

City Diplomacy Papers: Volume 1



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Introduction

Luncedo Njezula, South African Cities Network

The South African Cities Network (SACN) International Relations Forum (IRF) is a joint initiative of the SACN and its participant cities. Its primary purpose is to engage in and develop a collective city agenda that clearly positions South African cities within global and national contexts and debates. The IRF undertakes research, engagement and learning aimed at assisting cities to implement international and national urban policy frameworks by aligning their respective city strategies.

Internationally, there is a real recognition of the catalytic role that city diplomacy plays in the development of nation-states. To be effective, city diplomacy must first and foremost serve the core purpose and objective of local government, i.e. to improve the lives of citizens. City diplomacy is still a developing practice but generally involves activities such as building city networks, sharing of experiences and best practices through dialogue and learning exchanges with counterparts, cooperation between international private and public organisations, and creating networks of mayors and local government bodies.

The city diplomacy paper series seeks to explore the many dimensions of city diplomacy, as currently practised, in order to inform and encourage city stakeholders to engage critically on the meaning of city diplomacy and to translate this understanding into practice. The intention of the paper series is to outline and capture a set of perspectives that will form the basis for robust debate and engagement on the state of city diplomacy in South Africa, and how it can be enhanced and leveraged to advance the global interests of South African citizens.

This first volume contains papers that look at some broad topics of city diplomacy: the changing world of international relations, mobilising climate finance, knowledge co-production, and urban regeneration.

Overview of the papers

The rising influence (nationally and internationally) of cities, on the back of increased urbanisation and economic growth, has led to large cities and urban areas engaging directly in diplomatic activities, through twinning and other relations with counterparts abroad. Yet, although South African cities have seen an increase in municipal international relations (MIR), the outcomes have been limited, with the focus mostly on intangible city-to-city friendships rather than on concrete results. In their paper, “City diplomacy in a changing world of international relations”, Pierre Dietrichsen and Gerrit van Niekerk examine MIR in South Africa and the inherent intergovernmental tensions that could result, as well as the impact of the changing world of interdependence, technological innovation and fast communication on international relations and city diplomacy. The paper proposes that MIR should focus on results and tangible benefits for the inhabitants of the city, and highlights that effective liaison with provincial authorities and with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) could contribute to integrated and beneficial international relations. It also argues that DIRCO and the architecture of international representation should be adapted to meet the demands of the times, to use resources effectively and to stay abreast of technological developments in the pursuit of beneficial international relations.

Climate diplomacy is essential for mobilising greater financial flows, but may be more difficult in South African cities, due to the diversity within the financial sector and the limitations of city access to financial sources. The paper “City diplomacy in mobilising climate finance” by Kamlesh Pillay and Elnari Potgieter looks at barriers to accessing climate finance and uses examples to demonstrate the practical application of climate finance diplomacy. The paper presents a framework for engaging stakeholders, to enable South African cities to better engage with local, national and international financial institutions and stakeholders from both the public and private sector in order to scale financial flows for climate change. As initial steps for enhancing city diplomacy for climate finance mobilisation, the paper offers several action-orientated recommendations that go beyond simply providing policymakers with greater technical knowledge.

Dr Ruth Massey’s paper, “Knowledge co-production in city diplomacy: Experiences, challenges, and opportunities”, explores the role of knowledge co-production in building and strengthening city diplomacy, which could have a knock-on effect at a national level, by strengthening diplomatic ties between countries. Knowledge co-production describes partnerships (which could involve researchers, practitioners, city

managers, government officials, etc.) where different knowledge and expertise are produced and shared with the aim of providing better urban development, infrastructure and public-service delivery. Over the past decade, knowledge co-production has become a growing requirement for collaborative governance arrangements and city diplomacy, providing a means of growing the skills and capacity needed to tackle complex urban problems. By drawing on, distributing and creating new forms of knowledge through interactions between different cities, new approaches, perspectives and insights are gained which could assist in the development of effective policy and practice and new ways to deliver services to citizens. The paper presents two case studies of knowledge co-production processes: the Mistra Urban Futures centre and the CityLabs initiative, and provides guidance on the practical aspects of knowledge co-production based on these case studies and wider literature.

The paper, “Bo-Kaap: City diplomacy stakeholders in urban regeneration heritage precincts”, by Zinzile Seepie, Ben Mwasinga, Nkululeko Ntanzu and Palmira Ndesihala De Almeida, describes the unlikely cohort of stakeholders invested in the Bo-Kaap precinct, and the role of culture, heritage and identity in the built environment. It highlights the heritage significance of the Bo-Kaap and examines the links and tensions between diplomacy, heritage and city branding, as well as the impact of gentrification on the precinct. To illustrate how city diplomacy plays out at municipal level through the built environment, a map of the stakeholders involved in the urban regeneration of the Bo-Kaap has been developed. The paper offers recommendations for adopting an integrated approach that combines the interests of heritage and culture with commercial and residential development, as a way to encourage sustainable conservation and urban development. It concludes by describing opportunities for building on the precinct’s unique character, to achieve a liveable and diverse inner-city neighbourhood.

City Diplomacy in a Changing World of International Relations

Pierre Dietrichsen and Gert van Niekerk

Introduction

Diplomacy refers to managing “international relations by negotiation; the method by which the relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist” (Nicolson, 1969:4). After the Second World War, classical diplomacy began to fade, as multilateral diplomacy blossomed. During the same period, the concept of twinning emerged, originating in Europe and spreading to America, as a new form of “citizen-to-citizen” diplomacy (De Villiers, 2005: 23). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines twinning as a “long-term partnership between communities in different cities or towns” (ibid.: 20). In the beginning, the purpose of early French, German, British and American city twinning was mostly to promote mutual understanding and friendship. It has evolved, from an international instrument of friendship and cultural exchange to one of development and trade. Today, twinning relationships are less about the ceremonial and more about trade and investment (providing a gateway to new markets and products); sport, art, educational and cultural exchanges (and increasing tourism); technology and know-how transfer; and development assistance (De Villiers, 2005).

In 1990, the end of the Cold War meant the end of the stable framework of international relations that had anchored the foreign policy and diplomacy of many countries. The fluidity of the international system led to a renaissance in diplomacy, with each country seeking to build a web of diversified relationships that would support its external objectives encapsulated in its foreign policies. Traditionally, international relations have been concerned with the interaction of nation-states, whose increasing interdependence is a mark of the current international system. International relations are not limited to the domain of traditional diplomacy, which is typically conducted by a department of foreign affairs or international relations as well as heads of government. Other government departments, such as trade and industry, also play a role, as international relations have broadened into areas such as education, arts, agriculture and science. International relations are also about cross-border activities by civil society, involving business, trade, sport, cultural exchange, research and transfer of technology. The distinction can be seen as public (government, municipalities, state organisations) and private (Heywood, 1997: 8).

The influence of cities is growing, as increased urbanisation means that some cities have economies that are larger than those of many small to medium-sized countries (Ingenhoff and Asdourian, 2020). As a result, the “governments of large cities and urban areas increasingly engage directly in diplomatic activities, opening representative offices in foreign capitals and other major world cities and sending their mayors on ever more frequent ‘state’ visits to their foreign counterparts.” (Pigman, 2010: 47). This may cause some tensions, especially in South Africa where traditional diplomacy presumes centralised control of international interaction, mainly as a result of isolation through economic sanctions in the 1970s and 1980s.

Today technological innovations and new ways of communicating are changing the way people work and how international relations are conducted. This paper examines municipal international relations in South Africa, with a focus on twinning arrangements, and the inherent intergovernmental tensions that could result. It then explores the changing world and its impact on international relations and city diplomacy. It ends with proposals for influencing the way in which cities and other actors could interact with DIRCO.

Municipal/City International Relations

The main objective of a country's diplomatic service is to establish friendly and mutually beneficial relations with other countries. In South Africa, DIRCO manages the diplomatic services and international relations. This is clearly stated in paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Foreign Service Act (No. 26 of 2019), which was signed by the President on 4 June 2020 but is still to be gazetted.

(b) The Department is responsible for conducting and coordinating the international relations and cooperation of the Republic at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels through the Foreign Service abroad and through interactions with foreign representatives in the Republic, in accordance with the foreign policy of the Republic.

Although international relations at the national level are DIRCO's domain, provinces and municipalities are allowed to enter into international relations. DIRCO has a set of guidelines for provinces and local authorities covering international arrangements and agreements (DIRCO, n.d.). In addition, the intergovernmental Consultative Forum on International Relations (CFIR) exists to share information about all international involvements, provide foreign policy guidance, and plan and coordinate international visits and possible private sector/civil society engagements.

Twinning

The 1998 White Paper on Local Government recognises that municipalities “can engage with municipalities in other countries, through a range of mechanisms from informal linkages to formal twinning arrangements and membership of international municipal institutions” (South Africa, 1998: 49). In South Africa, twinning is referred to as ‘municipal international relations’ (MIR) or ‘sister city partnerships’.¹ The South African MIR policy framework defines these relationships as “a link between two or more communities from different nation states, in which one of the key actors is a municipality” (MPLG, 1999: 7). By 2005, of South Africa's 284 municipalities, 55 had 170 international relationships with 45 countries, and 224 had none (De Villiers, 2005: 239). In 2014, research by Buxbaum (2014: 42) concluded that 92 city-to-city agreements existed. Although no central updated database of city agreements could be found, Wikipedia² lists the following agreements:

- Mangaung (Bloemfontein): Bhubaneswar (India), Nanjing (China)
- Buffalo City: Jinhua and Qinquangdao (China), Leiden (Netherlands), Oldenburg (Germany)
- Ekurhuleni: Harbin (China)
- Msunduzi: Taichung (Taiwan)
- Nelson Mandela Bay: Gothenburg (Sweden), Jacksonville (USA), Ningbo (China)
- Tshwane (Pretoria): Baku (Azerbaijan), Bucharest (Romania), Kiev (Ukraine), Port Louis (Mauritius), Taipei (Taiwan), Tehran (Iran), Washington DC (USA)

Cape Town has active agreements and partnerships with Aachen and Munich (Germany), Accra (Ghana), Atlanta, Houston and Miami-Dade County (USA), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Bujumbura (Burundi), Dubai (UAE), Hangzhou, Huangshan, Shenzhen and Wuhan (China), Izmir (Turkey), Malmö (Sweden), Monterrey (Mexico), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Varna (Bulgaria).³

eThekweni has formalised sister city agreements with Leeds (UK), Maputo (Mozambique), Chicago and New Orleans (USA), Nantes (France), Bremen (Germany), Guangzhou (China), Bulawayo (Zimbabwe), Oran (Algeria), Alexandria (Egypt), Le Port (Reunion), Rotterdam (Holland), Daejeon (South Korea), Libreville (Gabon) and Mombasa (Kenya).⁴

Johannesburg has twinning agreements (in the form of either memoranda of understanding or cooperation on specific projects) with Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Birmingham (UK), New York (USA), Ramallah (Palestine), Verona (Italy) and Windhoek (Namibia). The city sees these agreements as “people-focussed projects, removed from politics to people-based needs”.⁵

Choosing a sister city

The choice of sister cities is influenced by several factors. In Johannesburg, factors have included strategic considerations and the personal preferences of city office bearers, which have shifted over time. Birmingham, Berlin and Ho Chi Minh City were early choices because of similarities among the cities and a perception of what Johannesburg could learn from them, while Kigali and St Petersburg were seen at the time as purely ceremonial (Buxbaum, 2014). The case of Cape Town's alliance with New York City, which specifically targets an increase in mutual tourism and business/trade between the two cities, serves as example of a beneficial and suitably strategic fit.⁶

¹These terms are used interchangeably in this paper.

