 2002 (Hlahla, 2004; Peete, 2006), and the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project that was launched in 2010 by former Gauteng Premier, Nomvula Mokonyane (Masemola, 2010a, p. 6).

6.3 Synthesis

The foregoing discussion on housing and services suggests that a considerable amount of capital investment related to infrastructure was made in Winterveld between 2001 and 2011. Except for the lower infrastructure levels regarding sanitation and formal housing, the figures for Winterveld are largely on a par with current access figures (for water and electricity) in older townships such as Atteridgeville. This suggests that the wall-to-wall municipal system has contributed to an effective means of redistribution. Residents widely acknowledged the significant investment made in general by the City of Tshwane during the community interviews. While acknowledging some existing challenges, one resident stated: ‘As someone who was born and bred in Winterveld, I can tell you that the Winterveld you see today is totally different from the one we lived in 20 years ago … despite challenges in some areas, generally there is huge improvement, with people now having water and electricity’ (Principal One, 2014).

7. THE ECONOMIC PROFILE

According to the Executive Mayor of Tshwane, Councillor Kgositso Ramokgopa (2014), the Gauteng economy is the largest single contributor to the country’s GDP, with a contribution of 35.6% in 2013; this underscores its presence and importance as a core economic hub on the continent.

Although some information was previously provided regarding the economic factors of Winterveld, more current details will now be discussed.

It is necessary, once again, to highlight the historical context that elucidates the Winterveld of today. Two decades ago, half of the population of Winterveld was not economically active. Those seeking formal employment travelled to the Metropolitan area to find job opportunities. The informal sector was more prominent. The involvement in the informal sector has now also decreased.

7.1 Economic growth

The Tshwane economy accounts for an estimated 27% of the provincial GDP and almost 10% of the national GDP (Ramokgopa, 2014). This section starts off with a discussion of the annual economic growth in the Winterveld Magisterial District in comparison with that of the Pretoria Magisterial District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pretoria Magisterial District</th>
<th>Winterveld Magisterial District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP (constant 2005 prices)</td>
<td>Annual GDP growth from previous period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>78 628 592</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>96 154 636</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>136 393 845</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>157 398 899</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>166 114 547</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 suggests that the economic growth of Pretoria was the highest (6.1%) between 1996 and 2007. Although lower than in Pretoria, the economic growth in Winterveld (4.6%) also reached a peak at the same time. The figure almost halved, in both cases, in 2013 – to 2.7% in the case of Pretoria, and to 1.6% in Winterveld’s case.

7.2 Economic structure and change

Shifting the focus from growth to change in the economic structure, this section considers changes in the sectoral contributions in the Winterveld economy (see Table 5).

Table 5: GVA (constant 2005 prices) per sector in Winterveld and Pretoria: 1996 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>6 556</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>237 104</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>2 387</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>110 474</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>193 754</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>6 132 059</td>
<td>16.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>29 025</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1 033 084</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>48 149</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1 303 399</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>353 770</td>
<td>19.16</td>
<td>5 175 265</td>
<td>13.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>327 931</td>
<td>17.76</td>
<td>3 476 354</td>
<td>9.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>281 995</td>
<td>15.27</td>
<td>6 609 705</td>
<td>17.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community services</td>
<td>602 581</td>
<td>32.64</td>
<td>14 071 017</td>
<td>36.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Industries</td>
<td>1 846 148</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>38 148 461</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 summarises the Gross Value Added by Region (GVA-R) in terms of broad economic sectors. The drop by 5.52% in the manufacturing sector between 1996 and 2013 in Winterveld is a matter of concern. This sector usually provides numerous employment opportunities. The GVA of the manufacturing sector in Pretoria decreased from 16.07% in 1996 to 9.57% in 2013. Other sectors in Winterveld in which a minimal decrease (2%) in GVA occurred between 1996 and 2013 are the trade and transport sectors (4.45%). Despite the large investments made by the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development within the Winterveld Urban Renewal Programme, the GVA-R in the agricultural sector has, in fact, decreased slightly from 0.36% to 0.14%.

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As in the case of the employment contribution statistics, the sectors in which the GVA increased were the finance sector (5.31%) and the community services sector (5.81%). Unpredictably, the GVA of the community services sector decreased for the Pretoria Magisterial District (from 36.88% in 2006 to 31.16% in 2013). This is probably due to the high dependency on government (or social) services and the improved infrastructural investment in education in the area.

8. Conclusion: Changing Functional Roles?

As Horn et al. (1992, p. 119) have noted, ‘…to the outsider, Winterveld may seem like a hell-hole imprisoning society’s throwaways. Yet, on the other hand, it is a settlement of its own making … for those who are in the process of getting an urban foothold, this is what is preferred and affordable’. Yet the area is still not ideally located in terms of its proximity to the main areas of employment and economic growth. Even though the inhabitants live in impoverished communities, the pride taken in these communities is evident (Simone, 2004, p. 68). Even though the evidence provided in the report suggests that the functional role of Winterveld has changed considerably over the past 20 years, its original envisaged role of creating a labour reserve to which black urbanisation could be channelled has not completely disappeared. The main post-1994 changes that have occurred, particularly since the incorporation of Winterveld into the City of Tshwane in 2001, include the following:

- The notion of Winterveld as a better-serviced rural area that affords its residents peace of mind, came prominently to the fore during the interviews. A response from an interviewee confirmed this viewpoint: ‘People are coming back from as far as Sandton to build themselves big houses in Winterveld … maybe because Winterveld is quieter, cheaper, and sites are bigger than in other areas’ (Community Member Three, 2014). Furthermore, it seems that more households than ever before are now able to access basic services, particularly electricity and drinking water; and this, in turn, has had a great influence on the general frame of mind of the residents of Winterveld.
- From both the statistical data and some of the interviews, it seems as if there is increasing evidence that Winterveld has since assumed a new role as an ‘educational haven’, both for the surrounding areas of Mabopane, Ga-Rankuwa, Soshanguve and former white suburbs in Pretoria North, and for certain areas in the Madibeng Local Municipality in the North West province. Further to the above, there is evidence to suggest substantial government investments in school infrastructure through the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project; both in terms of upgrading existing infrastructure and the provision of new schools. However, on the one hand, the growing number of children commuting daily from various areas in the Madibeng Local Municipality to the Winterveld schools may be indicative of the important role that could still be played by the amalgamation of smaller municipalities with bigger ones; while on the other hand, the growing tendency of parents, particularly those residing in former white suburbs of Pretoria North, to send their children to Winterveld schools can probably be ascribed to the unaffordability of transport, school fees, and stationery – hence the decision to opt for certain well-performing schools in Winterveld where they are required to pay only for transport.
- From the literature and community interviews, there seems to be increasing evidence that the number of new agricultural projects funded jointly by the government and individual farmers has increased significantly in 10-morgen areas in Winterveld (Hlahla, 2009).
- In contrast to the pre-1994 era, the bus subsidy in Winterveld is now beginning to show some signs of decline in its impact, largely as a result of what bus operators refer to as inadequate government support through the current subsidy model (DORA).
The application of collaborative measures aimed at bringing about improved provision of basic services (water and electricity), improved school infrastructure and small-scale agricultural development in Winterveld, exemplifies what the literature and the municipal IDP (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2011) refer to as ‘sound’ intergovernmental relations, coupled with willingness amongst ordinary community members and emerging farmers (as revealed during community interviews) to further privately finance certain aspects of these joint initiatives. Therefore, with community members assuming some responsibility by ensuring, for example, that they, too, co-operate privately with school principals, taxi operators, and bus companies to organise school transport for their children, it could be argued that some of the government’s investments in Winterveld are likely to be sustainable. For instance, community interviews and physical visits to several agricultural projects revealed that the projects funded jointly by the government (via subsidies) and individual farmers (via bank loans and personal savings) are more successful than those that depend entirely on state subsidies (Business person, 2014).

Yet, despite these changes, there is still evidence of continued spatial deprivation – a legacy of apartheid – which could be explained as follows:

- Statistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that employment opportunities in Winterveld remain a serious challenge, with Pretoria continuing to play a key role as a shopping and employment centre.
- There is a perception – especially amongst inhabitants still residing in remote rural 10-morgen areas – that the rate of infrastructural development still lags far behind that of the 5-morgen areas. There is also evidence that residents are relocating from 10-morgens to 5-morgens, which are perceived to be more urban in character and better serviced by the City of Tshwane.

Finally, we would like to conclude with a number of observations. We are aware that these remarks might well be contested. In fact, our aim is, precisely, to raise the level of debate in respect of Winterveld and similar places:

- The Winterveld community has, to some extent, managed to rid itself of the historical derogatory label of ‘forgotten folks’ that was used to reflect the severe impact of apartheid planning.
- The intergovernmental relations between the national departments, various Gauteng provincial government departments, and the City of Tshwane have played a major role in the infrastructural investment made through the Winterveld Urban Renewal Project. These relationships have, to a large extent, created a sense of purpose in the Winterveld community again.
- The amalgamation of Winterveld with the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Area (first the Tshwane Local Council in 2001 and then the Metropolitan Council in 2001) has had substantial value for Winterveld. This value is visible in the improved levels of infrastructure and, to some extent, in improved levels of integrated planning.
- There is evidence in municipal planning documents such as IDPs to suggest that the historical background has, to date, been appropriately contextualised in these documents, with Winterveld being referred to as Region One, rather than as a ‘dormitory town’ – a popular concept which is still used in the designation of some of the former R293 towns.
- Evidence from community interviews seems to suggest that the absence of a negotiated strategy on land redistribution between the City of Tshwane and thousands of plot owners is mainly responsible for the slow pace of, and sudden decline in the provision of formal housing in particular in the Winterveld area. Furthermore, with allegations that a ‘one-price-tag-fits-all’ approach is being followed by the City of Tshwane to implement its programme on land redistribution, it would be
feasible to argue that the city has never performed proper surveying and auditing of all existing plots in Winterveld. This notion is confirmed by remarks such as: ‘With the price of a watermelon being around R100 this year … the City of Tshwane may as well just come with a truck full of 460 watermelons and give that to each of us for our 4.2 hectares [5-morgen plots] … it is painful because regardless of the level of development already made on each plot, this is what our plots are worth according to the City of Tshwane’ (Landlord Three, 2014).

- In contrast to the pre-1994 situation, the revised post-1994 bus subsidy model has, to some extent, failed to counter the outmigration of residents from Winterveld to areas such as Soshanguve – instead, it has significantly contributed towards an exodus of these residents.
9. Bibliography

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Annexure A: City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>84 936.00</td>
<td>52 975.00</td>
<td>114 062.08</td>
<td>29 234.76</td>
<td>16 407.00</td>
<td>15 334.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>65 522.43</td>
<td>148 923.89</td>
<td>31 073.45</td>
<td>32 550.00</td>
<td>23 597.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>59 012.15</td>
<td>153 428.22</td>
<td>26 562.74</td>
<td>32 146.00</td>
<td>20 873.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>60 566.09</td>
<td>157 195.61</td>
<td>25 185.09</td>
<td>37 450.00</td>
<td>24 032.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>165 984.40</td>
<td>62 287.14</td>
<td>161 110.14</td>
<td>18 324.28</td>
<td>48 534.00</td>
<td>22 689.00</td>
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