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_twin_towns_and_sister_cities_in_South_Africa

³ <https://www.capetown.gov.za/Family%20and%20home/Meet-the-City/External-relations/sister-cities-partnership-agreements#Heading0>

⁴ http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/IQR/Pages/International-and-Donor-Relations.aspx

⁵ https://www.joburg.org.za/about_/Pages/About%20the%20City/About%20Joburg/Twinning-Agreements-.aspx

⁶ <https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1625393/cape-town-and-new-york-sign-city-partnership-agreement/>

However, potential sister cities might not appear to have much in common at first glance. For example, Cape Town is a port in South Africa, whereas Zürich is an inland city in Switzerland. However, upon closer investigation, the cities share much in common. They are both home to the headquarters of major insurance companies and top-level universities, and have an entrepreneurial approach to partnership with business and collaboration with other spheres of government (viz. the Western Cape Province and the canton of Zürich). They both promote industrial development for job creation and business incubators for start-up SMEs and the ‘tech’ industry.

Other potential fits include:

- Durban (eThekweni) with Toyota City or Nagoya in Japan, to pursue the Toyota connection
- Tshwane with Yokohama in Japan, for the Nissan connection
- Tshwane with Munich, to pursue the BMW connection
- Buffalo City with Stuttgart, to build on the Mercedes-Benz link
- Nelson Mandela Bay with Wolfsburg in Germany, to build on the Volkswagen Uitenhage link

In assessing a potential sister city, the search could be less focused on a single dimension, as in these examples, and expanded to other economic, educational and capacity-building spheres, such as Buffalo City TVET College in East London’s linking with German partners.

Tensions between collaboration and competition

Cities are increasingly making claims of being represented in the international arena, and city mayors, as the political representatives of the expanded urban power, are in a stronger position than ever before. This new power dynamic may create tensions between collaboration and competition, or “competitive cooperation” (van der Pluijm and Melissen, 2007: 13), when national and local (city) governments do not take the same approach. For example, in 2017, the then Mayor of Tshwane, Solly Msimanga, who did not belong to the ruling party, visited Taipei. DIRCO had advised against the visit, which it called a breach of South Africa’s foreign policy. In response, the Democratic Alliance (DA), Msimanga’s political party, stated that “neither the ANC nor the national government it runs can dictate who DA mayors meet with in order to obtain job-creating investment”.⁷ This incident highlights “one of the defining features of city diplomacy: that negative, active engagement can create positive outcomes”, as openly criticising national government promotes the city’s international role and strength (Ingenhoff and Asdourian, 2020).

International Relations in a Changing World

Today’s world is intertwined and inter-reliant, across nations and cultures, economies and environments, and diplomacy is no longer reserved for state-to-state relations. Furthermore, in a digital era, rapid technological and scientific advances are affecting every area of life, including diplomacy. Traditional diplomatic planning and decision-making models are hierarchical, slow, rigid and process-driven, characterised by inadequate delegations to levels where the work is actually performed, endless meetings and centralised decision-making. In South Africa, three spheres of government add several layers, with different committees coordinating liaison and communications, slowing down processes and decision-making even further. International relations in such a changing world are affected by the growing influence of transnational actors, new forms of communicating and different ways of working.

Growing influence of transnational actors

Diplomatic recognition is a “ticket of general admission to the international arena” (Krasner 1999:16) that has been granted to states or state-like entities, and not to other influential international entities, such as multi-national corporations or financial actors. The state-centric pattern of diplomatic recognition and representation persisted at the start of the 21st century, but there are signs of potential change (although a noteworthy exception is the recognition of the European Union as a diplomatic *persona*), as the influence of transnational actors and cities grows. Today, diplomacy is not about transforming relations between states but also “needs to take into account the changing fabric of trans-national relations (Melissen, 2005: 23).

⁷ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics-taiwan-idUSKBN14N12V>

Traditional bilateral and multilateral diplomacy has been “progressively supplemented by transnational issues which may or may not involve government-to-government activity.” (Hamilton and Langhorne, 2011: 267). The representation of transnational actors in various diplomatic forums is growing. These actors range from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or civil society organisations, to advocacy networks, party associations, philanthropic foundations and multinational corporations. Between 1948 and 2009, the number of NGOs that had consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations grew from 41 to nearly 3 000 (Tallberg and Jönsson, 2010). International organisations are using transnational actors as “policy experts, service providers, compliance watchdogs, and stakeholder representatives” (Tallberg et al., 2013: 3). However, the representation of transnational actors is problematic, as most are based in North America or Europe: in 2007, “66 per cent of the then 3 050 NGOs with consultative status at the ECOSOC came from North America or Europe.” (Dany, 2013: 8). This imbalance seriously reduces the legitimacy of their claims to represent the underprivileged and give voice to the voiceless.

In addition to gaining access to diplomatic forums, transnational actors engage in diplomacy through informal networking. Examples of networking between states, NGOs and international organisations include the processes leading to the Ottawa Treaty in 1997, which banned landmines, and the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has emerged as a major player in global health, while actors behind popular digital platforms, such as Google and Facebook, have a considerable political impact in how they organise access to information. Although these platforms are not yet actively involved in diplomatic processes, they are already affecting the way in which diplomacy is conducted.

New forms of communicating

In this new world, the ‘life form’ and organisational structure that is most evident is the network – social networks, electronic networks, media networks, to name a few. Historically, diplomats have enjoyed a monopoly on information and high prestige, but their traditional role has weakened in an increasingly decentralised, digitalised world. During the 1980s and 1990s, sanctions against South Africa made it increasingly difficult for businesses, NGOs and the media to obtain real-time information – they depended on the foreign affairs department for access to information and influence. However, with the help of technology, these non-state players have created their own power networks, and can now challenge and pressure the diplomatic corps. New communication technologies allow anyone with access to a terminal or smart phone to attend meetings or webinars, and to produce and share messages instead of just receiving them.

Modern communication technology does not mean that diplomats are no longer needed, but the complexities of diplomacy have changed. Businesspeople do not have time to wait for a bureaucratic system to deal with issues of interest to them. The government approval processes, with several layers of bureaucratic structures, where official statements are checked word by word (and sometimes by dozens of offices and individuals) before release, are slow and ill-equipped to respond to the demanding nature of social media.

The internet has become central to public and private communication, while contemporary tools, including social media, have brought millions into open, peer-to-peer conversation spaces. This provides new opportunities but also challenges. It enables government to communicate in real time with millions of people, and citizens to receive virtual answers to their questions instead of having to physically visit embassies. The world of eDiplomacy will require new skills and ways of working, especially as technology allows people to work from home, in a virtual office and geographically dispersed. For example, diplomats can now work in virtual teams across date- and timelines, and even from their home countries.

New ways of working

The nature of work is changing, with working from home and virtual offices a reality. The lockdown period due to the Covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to rethink organisational structures, division of responsibilities and delegations of power. The days when employees were told *what* to do are of a bygone era. Modern employees want to know *why* it is necessary to do something. Strategic and operational plans, which took days, months and even years to put together and approve, are becoming obsolete before they are implemented. The Covid-19 crisis has forced managers to rethink their strategic plans and cost those plans from a zero-base. Crisis management has become the norm, with managers needing to negotiate patchwork solutions from one crisis to the next.

In addition, the rise of CNN, BBC and other international news channels (and the internet) has greatly shortened the time horizons of diplomatic decision-making. News from distant countries, in different date and time zones, can become public knowledge more quickly than ever before. With information arriving very quickly, diplomats and DIRCO officials have to make decisions much more speedily than previously. To be able to respond fast will require flatter hierarchical structures with decentralised decision-making and the assumption of accountability within areas of responsibility. Imposing layers of checks and balances will lead to employees not acting or taking too long to finalise an action (Hanson, 2012). However, the risk of allowing employees the freedom to respond rapidly within online communities is that organisations are essentially enabling employees to determine policy without the approval of their principals. This holds the potential for disastrous consequences which might not be easily mitigated.

The work of diplomats has shifted to a more 'integrative approach', as a result of greater information and communication flow. It is no longer about relaying the news but about providing quicker and more precise analyses of information and actors. Artificial Intelligence (AI) will in the future assist diplomats to analyse and predict outcomes based on simulated scenarios, replacing the cumbersome, subjective and lengthy process of working through volumes of discussions, meetings and personal experiences. These changes will require retraining and upskilling of diplomats and officials from all government spheres, to enable them to focus on specific concerns and communicate with an increasingly diverse set of actors.

The Covid-19 experience

This paper does not discuss the broader societal and governmental lessons to be learned from the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic; however, elements that have or may yet have an impact on municipal international relations are briefly highlighted:

- Cities must focus on community health and related infrastructure such as clinics, hospitals, retirement homes and quarantine facilities.
- Frontline health care workers' training and capacity building must be adapted to assist with primary and more advanced health threats.
- Budgets for medical emergencies, infrastructure, staff and equipment must be an ongoing priority.
- Staff involved in municipal services of all types need to be prepared for epidemic/pandemic situations; management has a responsibility to plan for business continuity risks and solutions.
- MIR should reflect elements of these 'new normal' phenomena and the experience of other nations and cities (e.g. China, Spain and Italy) should be accessed and applied in suitable policies and practices.
- Pandemics and national (including natural) disasters not only affect a city's MIR budget but also its capacity to handle essential local services such as water, sanitation, electricity and administration, this reducing capacity for MIR.
- Technology can increasingly be used for communication, data management, remote or online work and services.

Towards a New Approach to International Relations

To handle the new realities of international relations, South Africa will need to modernise how DIRCO and other spheres of government conduct their international relations. Traditional diplomacy is already overshadowed by a plethora of activities executed by non-traditional diplomatic actors who have built international relations due to the slowness of government bureaucracy. Non-state actors establish direct contact when government spheres do not meet their demands, thereby diminishing the role and influence of the diplomatic community. Greater integration is needed among spheres, as well as better networking with other actors through a hub-and-spoke structure. The digital world must be embraced but this necessitates rethinking the selection and training of staff tasked with diplomatic duties.

Conduct city diplomacy differently

Faced with the new realities of international relations, cities will need to move away from traditional costly and ineffective structures (or entities) such as twinning chairpersons, committees, portfolio managers, and support staff. Any twinning or sister city agreements will need to have clear priorities in areas such as economic development (e.g. for investment in factories), technology and educational exchange (e.g. collaboration between universities within the region), infrastructure development (e.g. for drinking water or sanitation), community health or similar projects that bring actual benefit to communities. Broad intangible objectives, such as cultural exchange and the promotion of friendship, should be avoided, while public-private partnerships, such as triangular collaboration among business, donors and municipalities, should be supported.

Any physical mutual visits by teams of municipal official and politicians should be limited, especially if made only for goodwill and recreation with no benefit for or impact on the community. Video conferencing, digital communications and related technology can be used to research and identify the right partner cities, and then to pursue areas of mutual benefit and planning implementation by dedicated 'project leaders' on both sides. Cities should also inform and liaise early with the relevant ambassadors, DIRCO, SALGA⁸, and provincial authorities. This will promote synergy with provincial objectives and support national foreign policy objectives in that particular country.

Integrate national, provincial and city-level international relations

The internationalisation of national ministries and governmental agencies has for some time challenged the roles of foreign ministries, such as DIRCO, as their government's diplomatic face (Hocking, 2017). There is empirical evidence supporting this development, but the specific nature of geo-economic diplomacy necessitates analytical frameworks that:

- encompass the substantial roles played by sub-national and non-governmental parties,
- allow for greater understanding of how the involvement of such parties changes from case to case, and
- provide for a less static understanding of unfolding relationships and cooperation from DIRCO, and closer cooperation with role players at sub-national level and non-governmental parties.

To address potential duplication and overreach by departments and sub-national governments, the first step should be to clearly define parameters within which the government spheres must function. These new regulations should fit within the framework established by the Foreign Service Act. The DIRCO Guidelines for MIR (DIRCO, n.d.) require reporting, consultation, and cascading of the national goals and objectives to local level, which is good practice, enhances sound cooperation between spheres, and provides scope for synergy. However, currently, DIRCO and other national departments (such as trade and industry, tourism and agriculture) each develop their own strategic plans, which are not considered by provinces and cities when developing their strategic plans and priorities. Cities and provinces engaging in MIR need to study the latest DIRCO Strategic Plan to avoid action and commitments that are in conflict with national objectives and priorities. They should aim to create synergies and avoid the duplication of plans/projects already in progress. City diplomacy is already an important player in the international arena of diplomacy and must be enhanced rather than be seen as a threat to national diplomacy and foreign policy aims and goals.

Engagements in international relations at all levels need to be reviewed/evaluated to avoid internal competition" and counter-productive agreements. This should become an effective instrument to enhance economic development at regional and city levels. An early warning system, informed by links to a network of inter-city/provincial and business relations, could be used to analyse trends worldwide.

Develop the hub-and-spoke concept

The hub-and-spoke concept is not foreign in diplomatic circles. Countries with limited physical presence in foreign countries have opted for a hub mission with an ambassador accredited to several other countries in the region. South Africa has long had missions of this nature. DIRCO would be the central node in networks constituted through its multiple relationships with governmental and non-governmental parties. Although identifying DIRCO as the central network actor is not necessarily an accurate empirical reflection of their

⁸ South African Local Government Association

centrality in all aspects of the government's foreign relations, it would help to determine both how traditional DIRCO diplomats would relate to relevant governmental and non-governmental actors and how these relations affect the country's ability to operate in the geo-economic diplomatic field. Given South Africa's economic position and political realities, the centrality of DIRCO is essential in a network system that must be practical, effective, efficient and economical.

To facilitate and broaden representation in even more countries, embassies could develop hub-and-spoke virtual offices in collaboration with local chambers of commerce, mayors of cities and business associates. It may also be possible to create virtual desks at DIRCO as a South African hub feeding into the greater network of hub-and-spoke virtual offices worldwide. MIR city offices could be successful partners with DIRCO in the virtual offices in South Africa and beyond in a world of virtual networks. The hub-and-spoke concept could be expanded to include sub-national-level diplomacy. The provincial premier's office could become the hub for all its cities and one of the nine spokes linked to the DIRCO hub, ensuring an organised approach to diplomacy and representation in foreign countries, albeit virtually. A global task force would be available to serve the national and sub-national interests in a coordinated approach that is efficacious, economical and efficient.

Align to the digital diplomatic world

A paradigm shift, by all spheres of government, is needed in terms of using digital diplomacy – without losing the traditional skills that are a necessary part of a complete modern diplomat. South Africa needs to change its structures - functions performed at missions could be done just as well from head office or on a regional basis through a network system. Part of this change involves moving from the traditional vertical hierarchy operating model to a cross-functional, cross-business units, horizontally structured model. In order to remain relevant, DIRCO must align decision-making to the digitalised diplomatic world in which they function. In hierarchically structured organisations, the management structure, not the type of decision required, determines the decision-making authority. The safe system of meetings and committees or sub-committees deliberating for days and even months to make a recommendation that then has to move up the hierarchy to be approved, is too slow. Diplomacy and international affairs demand almost business-like agility to stay abreast of change and be relevant.

The lockdown in South Africa has shown that some functions can be performed cost-effectively from home. It has also presented the opportunity for all spheres of government, NGOs, businesses and individuals to re-evaluate their circumstances. The lesson of 'less is more' has shown that the same outcomes can be produced with less effort and can even lead to an increase in productivity. Managers must be given the opportunity to manage with appropriate delegation levels to reduce red-tape and costly hierarchical structures. Managers should be expected to motivate the existence of and need for their component by doing a return on investment study. Departments can use these inputs to do comparative studies to determine the value for money. Obsolete and redundant policies must be repealed/cancelled, and all delegations must be reviewed to allow a reduction in bureaucratic red-tape. All three spheres of government should apply a zero-based methodology when evaluating costly advertising, glamour publications and promotional items or events. A needs assessment must answer the question "What if...?" to determine the results of any of these actions. Organisations must not ask "What are we doing?" but "Why are we doing it?" Asking 'what' questions determines the symptoms of the problem, while the 'why' questions pinpoint the root causes behind the perpetuation of obsolete work and organisational structures.

Embrace the digital

DIRCO and the sub-national government spheres need to speed up the digitalisation of departments, roll out e-learning training, employ a system of virtual meetings and webinars, encourage the use of digital platforms, develop a secure messenger system and refresh their technological systems. To counter the South African experience of bureaucracies working on a siloed, need-to-know basis, the challenges of interoperability and connectivity must be addressed, through a 'need to share' architecture and greater interministerial exchanges better able to use digitally-generated information (Ashbrook, 2020).

Embassies have started to create WhatsApp groups, Twitter channels, Facebook profiles and YouTube channels. Diplomats are now able to use these digital platforms to elicit and answer questions. All foreign ministries maintain websites (often with individual embassy links), and valuable insights can be gained from accessing them. The website of the United States Institute of Peace lists the world's foreign ministries

alphabetically, with links provided to their websites⁹. DIRCO could expand and create similar links allowing easy access to international partners, businesses and industries. Virtual exploration portals could support city twinning, place-making, spatial planning, densification, business opportunities and international relations with important international actors.

Digital diplomacy and virtual offices are a reality – and may one day include holographic ambassadors in virtual embassies. Virtual reality would be beneficial to cities, who could acquire virtual office space in all worldwide virtual embassies, receive standardised diplomatic training and partner in the establishment and use of AI. AI would not replace diplomats, but would empower them to speed up decision-making and communication processes. Major transitions do not happen overnight but may be achieved in the medium or long term, through a re-engineering process. Furthermore, diplomacy and diplomats would not disappear, and negotiations and communication would still be a trademark of the diplomatic profession. However, to stay relevant, a digital future must be embraced.

Rethink the selection and training of diplomats

A new breed of digitally inclined diplomatic staff is needed to replace the traditionalists. The public servant of the future must be skilful, career oriented and productive. The recruitment and selection processes need to consider the personality traits required for a diplomat or anyone treading on the terrain of diplomacy. The best solution may be a hybrid of the younger and older generations of diplomatic employees, augmented by skills training in decision-making, analytical thinking, listening skills and data mining. Younger generation employees may already be skilled in social media, but lack the traditional skills expected of a diplomat, while older generation employees may possess all the traditional skills, mastered through practical experience, but lack an understanding of how to use social media. Obtaining new skills is an ongoing process and must be incorporated into everyone's annual work plans.

Training the new breed of diplomatic staff will face some challenges but using technology to digitalise the profession will ensure that even those serving at missions abroad could receive ongoing training and use AI to assist in decision-making. There might be strong opposition from the current diplomatic corps who might see it as an erosion of their careers and aspirations. It is not. It is an early warning that, to stay relevant, diplomats need urgent training to embrace technology and augment the skills they already have. Training for all tasked with matters of diplomacy must be standardised and, to be cost effective, offered via e-learning platforms, to avoid long absences from office, and costly subsistence and transport expenses. Legacy training for diplomatic staff must be evaluated and fundamental changes that come with technical developments, especially due to digitalisation, must be incorporated into all training. This will include the retraining of everyone currently tasked with the execution of diplomacy. A uniform approach is necessary to prevent contradictory messaging to stakeholders because of the increase of diplomatic activity by actors from all spheres of government, political opposition parties, NGOs, public interest groups and the private sector.

Training for all government spheres should be coordinated and make use of online meeting platforms and e-learning programmes, to expedite the integration of diplomatic role players from all three spheres of government in South Africa. A new approach to the mobility of employees is necessary and could even involve redeployment across the three spheres of government. DIRCO's Diplomatic Academy¹⁰ should coordinate diplomacy and diplomatic skills training. Uniformity and an integrative approach are essential to accommodate the sub-national government spheres. The development of e-learning programmes could be outsourced and financed by the relevant SETAs¹¹.

Proper job evaluations must be done and, through a policy of natural attrition, departments must be trimmed to be lean, effective, efficient and productive. Upskilling of all personnel should be done continually, through skills training and bridging identified gaps, and not merely for those who already hold tertiary qualifications or training for training's sake. Training done through e-learning will allow personnel to combine their daily tasks and studies, and to use their new-gained skills practically in the work environment.

⁹ <http://www.usip.org/publications/foreign-affairs-ministries-web>

¹⁰ This is what the Diplomatic Training, Research and Development (DTRD) Branch will be known as after the Foreign Service Act has been gazetted.

¹¹ Sector Education and Training Authorities

Conclusion

Over the past century, diplomacy, or managing international relations, has evolved. The rate of change is increasing, because of technological advances, new ways of communicating and working, the growing influence (and power) of cities and transnational actors, as well as the emergence of digital diplomacy. Although international relations are the domain of the national department (DIRCO), municipal or city international relations are recognised and encouraged. These can take the form of sister city agreements or twinning with other cities and regions.

As cities gain greater representation in the international arena, tensions may grow between national and local government spheres.

To handle the realities of this changing world, South Africa needs to review and modernise how DIRCO and other government spheres conduct their international relations. Cities will need to conduct diplomacy differently, choosing sister cities based on clear priorities, rather than broad, intangible objectives, making use of technology (rather than physical visits) and seeking synergy with other government spheres. International relations will need to be integrated across South Africa's three spheres of government, including aligning strategic plans and reviewing international engagements and agreements.

The hub-and-spoke concept offers a structure that could work for all government spheres and increase South Africa's ability to operate in the geo-economic diplomatic field. A paradigm shift is needed to move to digital diplomacy, which involves shifting from a traditional, hierarchical structure to a cross-functional horizontal operating model.

The lockdown during the Covid-19 pandemic has shown that many functions can be performed digitally and virtually. Therefore, government needs to embrace the digital world, roll out e-learning and increase the use of digital platforms. Eventually virtual embassies and diplomats may become a reality.

These changes will not mean that diplomats and diplomacy disappear but will result in a leaner, more efficient and productive diplomatic service. By becoming more streamlined, DIRCO could assist government to cope with domestic challenges that have resulted from the Covid-19 pandemic, by re-allocating funds freed through reducing staff at Head Office and the 126 missions abroad. South African interests in countries where embassies are reduced or closed could be served by digital communication, the creation of regional embassies and the direct use of portals and online tools. In addition, diplomats would be able to gain new skills, to complement their traditional skills of analytical thinking and listening. Training this new breed of diplomatic staff would face some challenges, but technology makes possible training that is cost effective and does not require long absences from the office. Training needs to be uniform and coordinated through DIRCO's Diplomatic Academy.

The focus and methods of conducting diplomacy, and of supporting MIR and provinces, must adapt to new realities, but this does not mean that diplomats become less important. On the contrary, if ever there were a time in history for South Africa to justify its global diplomatic footprint, it would be now. In a Covid-19-centric world, diplomacy remains the machinery ensuring international relationships do not grind to a halt. Diplomats around the world ensure the continual moving forward of global relationships in bilateral, regional and multilateral spaces. Structurally missions can be resized, even expanded into more countries and cities worldwide, but with fewer personnel. These personnel must be well trained, competent and able to function in a digitalised world. Establishing more virtual global networks, with linkages to virtual offices and twinned cities in South Africa, based on the specific needs of cities, would decrease wastage, overlaps and/or duplication of functions. This would directly contribute to the radical economic transformation that would benefit citizens of poor communities in South Africa.

The success or failure of international relations is based on the success or failure of diplomacy, irrespective of the level at which it is performed, as long as it is coordinated within a professional framework of well-trained and dedicated diplomats. An integrated, coordinated approach from highly trained futuristic thinkers in a global digitalised environment, without borders and archaic practice, would position South Africa to more accurately predict a sustainable future and prepare for any as yet unknown change.

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City Diplomacy in Mobilising Climate Finance

Kamleshan Pillay and Elnari Potgieter

Introduction

South Africa's ambitious targets for mitigation actions, which are outlined in its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), include curbing emissions below a baseline of around 34% by 2020 and by around 42% by 2025 (DEA, 2015). Achieving these ambitious climate targets set by national government will require the participation of cities (Reddy and Wolpe, 2017) because they are where 60% of South Africans live, and where 80% will live by 2050 (DCoG, 2016). Given that city energy use is expected to triple by 2050, the focus needs to be on climate action in cities if South Africa is to move onto a more sustainable path (Reddy and Wolpe, 2017).

Cities and local governments are responsive to national policy frameworks, despite the lack of clarity about the role of sub-national governments in addressing climate change. Many municipalities have already developed climate change action and response strategies, but climate change is not sufficiently mainstreamed in their main planning tools, the integrated development plan (IDP) and spatial development framework (SDF). IDPs are short term (five years) and generally do not include the long-term capital investment that climate mitigation initiatives require. Their focus tends to be on short-term capital expenditure without factoring in the cost savings from climate-proofing infrastructure, such as greater efficiency and less maintenance (Petrie et al., 2018).

The availability of finance will ultimately determine the ability of cities to transition to a low-carbon and climate resilient future. They will require financial flows from all sources, "including both public (government) and private (commercial) actors" (Pillay and Clapp, 2017: 2). However, financing large-scale, climate-resilient infrastructure faces the same barriers as financing standard large-scale infrastructure, i.e. high initial capital costs and risks (politics, policy changes, demand uncertainty) and unexpected construction timelines (Smith et al., 2014; Barnard, 2015; World Bank, 2015; CCFLA, 2015). Although climate-resilient and low-carbon initiatives have higher initial capital costs, the benefits in terms of avoiding financial losses, and maintaining development gains and economic growth can be substantial. Cities find accessing multilateral climate finance difficult because international funds are typically directed to national governments (Pillay and Pillay, 2018). At the same time, at local level, climate actions are competing for a share of the city budget with other, service delivery demands. Investing in long-term, high-capital infrastructure tends to lose out to improving service delivery that has immediate and tangible outcomes.

What is needed is 'greater political buy-in', which is perhaps the most overstated policy recommendation with respect to mobilising more climate finance. Few studies have attempted to outline how policymakers can better negotiate the position of local governments, which is perhaps more essential in the context of climate finance. Cities must engage not only in political negotiations related to international climate finance, but also with private finance stakeholders whose motivations may be varied.

This paper looks at how South African cities can better engage with local, national and international financial institutions and stakeholders from both the public and private sector to scale financial flows for climate change. After providing an overview of the South African climate finance landscape and the barriers to mobilising finance, the paper examines climate finance diplomacy and three crucial capabilities. A framework for engaging stakeholders is presented, from which the agenda-setting and influencing strategy elements are highlighted and used to illustrate the practical application of climate finance diplomacy using two examples: accessing the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and co-financing adaptation with the insurance sectors. The paper concludes with recommendations for actions that cities can take to enhance diplomacy for climate finance mobilisation.

Climate Finance in South African Cities

Climate finance refers to the financial resources that are used to fund climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives. Although there is no single definition of climate finance, the UNFCCC defines it as “finance that aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts”.¹²

For South African cities, climate finance is available from public and private sources, Public sources include government and donor funding, while private sources include commercial banks and capital markets. Cities can draw from their own revenue (primarily property taxes and municipal service charges for water and electricity provision) and intergovernmental transfers from national government, usually in the form of conditional grants (Pillay and Pillay, 2018). They can also access capital directly from development finance institutions (DFIs), such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), and national climate funds, such as the South African Green Fund. A potential source of climate finance is official development assistance, but this bilateral aid tends to be delivered through national governments or intermediaries. Some donor agencies, such as the French Development Agency (AFD) provide finance to South African cities, but this direct aid is usually small and used to fund research, knowledge, and feasibility studies. Commercial banks and capital markets are private sources of funding, and the insurance sector also has a role to play in financing disaster losses. Often public-private partnership (PPP) agreements and co-financing arrangements are necessary. For example, local governments wanting to access the Climate Finance Facility offered by the DBSA would need to be part of a PPP, as the finance is available for private sector applicants.

Between 2013 and 2017, South Africa received \$2.65-billion in public international climate finance, with 81.7% allocated for mitigation, 9.4% for adaptation and 8.9% for crosscutting projects (Pillay, 2020). In 2013/14, National Treasury dispersed R33,5-billion in conditional grants to South African municipalities, and in 2018 domestic environment-related expenditure was estimated to be R35,5-billion (ibid.). However, it is not possible to determine the exact mitigation and adaptation finance allocations within these conditional grants, as the budget tagging for climate finance remains under-developed.

Barriers to mobilising climate finance

South Africa has climate change policies and fiscal arrangements in place, but in practice cities struggle to raise sufficient funds for climate action because of policy uncertainty, poor intergovernmental coordination, competing demands on budget, capacity constraints and a lack of mainstreaming of climate action in intergovernmental grants.

- **Policy uncertainty:** Over-riding climate policies are in place, but they are not accompanied by clear regulations relating to carbon taxes, energy generation, energy efficiency incentives or fossil-fuel subsidies. This increases the risk to local government, as the regulation uncertainty deters private sector actors from investing in low-emission, climate-resilient infrastructure. For example, the Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity, which fall under the Electricity Regulation Act (No. 4 of 2006), are still not clear about municipalities being able to generate and sell their own power or enter into bulk power purchase agreements from independent power producers (Petrie et al., 2018).
- **Poor intergovernmental coordination:** The policy does not clearly define the roles of sub-national spheres in response to climate change. Yet intergovernmental coordination is crucial for climate finance, as international funding flows via the national designated authority, with local government limited to being the executing entity. The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) is the national department responsible for supervising local climate action but does not have the authority to enforce policy. Despite the presence of intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, such as the Intergovernmental Climate Change Committee (IGCCC), national decision-making continues to dominate, and the flow of information and decision is top-down. In addition, the separation of authority, control and mandates to different levels of government often results in inefficient public financial management.


¹² <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/explainers/what-is-climate-finance-and-where-will-it-come-from/>

- **Competing demands on city budgets:** At local level, the competing demands on a city's budget are many, and decisions are often driven by election cycles. As a result, allocating substantive financial reserves to climate-related projects is difficult given the other competing demands on the budget, such as keeping the public safe and the streets clean. These demands are often viewed as more urgent than the creeping nature of climate impacts, and so financial allocations to climate change actions tend to be volatile. In addition, the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) are not conducive to long-term financing. For instance, the MFMA requires a lengthy tendering process, including public participation, for any commitments of more than three years (Petrie et al., 2018). Furthermore, officials tend to be conservative in their interpretation of the MFMA regulations, resulting in traditional investments being favoured over innovative climate projects (ibid.).
- **Capacity constraints:** Local governments in South Africa often lack the ability to develop bankable climate projects that attract public and private finance. The use of external consultants to submit technical proposals also means that the knowledge and expertise needed to package climate proposals for funding or to lobby for greater climate finance are seldom institutionalised. Skills needed include being able to manage and administer complex projects, meet the fiduciary requirements of certain sources of climate finance, and to lobby other spheres of government and funders effectively. In addition, climate change is not always a distinct portfolio, especially in smaller local municipalities, but rather is embedded within environmental departments.
- **Lack of mainstreaming in intergovernmental grants:** Although the current rhetoric is about mobilising additional climate finance flows, climate mainstreaming or climate proofing is arguably more important. This refers to brown investments aimed at transforming existing infrastructure and facilities. South Africa does not have any climate action conditional grants, but conditional grants could be climate mainstreamed. However, for cities with limited technical capacity and budgets, it can be difficult to establish climate outcomes within intergovernmental grant applications. Certain conditional grants could assist with capacity building for climate mainstreaming, such as the infrastructure development or the integrated urban development grants. National Treasury, through its City Support Programme, is currently assessing how climate proofing can be better integrated into Built Environment Performance Plans (ibid), but financial flows will remain unpredictable without a dedicated climate action conditional grant.

Climate Finance Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the art of influence that aims to forge agreement while moving political boundaries, whereas climate diplomacy focuses specifically on national interests and international cooperation on climate issues to find common ground, and build trust and long-term relationships (Mabey et al., 2013). Climate diplomacy requires multi-level governance, which refers to the interactions between different levels of governments, non-state actors and sectors in governing climate issues, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 (Jänicke, 2013). Climate governance related to climate finance would include non-state actors (stakeholders from the financial sector, such as commercial banks and institutional investors – pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and insurance funds), national climate funds, development finance institutions and guarantee facilities.

Figure 2.1: Multi-lateral climate governance



Source: Jänicke (2013), Petrie et al. (2019)

Multi-lateral climate governance requires both collaboration between actors at different scales and horizontal and vertical coordination (Jänicke, 2017). Vertical coordination refers to engagements at different levels of government within a country – local, provincial, and national – but also with international organisations, and may occur in a top-down or bottom-up manner (ibid.); e.g. cities engaging with the DEA, as the national designated authority for the GCF, on issues related to city accreditation. Horizontal coordination is about stakeholder engagements at the same governance level. For example, the green bond pooling mechanism, which is being pioneered in the Western Cape, relies on local municipalities working together and partnering to potentially issue green bonds jointly (Petrie et al., 2019).

Multi-lateral engagements are diplomatic spaces because cities may have to “engage in relations with actors on an international political stage, with the aim of representing themselves and their interests” (Pluijm, 2007:11). When non-state actors are involved, processes may reflect contemporary diplomacy characteristics, rather than the traditional state-centric diplomacy processes (Du Plessis, 2006:139). Such engagements take place through multiple channels. They are complex and dynamic, and have a more variable agenda that includes agenda-setting, unlike the fixed agenda associated with more traditional diplomacy. Compared to traditional diplomacy, the approach is likely to be unconventional, democratic and pluralistic, although the traditional diplomatic approaches should not be discounted and may still be required.

Capabilities for climate diplomacy

To engage in climate diplomacy and negotiation, three core capabilities are crucial: know yourself, know the other and the capacity to influence (Mabey et al. 2013):

- **Know yourself:** To negotiate successfully, a city needs to be able to understand climate finance and its impact on local government’s interests. This includes understanding local government’s political interests, as well as the economic, legal, policy and financial constraints that affect its negotiating position. As diplomatic activities are likely to result in tensions among actors, addressing these tensions requires a clear, analytically robust assessment of short-, medium- and long-term interests, and the ability to make difficult trade-offs with seemingly competing objectives. A more ambitious approach to climate change also involves policy coordination inside different sectoral departments (e.g. planning and energy).
- **Know the other:** To be able to adjust its negotiating position, a city must understand the interests, motivations, constraints and capacities of the other actors. This will enable it to be adaptable in achieving its objectives and priorities, and to exert strategic influence on other stakeholders to attain positive outcomes. However, this is more difficult to achieve in the case of climate finance, where public and private finance actors may have significantly different motivations. For example, development banks have a mandate to promote development while delivering public benefits, whereas commercial banks have a purely profit-driven agenda. Understanding the positions of stakeholders is a crucial element for identifying fundamental tensions among actors.
- **Capacity to influence:** The ability to influence positions depends on the capability of cities to integrate their priorities into diplomatic processes. The starting point for a clear influencing strategy is understanding interests. An influencing strategy focuses on the assets and limitations of influence, must have an envisioned outcome, and must understand where the inflection points lie in negotiation and what will need to change in order to deliver outcomes. One of the fundamentals of an influence strategy is an understanding of the core basis of influence and how this can be leveraged to create cooperation.

A Framework for Engaging Stakeholders


A framework or methodology for mapping and analysing other stakeholders can provide a greater understanding of their negotiating positions, issues of influence and areas of agreement. Constructing a framework for decoding each stakeholder’s intentions goes beyond possessing the relevant technical knowledge. It requires a critical interpretation of a stakeholder’s interests and motivations. In multi-stakeholder engagements, the appropriate analysis of stakeholder interests, motives and perceptions can build partnerships. To understand the negotiation position of the different actors may require system mapping, which allows for an understanding of the flexibility of positions within engagements.

In multi-lateral diplomacy, as in other multi-layered and varied engagement processes between various stakeholders, certain practical questions should be considered upfront (Du Plessis, 2006):

- Who needs to engage in the process?
- On what (agenda) do they (various stakeholders respectively) need to engage?
- How will the proceedings and decision-making unfold?
- Where does engagement happen (venue/space)?
- Who initiates the process?

The suggested starting point is to identify which institutions need to be involved in the process, and which individuals (or position-holders) within those institutions need to be engaged. These stakeholders can then be clustered according to influence and interest, and their existing relationships mapped to understand who needs to be involved in the different stages of the process, and how they can be included. Many tools can assist in this step. Figure 2.2 shows the often-used stakeholder interest/influence grid (Künkel et al., 2011: 168), which categorises stakeholders according to their current influence and interest. In the process of mobilising climate finance, most effort should be made to engage stakeholders with both high interest and high influence. Stakeholders who have high power, but lower interest should be engaged in order to raise interest, while those who have high interest, but less influence should be supported to gain influence. Stakeholders with low interest and low influence do not necessarily need to be engaged, but as their status might change, their status in the grid should be revised frequently (Künkel et al., 2011: 170). The status of all stakeholders should be revisited at various stages of any process.


Figure 2.2: Stakeholder influence/interest grid



Source: Adapted from Künkel et al. (2011: 168)

To understand how to engage stakeholders when mobilising funding, Figure 2.3 offers some insights into a possible approach, which is based on the five stages of the policy cycle and applied problem-solving. For the purposes of this discussion, the first three stages – agenda-setting, formulation of course of action or strategy, and decision-making – are most relevant as the focus of this paper is on mobilising, rather than implementing, climate finance. The stages do not necessarily follow each other in a linear manner, as, in practice, it may be necessary to go back and forth between various stages to consolidate the mobilisation of the relevant funding.

Figure 2.3: Stages of mobilising climate funding for cities



Source: Adapted from Howlett et al. (2009: 12–13)

Stage 1: Agenda-setting

This is also called the problem recognition stage, and refers to bringing climate finance mobilisation for cities to the attention of a broader set of stakeholders. This could be done through the coordination of a summit, a meeting or “conference diplomacy”, or issue-specific diplomacy, as with multilateral more temporary diplomacy approaches (Du Plessis, 2006: 140). For South African cities, bodies such as the SACN, The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), the International Council for Local Environment Initiatives (ICLEI) or SALGA may be best placed to coordinate the initial engagement, allowing for confidence-building (where no tensions exist between stakeholders) and partnership-building through dialogue, should partnerships be required later on.

Stage 2: Formulation of course of action or strategy

During this stage, solutions are proposed and/or a course of action or strategy is formulated, based on what was agreed during the agenda-setting stage. This may require some lobbying, informing, and coordination within or between institutions, so that the relevant stakeholders are able to consider the available options that will be presented to decision-makers in Stage 3. During Stages 1 and 2, some negotiation between stakeholders may be required if conflicting interests arise.

Stage 3: Decision-making

Some lobbying may be required prior to this stage, to convince decision-makers to follow the proposed course of action or strategy. To ensure that the relevant decision-making stakeholders are at the table, some coordination may be necessary. This stage typically involves the fewest number of stakeholders.

Stage 4: Implementation

During this stage, the relevant institutions will implement the course of action or strategy decided upon, which will involve a set of key implementing role-players.

Stage 5: Evaluation

This stage will typically involve a broader set of stakeholders. The findings from the evaluation of the mobilisation/implementation process will again feed into agenda-setting stages for further or other relevant processes. Stages 4 and 5 are implementation-related and may involve auditing, oversight and accountability measures.

Building influencing strategies among stakeholders

As mentioned above, various strategies may be used to involve and engage stakeholders in mobilising climate finance for cities. They include confidence-building; dialogues; negotiation, mediation and arbitration; and lobbying. Each strategy is suited to certain situations or contexts.

Confidence-building

When key stakeholders distrust each other or have tense existing relationships, confidence-building will need to take place prior to, or as part of, the mobilisation process. Confidence-building is an incremental approach that requires each side to perceive that the other's attitudes have changed, as evidenced by continued changed behaviours. Confidence-building among or between stakeholders requires each side to be willing and able to change (Fisher et al., 2011).

Dialogues

Stakeholder dialogues can be defined as a “methodology for designing and implementing consultation and cooperation in a complex change process that require different interest groups to be included and integrated” (Künkel et al., 2011: 17). Communication in dialogues is not unilateral, unlike when sharing information. Dialogues work well in situations where change is envisioned, and/or stakeholder contributions to processes are truly valued. They are useful in cases that require joint implementation, broad acceptance by stakeholders, the integration of various perspectives, and inspiration for change. Dialogues are also used to harness the collective intelligence and innovation of more than one stakeholder group in order to solve problems. The form of stakeholder dialogues (e.g. consultations, platforms, initiatives or partnerships) must be appropriate for a particular context and align with the purpose of the dialogue (Künkel et al., 2011). In any stakeholder dialogue, the common or shared goal must be visible, and the value of engaging in the process needs to be (or become) clear for each stakeholder. To initiate (or keep on track) such processes often requires facilitation and/or convening (ibid.).

Negotiation, mediation and arbitration

Negotiation is often used in conflict situations and is a type of structured dialogue between stakeholders or role-players who do not agree on an issue, without any third party's involvement. The aim is for the conflicting parties to gain clarity on the areas of disagreement and, through the process, arrive at an agreement to settle differences (Fisher et al., 2011). When this is not possible or fails, and direct communication between stakeholders is not possible, mediation processes may be pursued. In mediation, a third party who is recognised and accepted by all sides, intervenes. If the mediation is also unsuccessful, arbitration processes may be considered, where arbitrators consider the arguments of the various conflicting stakeholders and then decide on the course of action (ibid.).

Lobbying (and campaigning)

This refers to approaching decision-makers (or those with access to them) directly. Lobbying may be done privately and often occurs before important decision-making meetings in order to influence the decision(s) taken (ibid.). In contrast, campaigning is aimed at mobilising the broader public to support changing particular policies. It is often combined with lobbying, thereby adding pressure from the public to the lobbying of decision-makers. In such processes, what is important is to bring to the table a clear message that is supported by well-researched arguments, and to communicate clearly the outcomes of the proposed change (ibid.).

Putting Climate Diplomacy into Practice

Two prominent climate finance issues that limit city mobilisation efforts are used here to demonstrate agenda setting and influencing strategy, and illustrate the practical application of climate finance diplomacy.

Accessing the Green Climate Fund

In 2010, the UNFCCC established the GCF with the aim of assisting developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to respond to climate change. It is intended to be the primary climate finance fund, with the goal of getting commitments of \$100-billion from public and private resources by 2020. Under the current endorsement process, the national designated authority (the DEA) submits proposals on behalf of the country and is assisted by two GCF-accredited entities: the DBSA and the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI).

Although the GCF's initial intention was to include local government actors, its structure, policies and process make it difficult for cities to be involved to any substantive degree. The South African government has institutionalised a process through which municipal and provincial governments may apply to international climate change funds, but several barriers remain. Fiduciary standards make it challenging for any South African city to become an accredited entity, while cities need to have experience in managing complex projects and programmes, and to ensure that project outcomes align with the GCF monitoring and evaluation criteria. The lengthy intergovernmental processes, and having to work through the national ministry, make it difficult for cities to apply for the fund, as politics and bureaucracy may delay access to funds.

Agenda setting - 'knowing the city and knowing the other'

The aim is to enter negotiations to receive GCF accreditation for a South African metropolitan city, and the objectives are the following:

- Short term: To engage the national designated authority on the needs of the city and to develop proposals that could feed into the current accredited entity project pipelines.
- Medium term: To lobby the national designated authority and South African representatives to the GCF about cities having direct access to the fund.
- Long term: To become an accredited entity, so that the city can develop proposals and projects for GCF financing.

For the city:

- Its core interest is streamlining access to the GCF, by minimising the administrative requirements from different government spheres.
- Its core concern is that managing GCF financial flows would require significantly increased capacity to enable the city to manage project implementation, fiduciary responsibilities, reporting to the GCF, and the required monitoring and evaluation.

For the national designated authority:

- Its core interest is to enable sub-national governments to implement climate actions.
- Its core concern is that giving cities direct access would mean increased oversight for the authority in managing GCF financial flows, as multiple cities would be applying for accreditation.

Influencing strategy:

Confidence building

- Build a track record of climate change projects from current climate finance sources including SANBI and DBSA (as a short-term objective) to demonstrate the ability to manage climate projects.
- Demonstrate the climate and co-benefit outcomes from successful project implementation, to outline how the city is delivering on National Development Plan (NDP) targets.

Lobbying

- Convene a discussion among South African cities with a similar aim, to build an alliance and thereby strengthen the negotiating position.
- A neutral entity, such as the SACN, C40, SALGA or ICLEI, should facilitate the discussions among South African cities.

Negotiation and stakeholder dialogues

- The aim would be to demonstrate that accrediting cities would enhance the overall process of GCF applications, as cities would not need to submit proposals for financing through SANBI and DBSA.
- Although managing multiple accredited entities may require more resources, the process of managing accredited entities is already in place and so the DEA would still have oversight of the direction of city GCF proposals.
- To address the concern about devolving control, the city would need to demonstrate how control by the DEA would be maintained. One argument could be that direct access would not exclude other accredited entities from applying for GCF funding. In other words, cities would not be competing with other accredited entities but rather expanding potential access to GCF climate finance.
- The benefits for the DEA of expanding access to cities would be that South Africa could mobilise more climate finance and have successful diplomatic negotiations with UNFCCC and GCF processes.

Mobilising co-finance for adaptation from the insurance sector

Cities are centres of economic growth and their high-value assets need to be safeguarded against climate risks, to reduce post-disaster economic losses and enhance recovery. Therefore, insurance is an important financial instrument for disaster risk, as it allows for residual risks to be managed after the implementation of risk reduction, adaptation and risk retention approaches. The relationship between cities and insurance companies may be reciprocal. There may be opportunities for exchanges that go beyond the obvious interaction, where cities insure their infrastructure against climate hazards, and insurance companies gain clients for their products. Insurance companies hold economic-loss data, which could provide cities with useful insights for planning adaptation and resilience measures and ensuring that implementation is targeted at focused locations and sectors. Furthermore, insurance companies can offer insight into known risk reduction measures and behaviours that allow for premium cost reductions, particularly for more traditional climate hazards such as floods and droughts. Communicating these measures to cities could help city decision-makers to design better policies for reducing infrastructure risk with cascading impacts.

In terms of longer-term planning, cities would be able to construct new infrastructure in ways that reduce interdependent risks, thereby decreasing the exposure of a city to climate hazards. This could also reduce economic losses resulting from high-severity, low-frequency events, and so maintain the profitability of disaster risk insurance products.

Agenda setting: ‘knowing the city and knowing the other’:

The aim is to develop a partnership with the insurance sector to co-finance adaptation and risk reduction projects in the city, with the following objectives:

- Short/medium term: To engage insurance companies to understand the potential for collaboration or cooperation in the areas of risk modelling, data analytics, risk quantification, adaptation and resilience option design, and data collection practices.
- Long term: To mobilise co-financing from the insurance sector for adaptation and risk reduction projects.

For the city:

- Its core interest is to mobilise private finance for the implementation of risk reduction and adaptation initiatives.
- Its core concern is that municipal assets are at risk from extreme weather events and must be safeguarded. Adaptation initiatives could reduce the residual risk thereby lessening potential economic losses.

For the insurance sector:

- Its core interest is to develop, market and sell insurance contracts, so that profits are maximised while pay-outs (losses) incurred from perils are minimised.
- Its core concern is that extreme weather events will increase, and so economic losses could become too substantial and frequent to offer climate-risk insurance products. This would ultimately affect the profitability of the company, particularly if an extreme weather event is catastrophic and multiple insurance contracts are triggered simultaneously.

Influencing strategy:

Confidence building

- Data-sharing agreements between cities and insurance companies could foster greater trust. For example, economic loss data could indicate the risk exposure, while the municipality's spatial data could provide insight for developing possible risk-transfer products.
- Policies that reduce the risk of loss for the municipality, insurance sector and the public can be pursued. For example, insurance companies could disincentivise the building of infrastructure in floodplains under extreme climate scenarios, which the city can reinforce by implementing zoning laws that prohibit the building of infrastructure in these areas.

Lobbying

- Convening a discussion between South African cities and the insurance sector could allow for greater insight into the motivations of the insurance sector.
- A neutral entity, such as the SACN, C40, SALGA or ICLEI, should facilitate the discussion between South African cities and the insurance sector.

Negotiation and stakeholder dialogues

- Insurance companies may be more willing to co-finance adaptation and resilience measures if cities are existing or prospective insurance holders, or when risk reduction efforts reduce the probability of loss for other contract holders while safeguarding municipal assets.
- Cities investigating insurance products are in a better position to negotiate, as terms and conditions of the insurance contracts are not yet formalised, while cities renewing their insurance contracts annually would have the opportunity to renegotiate terms.
- One example is Santam's partnerships with NGOs in Port Elizabeth to provide financial support for alien invasive clearing to reduce fire risk in several nature reserves near St Francis Bay (Kouga Local Municipality). In 2012, Santam settled claims for about R40-million in response to fires in the municipality. The motivation for Santam's participation is apparent: providing resilience and adaptation finance will reduce the probability of fires, thereby reducing the number of pay-outs to residential insurance holders.

Conclusion

If South Africa is to achieve its ambitious climate targets, the participation of cities is crucial. Cities are where the majority of South Africans live and are centres of economic growth whose valuable assets need to be protected. For cities to transition to a low-carbon and climate-resilient future means having access to financing to implement adaptation and mitigation measures. It also requires government to mainstream climate change interventions into their planning tools and intergovernmental grants. This lack of mainstreaming in intergovernmental grants is one of the several barriers that impede cities from accessing the required funding. Other barriers include policy uncertainty, poor intergovernmental coordination, competing demands on budget, and capacity constraints.

This paper argues that, through climate diplomacy, cities can mobilise funding for climate actions. A model for climate finance diplomacy was developed, based on agenda-setting and influencing strategy, and its practical application was illustrated using the examples of accessing the GCF and co-financing adaptation measures with the insurance sector. The following action-orientated recommendations are proposed, as the initial steps for enhanced city diplomacy for climate finance mobilisation:

Establish internal knowledge exchanges and working groups

- City officials involved in negotiations about climate finance will require multi-disciplinary knowledge. Therefore, convening internal knowledge exchanges could be beneficial and may enhance horizontal and vertical coordination.
- Working groups, comprising representatives from different departments, both internal and external to the city, could formalise the knowledge exchanges.
- The identification of champions is crucial when developing working groups, to ensure continuity.

Collaborate with neutral intermediaries

- Local governments could engage neutral climate intermediaries, such as the SACN, SALGA, C40 and ICLEI, to facilitate dialogue sessions.
- Where negotiating positions differ, a neutral intermediary who understands the city interests may be more effective in convening sensitive discussions.
- Neutral climate intermediaries act as interlocutors and usually possess stakeholder engagement, facilitation and technical expertise.

Undertake pre-engagement research

- The climate finance area is still evolving, and so local governments must undertake research prior to engaging with counterparties. This allows for a greater understanding of the position of the city and possibilities for engagement and negotiation.
- The city may wish to partner with academic institutions, NGOs and thinktanks to undertake this research, which would also allow for cost sharing.
- What is important is that the knowledge created be institutionalised, so that long-term capacity can be built within the city.

Long-term partnerships

- Negotiations with counterparts may require the fostering of long-term partnerships.
- Trust and patience are key elements to the negotiating partnership if local government is meet its long-term objectives.

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Knowledge Co-production in City Diplomacy: Experiences, challenges, and opportunities

Ruth Massey

Introduction

Cities of the Global South face significant challenges, which cut across multiple regions, sectors, cultures and disciplines. The challenges that need urgent attention include rising population numbers, rapid urbanisation, the expansion of slums and informal settlements, food insecurity, the lack of basic services and infrastructure, poverty, and inequality. Adding further complexity is the compounding effect of climate change impacts. To address these challenges will require a broad range of intersecting forms of knowledge and expertise, from multiple layers of urban society (Moser, 2013; Polk, 2015). Engagement with stakeholders from different realms of society is needed, not only to recognise the interrelationships between human, infrastructural and environmental systems, but also to ensure knowledge is relevant to societal problems and issues (Bergmann et al., 2012; Frantzeskaki and Kabisch, 2016). Therefore, interdisciplinary approaches (such as knowledge co-production) are needed to engage with diverse knowledge holders such as scientists, citizens and practitioners. There is tremendous scope for cities to work together, combining their knowledge and experiences to create a new set of knowledge systems that could help all parties meet their priorities and objectives. Knowledge co-production is an effective and promising method of generating and applying knowledge that is both practical and useful (Mistra Urban Futures, 2015; Palmer and Walasek, 2016; Trencher et al., 2014). It is also linked to a growing requirement for collaborative governance arrangements and the search for solutions to recurring and entrenched problems at the local level. Knowledge co-production can offer mutual learning spaces and an alternate pathway to sustainable urban transformation, through socially relevant, scientifically reliable, and widely beneficial knowledge generation and application (Campbell and Vanderhoven, 2016; Polk, 2015).

Knowledge Co-production


During the 1970s, the term 'co-production' first emerged in the field of public administration, referring to the objective of bringing together different stakeholder groups in order to tackle complex challenges and improve development and delivery outcomes (Simon et al., 2018). In the late 1990s, the political economist, Elinor Ostrom, expanded upon the concept, defining co-production as "a process through which inputs from individuals who are not 'in' the same organization are transformed into goods and services" (Ostrom, 1996: 1073). Co-production usually involves public sector institutions (generally local authorities) engaging with residents, communities, and local organisations in order to improve service provision (Polk, 2015). Many of the early definitions and formulations of co-production excluded the role that other stakeholders, such as private developers, entrepreneurs and non-governmental partners, could play. Contemporary approaches acknowledge that multiple and varied actors can participate in co-production, and definitions have expanded to include both individuals and organisations collaborating with government agencies to design and manage services and service delivery (Bovaird, 2007; Poocharoen and Ting, 2015). Co-production is also used in many different contexts, going beyond the co-production of services to include institutional co-production and knowledge co-production (Galuszka, 2018). The term is used in governance, policymaking and research, and often in policy and planning processes when facilitating stakeholder engagement (Moser, 2016). Co-production fits well methodologically with processes such as international development that draws upon the perspectives and expertise of several different partners (Collodi et al., 2017).

Knowledge co-production is currently one of the cornerstones of effective public policy and is a valuable approach for public service reform, and the effective and sustainable planning and delivery of public services (Osborne et al., 2016). It involves different actors (from science, policy and practice) working together to identify problems and challenges, produce knowledge, and then put this co-created knowledge into action through partnerships, collaboration, integration and learning application (Hegger et al., 2012). This approach re-thinks the conventional relationship between knowledge and decision-making, where knowledge is produced independently of decision-making, by acknowledging the diversity of knowledge systems, actors, networks, social relations and urban arrangements that all play a role in both creating and applying knowledge

(Muñoz-Erickson et al., 2017). The co-production of knowledge is both an activity (creating and applying knowledge) and a social and political exercise (ibid.). Co-production can assist in developing and nurturing different spaces of learning and reflection and support the sustainable transformation of urban spaces (Perry and Atherton, 2017). Knowledge co-production is central in the process of creating “opportunities for new ways of thinking, relating and acting together” (Bretzer, 2016: 38).

Scientists and academics are not the only stakeholders who hold and produce knowledge that may prove useful in addressing current challenges (Osuteye et al., 2019). Co-production can take place among various stakeholders with numerous types of knowledge (Figure 3.1). Traditionally, knowledge co-production occurs among the scientific community (often university academics and researchers) and government organisations, among local communities and scientists, or among communities and government organisations. However, as Figure 3.2 shows, knowledge co-production is not restricted to these pairings. Each stakeholder has their own set of discourses (language), knowledge (including ideas and beliefs), practices, and goals (purposes and mandates) that must be recognised and respected (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Each stakeholder’s lens is as valuable as the others.

Figure 3.1: Stakeholder environment




Source: Adapted from Jasanoff and Wynne (1998).

The process and outputs of knowledge co-production bring several benefits:

- The building of diverse knowledge networks, which allows for sharing and capitalising knowledge from a variety of different stakeholders and actors (Albert et al., 2014). These networks, partnerships and relationships enable information to be shared, and new knowledge to be created (Lemos and Morehouse, 2011).
- The creation of synergies, as different but complementary actors contribute in various ways. For example, communities contribute their local knowledge and skills, the state provides resources and technical expertise, and scientists bring their research and data analysis capabilities. Working together increases the chances of creating usable and actionable knowledge that can improve an initiative’s outcome or approach (Watson, 2014), and inform policy and strategic plans, such as spatial development frameworks and integrated development plans.
- The combination of technical knowledge, produced in laboratories or research centres, and the knowledge of communities, government, business, etcetera, that can be synergised to contextualise, test and co-produce usable and actionable new knowledge (Negev and Teschner, 2013).
- More equitable and socially just decision-making, policy development and planning, as all knowledge and expertise are seen to add value, and many different needs and contexts are accounted for in co-creating the knowledge.
- The potential to link knowledge to action through collaboration, as knowledge alone, if not acted upon, has limited impact.

- Enhanced and strengthened relationships between government and other stakeholders, thereby improving governance systems, service quality and delivery, accountability, capacity building and empowerment (Boyle and Harris, 2009; Sancino, 2016).
- Stronger city diplomacy, as cities work together to share and create new actionable and usable knowledge.
- The space to enable the exchange of knowledge and the sharing of perspectives and insights from a wide range of stakeholders. All expertise is considered, and all participants are acknowledged as having something of value to add.

Figure 3.2: Knowledge co-production between different stakeholders



Source: Adapted from Jasanoff and Wynne (1998).

Like many collaborative arrangements and practices, the knowledge co-production process also has several challenges and constraints that stakeholders need to be aware of and work together to mitigate (Howlett and Ramesh, 2017). Co-producing knowledge requires deliberate communication, negotiation and the building of a shared understanding for joint progress. Therefore, stakeholders may hit roadblocks when integrating knowledge and methodologies, aligning the various ways of thinking and conceptualising a particular challenge. To arrive at applicable and useful knowledge requires thinking through the practical element of the knowledge being produced (Pohl et al., 2010). Including all types of stakeholder knowledge may be challenging because different actors have different ways of generating and conceptualising data and information. Being aware of this will help to achieve a more inclusive approach (both in terms of power and integration), and an actionable, usable set of co-produced knowledge (ibid.).

The process of co-producing knowledge could also have legal and intellectual property complications that need to be considered. To ensure that the knowledge co-produced benefits all parties, ownership of knowledge inputs and outputs needs to be established, and innovative, diverse ways of thinking and knowledge sharing (and ownership) are required. It will mean being aware of differing values, rationalities and

methods of practice that exist among the various actors and how these interact within a particular context (Filipe et al., 2017). Communication and information channels also need careful navigation and negotiation, so all co-produced knowledge can be made available and accessible to a wider audience. The motivation for being involved in the knowledge co-production also needs to be considered, as each actor may have different reasons for participating. Ideally, the primary motivation for being involved would be the creation of a joint value as the output of the co-production project; however, realistically, each actor would be functioning under different institutional pressures and incentives (Culwick et al., 2019). It is also important to caution that knowledge co-production does not automatically lead to good governance, diplomacy or actual service/project delivery, but it does strengthen these activities going forward.

Principles and Elements of Successful Knowledge Co-production

Two types of conditions affect the way in which knowledge is co-produced (Frantzeskaki and Kabisch, 2016):

- a) **The set-up of the knowledge co-production process.** This includes openness in the process and form of discussion (open forum), which enables the sharing of ideas and knowledge. Actors from multiple and varied disciplines and sectors must be included, as their different experiences and expertise contribute and add value to the process. Successful knowledge co-production requires (ibid.):
 - *Openly shared knowledge:* This is particularly important for sharing and learning, solving problems, searching for solutions (Leith et al., 2014), and understanding diverse values, beliefs and world views (Polk, 2015). It means openly discussing and clearly presenting the needs of all stakeholders at the start of the process, in order to ensure mutual understanding and respect.
 - *Inclusive of multiple types of knowledge:* A more creative and usable output is more likely when varied types of knowledge (including implied knowledge and knowledge from experience) are incorporated. This approach also ensures accountability and applicability (socially, politically and in practice) of the new knowledge co-produced (ibid.).
 - *Legitimate knowledge:* The credibility of knowledge is important and assists in building trust in the engagement process and outcomes. The results of the knowledge co-production process are also more likely to be used in project planning and delivery, and policy development and implementation (Lemos and Morehouse, 2005).

- b) **The expected value and benefit to society, policy and practice of the co-produced knowledge and its uptake.** This includes the real-world usability of the co-produced knowledge and the rate at which this knowledge is used to address a particular challenge or to contribute to policy development and/or debates. The following elements are needed to ensure that this takes place successfully (Frantzeskaki and Kabisch, 2016):
 - *Usable knowledge:* This may be knowledge that directly influences policy and decision-making (Lemos and Morehouse, 2005), projects and programmes (planning, delivery and monitoring) and/or strategic planning. The type of co-produced knowledge may be more useful in one context than another and may also have time limitations on its usefulness (for example: some climate change models).
 - *Actionable knowledge:* Generated knowledge must be applicable and relevant to the context in which it is being co-produced.

Successful knowledge co-production embodies the following four principles (Norström et al., 2020):

- *Context-based:* Understanding how the challenge came to exist in the first place and how it is affected by the economic, environmental/ecological, political and social/cultural contexts.
- *Pluralistic/collaborative:* Recognising the range of knowledge, expertise, capabilities and perspectives. Gender, religion, ethnicity, culture and age should also all be considered when developing the knowledge co-production process.
- *Goal-oriented:* Having goals that are well-defined, inclusive and shared appropriately among all involved. Seeing solution-oriented knowledge from the start will increase the likelihood of success, joint commitment and focus (Lang et al., 2012).
- *Interactive and reflexive:* Ensuring ongoing and continuous learning, frequent communication/contact and active engagement by all actors in the process. The knowledge co-production process should include some flexibility (of timelines, budgets, and project duration) as any situation may evolve and change over time (Dilling and Lemos, 2011).

City Diplomacy and Knowledge Co-production: Local to global

Cities are rapidly becoming leaders in creating and implementing innovative approaches to sustainable development, exploring ways to reduce vulnerability and strengthen resilience. Significant advancements have been made in green technologies and infrastructure design; the development of more efficient transportation and waste management systems; the mitigation of flood, fire, and other hazards; and building construction. Urban areas are more than physical and institutional infrastructures: they are also spaces where diverse organisations/actors, along with their knowledge systems, can come together to stimulate new ideas and innovations (Acuto et al., 2017). The rapid rise in globalisation has enabled cities to form networks, facilitate public diplomacy, foster collaborative relationships (for example, between international public and private bodies), participate in dialogue with other cities, and share lessons learned and best practices. Cities can now engage meaningfully in all manner of global conversations and negotiations, reach agreements, sign accords, and influence world politics (Musch et al., 2008). Thanks to their networks, collective influence and will, and implementation power, cities and local governments have responded to global challenges (such as climate change and pandemics) more quickly and nimbly than national governments (Dossani and Amiri, 2019). Local governments have an “in-between power” (van Ham, 2010), being both deeply connected with the public and local communities and forming part of a larger government system. Although this can prove challenging, local government is able to play an important diplomatic role, capitalising on the potential for global influence in order to co-produce knowledge, access international funding and help local communities (Dossani and Amiri, 2019).

Cities are expected to play a larger (and increasingly accelerated) role in the national and global governance required for sustainable development (Acuto et al., 2017). With global elements more present locally, city planning, and development will need to bring to the fore diplomacy, good governance, democracy, political participation and knowledge co-production (Norström et al., 2020). Cities have complex connections and interdependencies with other places and are affected by larger-scale multiple drivers (Moser, 2013). As cities face more complex challenges, they will need to adopt an approach that is cognisant of local, national and global dynamics, rather than ‘one-size-fits-all’. They will also need to be flexible to respond effectively to dynamic and diverse urban spaces. Knowledge co-production allows for context-sensitivity and flexibility and can assist in striking a balance between the priorities that are shared internationally and the distinct practices of local contexts (Polk, 2015). Traditionally, knowledge co-production processes have involved teams of non-academics and academics working together on a local or regional scale (Norström et al., 2020). The interest in using this approach on a broader regional, or even global, scale is growing in this time of the Anthropocene¹³, with its dynamic, complex, multi-scale and multi-national challenges. There has been a rapid rise in co-productive partnership arrangements at the local level, including several forms of knowledge partnerships for various contexts (Trencher et al., 2014). The process of co-producing knowledge can enhance and strengthen relationships between cities, as experiences and expertise are shared and co-created. This could have a knock-on effect at the national level, strengthening diplomatic ties between countries. The process of working together to co-produce knowledge can be a useful and powerful mechanism to build relationships between cities, form collaborations, provide support, learn lessons, and strengthen international relations and cross-city dialogue (van Ham, 2010).

Mistra Urban Futures and CityLabs: A case study of knowledge co-production

The Mistra Urban Futures and CityLabs knowledge co-production initiative is found in various cities around the world, including Cape Town. Knowledge co-production is used to address challenges such as sustainable urban futures (Polk, 2015), urban service provision (Mitlin and Bartlett, 2018), climate change (Howarth et al., 2017), urban development (Omondi et al., 2014), multi-level governance and planning (Watson, 2014), policy evaluation and ecosystem services (Palomo et al., 2016). Although the Mistra Urban Futures and CityLabs case study is not a direct example of knowledge co-production between cities (leading to city diplomacy), it provides a deep dive into the process and (importantly) the lessons learned, and the knowledge created.

¹³ Term used to describe the most recent period in Earth’s history when human activity started to have a significant impact on the planet’s climate and ecosystems (<https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/anthropocene/>)

Mistra Urban Futures is an international centre for research and knowledge on sustainable urban development that seeks to effect notable and positive change in the lives of urban communities. It offers a collaborative environment for intellectual exchange, discussion and information generation, by working in conjunction with the public and private sector, including local and provincial governments, universities and research institutes, businesses, and civil groups (Hansson and Polk, 2012). Mistra Urban Futures aims to confront real problems and provide unique solutions built upon comparative transnational research, by using its local interaction platforms (LIPs) to produce innovative ideas and broader awareness (Palmer and Walasek, 2016).

Currently, Mistra Urban Futures has five LIPs, spread across Europe and Africa, in the United Kingdom (Sheffield-Manchester, previously just Greater Manchester), Sweden (the Skåne region, around the cities of Lund and Malmö, and Gothenburg), Kenya (Kisumu) and South Africa (Cape Town). In the LIPs, teams of multiple stakeholders collaborate on the lifespan of a research project, from its start to finish (Mistra Urban Futures, 2015). Stakeholders are pulled in from the governance, practice and research sectors, to jointly create information and awareness that advocate for a move towards 'Just Cities', or cities that are built around principles of fairness, environmentalism and accessibility (Polk et al., 2013). LIPs offer a place beyond the constrictions of large hierarchical systems, for contributors to tackle problems inside and across urban spaces (Palmer and Walasek, 2016).

In 2008, the CityLab programme was founded to conduct interdisciplinary research into the particular challenges experienced in the City of Cape Town. It is a bespoke, university-located but external-partnered system that interrogates and explores the dynamics within Cape Town and its wider urban area (Mistra Urban Futures, 2015). Its aim is to tackle tangible issues across the city-region by generating actionable information that overcomes the confines of narrow disciplines and spans the gap between practice and policy (Culwick et al., 2019). In 2010, CityLabs became a central part of the Cape Town LIP, when the African Centre for Cities (ACC) at the University of Cape Town (UCT) joined Mistra Urban Futures.

CityLabs unites disparate information groups across academia and government in order to generate city research that could influence policy (Smit et al., 2020). As hubs for researchers and practitioners to produce policy-informing knowledge, different CityLabs have looked at different ways to produce actionable research that can tackle the real problems of sustainability in cities (Palmer and Walasek, 2016). Unlike other forums, such as 'living labs' that seek to produce technological solutions, CityLabs seek to generate collaborative information that will allow multiple government departments to tackle sustainability issues in cities (Culwick et al., 2019). Their mandate is to foster mutual respect and awareness of the issues affecting multiple groups, by bringing together people from across society on impartial territory, which allows for increased openness and information exchange (Palmer and Walasek, 2016). Although the different CityLabs share some commonalities, they do not have to conform to a specific set of criteria but are influenced by, and built to respond to, their unique local situation (Mistra Urban Futures, 2015).

In 2008, the ACC held nine CityLabs that brought together representatives from government, academia and external stakeholders to work on creating applicable research for policies affecting urban problems in Cape Town (Smit et al., 2020). Different forms of information were combined to run seminars and publish articles that captured the diversity of official, civic and academic perspectives, and the situations affecting them (Culwick et al., 2019). As a result, 'communities of knowledge and practice' were formed. Many of the CityLabs included additional activities, such as conducting collaborative research; producing policies in conjunction with legislators; and creating, designing, and implementing collaborative innovation projects. The subjects tackled were decided through discussion with the Western Cape Provincial Government and the City of Cape Town (COCT). Two focused on the specific urban areas of the central city and Philippi, while the other seven dealt with the thematic areas of public culture; safety, violence and inclusion; sustainable human settlements; healthy cities; urban flooding; and climate change (Smit et al., 2020).

Several of the CityLabs addressed sustainability issues:

- **The CityLab on Sustainable Human Settlements** aimed to create a collaborative policy, the Living Cape Framework, that built on regular dialogue between official actors from multiple sectors over several years (Smit et al., 2020). Participants brainstormed, grouped and prioritised problems, overseen by a neutral mediator, and a policy document was written collaboratively after numerous drafts and revisions (Culwick et al., 2019).

- **The CityLab on Urban Ecology** met monthly to discuss different areas of Cape Town's urban ecology, where each topic focused on a particular area of the urban ecology in Cape Town. Meetings were attended by representatives from government and academia, as well as members of the public and practitioners, with their composition changing according to the subject being discussed.
- **The CityLab addressing Climate Change** collectively commissioned and reviewed articles dealing with the impact of climate change upon Cape Town and offered solutions to mitigate its impact (Culwick et al., 2019).

After the first set of City Labs, the ACC refined and expanded the idea through other initiatives, such as the Tanzanian Urbanisation Laboratory, which used a similar method to tackle sustainability problems on a national level (Mistra Urban Futures, 2015). Another initiative was the Mistra Urban Futures Knowledge Transfer Programme, which involved personnel exchanges between the ACC and COCT. Government officials were temporarily embedded in universities, and academics were seconded to city departments, as a way of fostering greater understanding and information development that could transcend the city-academia divide (Culwick et al., 2019). In phase one, four ACC academics were assigned to different COCT administrative departments for a period of three years, where they used a knowledge co-production approach to address major sustainability challenges facing the city. Reciprocally, every year, six officials from Cape Town joined the ACC, to record and share their perspectives on these issues, and in exchange be assisted in crafting policy documentation on transport, the green economy and climate change, among others (ibid.).

In 2014, the Gauteng City Region Observatory (GCRO) in Johannesburg also adopted the CityLab approach, with the intention of investigating and creating information about environmental infrastructure within the Gauteng Region. Through this CityLab, information on green infrastructural initiatives could be collaboratively created and disseminated by diverse and representative stakeholders and municipal and provincial officials (GCRO, 2014). The GCRO investigated planned green infrastructure projects and assessed the information-sharing requirements for integrating green infrastructure into the municipality's systems of planning. Over a year, Gauteng's Green Infrastructure CityLab met six times and included about 15 contributors from provincial and local government, non-government organisations and universities. Every CityLab meeting fed into the next, interrogating the different angles from which to approach green infrastructure (ibid.). A green infrastructure planning approach was developed and, in October 2018, the publication, "A framework for a green infrastructure planning approach in the Gauteng City Region", received the Research in Sustainability award for 2017/18 from the AfriSam-SAIA Awards for Sustainable Architecture + Innovation.


This case study, supported by other literature, highlights multiple lessons for undertaking a collaborative knowledge co-production initiative:

- **Provide space for continual learning and flexibility.** All those involved need to reflect carefully on methods and approaches throughout the process and, if necessary, adapt these to changing circumstances and settings. Knowledge co-production is not a linear, neat set of processes, particularly when science, policy and society interact. Diverse actors in different contexts will have varying expectations: some will be interested in the political and social feasibility of the knowledge co-production process, while others may be preoccupied with the need for scientific rigour (Osuteye et al., 2019). Therefore, it is crucial to appreciate that all types of knowledge are valid and valuable, while ensuring that the types of knowledge created are useful and useable on the ground (Culwick et al., 2019). This requires building consensus among stakeholders on the solutions and actionable outcomes, which can be time-consuming but remains crucial for the success of the co-production process.
- **Ensure meaningful participation.** Meaningful participation requires being aware of the different community dynamics, ambitions, motivations, power structures and interdependencies. Ensuring ongoing involvement of all actors and a culture of co-operation needs continual communication and interaction. Securing institutional, rather than individual, commitment to the process also minimises inconsistent participation, thereby avoiding any disruption to the process (Osuteye et al., 2019).
- **Build relationships.** The building of solid and strong partnerships improves the likelihood of success and can lead to future project collaborations and joint-funding opportunities for those involved (as well as opportunities for city diplomacy). In some cases, the process of bringing stakeholders together to work on a specific problem or challenge may be more beneficial than the knowledge outcome/product (ibid.). Indeed, the building of strong, long-term relationships and partnerships and the process of knowledge co-production can themselves be agents of change and diplomacy (Culwick et al., 2019).

Knowledge Co-production in Practice

This section builds on the lessons learnt from the Mistra Urban Futures and CityLabs examples, and the literature, to provide a guide for setting up and running a knowledge co-production initiative. Knowledge co-production processes look similar to programme or project management processes. A successful co-production process needs to ensure that a tangible piece of solution-oriented, actionable and usable knowledge is produced collaboratively through the involvement of multiple stakeholders. Figure 3.3 shows the different phases that make up such a process.


Figure 3.3: Phases of setting up and running a knowledge co-production initiative



Source: Adapted from Djenontin and Meadow (2018).

Although a structured (phased) approach is provided, the co-production of knowledge cannot be seen strictly as a series of steps and controlled activities. It is a fluid process that is open to diverse approaches and objectives. The aim and purpose of the co-production can either be very specific or much wider, depending on context and process. Flexibility is important, as in some instances certain steps and approaches will need to be re-evaluated at different times (Dilling and Lemos, 2011). The phase-by-phase approach provided here is a suggested format and may need to be adjusted to fit within a particular context. What is important is to ensure that the main elements of successful knowledge co-production are included in both the process and its outputs (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4: Main elements of successful knowledge co-production



Source: Frantzeskaki and Kabisch (2016); Norström et al. (2020); Osuteye et al. (2019); Polk (2015)

Phase 1: Context

During the development/initiation phase, it is crucial to take sufficient time to set up the framework. The success of knowledge co-production is determined by the amount of work done at the beginning of the process. Knowledge co-production is heavily influenced by the conditions under which it is created, and so it is important to build trust, resolve existing tensions and clarify expectations at the beginning. It is also important to make the following clear: knowledge and expertise are recognised as important and valuable; the process will be based on openness, respect and negotiation; the knowledge of some actors will not be privileged over that of others (Pohl et al., 2010).

The first step is to decide the particular challenge or area of importance (solution/goal-oriented), and to be very specific about the context/location (Norström et al., 2020) and the exact features that need to be examined (for example, flooding in informal settlements). The more specific the challenge, the easier it is to choose the stakeholder/partners and the knowledge needed, as well as the desired output/outcome (for example, a report, a risk assessment model, or a planning layout). All parties, which include potential end users, should benefit from the resulting co-produced knowledge (Albert et al., 2014). Choosing the right partner city is important to ensure actionable, useable, co-produced knowledge. The right partner is a city that is facing a similar challenge and has aligned knowledge needs (Frantzeskaki and Kabisch, 2016). During this phase, governing capabilities, competencies of stakeholders and resource requirements should be identified, acknowledged and catered for.

At this point, having a terms of reference (TOR) document will help to manage the expectations of various actors. It should include the aims and objectives of the process, roles and responsibilities, the procedures to be followed, available resources (financial and other), communication strategies, timelines, and a step-by-step map of the process (which should be updated regularly). The TOR may also include other financial information, such as what funding is available and from where, what the funding has been earmarked for and when (and where) it is expected to be used.

Different formats can be used to help frame the agenda for the co-production process, such as workshops, proposal writing sessions, participatory mapping and learning labs (Osuteye et al., 2019). Setting the process milestones will need to consider various instances where some or all of the actors may be restricted in their participation. These include election dates (local and national), seasons (e.g. rainy/monsoon season/Southern or Northern Hemisphere), financial year end, among other circumstances. A crucial element is meeting in a neutral space that is accessible to all stakeholders. This will also help in managing power dynamics. A culture of openness and a willingness to learn collectively needs to be cultivated from the beginning as this is as much an outcome of the process as the co-production result itself (Osuteye et al., 2019). Indeed, learning should be recognised as an important and inherent part of the process at each phase.

Phase 2: Inputs

Knowledge co-production initiatives must have proficiency and expertise within the stakeholder group, determine legitimate involvement and build trust (Albert et al., 2014). During this phase, the multiple forms of knowledge present among stakeholders need to be recognised, documented and validated, and any areas of weakness should be identified. Recognising the different types of knowledge present among the stakeholders ensures inclusivity, legitimacy and sound knowledge co-production. As Davoudi (2015: 318) explains, what is required is an “understanding of the complex interrelationship between knowing what (cognitive/theoretical knowledge), knowing how (skills/technical knowledge), knowing to what end (moral choices) and doing (action/practice)”. This phase also presents an opportunity for skills and capacity building.

Phase 3: Activities

This phase involves setting up the knowledge co-production process and developing and designing the methodology and project plan. It is when the actual implementation of the knowledge co-production process takes place. This will be very specific to the type of challenge being addressed and the context of the initiative (Norström et al., 2020). Therefore, it is crucial that the knowledge co-production process remains situated and sensitive to local contexts; transdisciplinary, involving many different sets of knowledge; horizontal in that partnerships are equal (aware of multiple power relations); and reflexive on practices, methodologies, institutional learning, and complexities. Knowledge co-production is a communal activity, although one stakeholder or organisation may take on a leadership role in the process. Each stakeholder needs to be clear about their expectations, roles and responsibilities (Lemos and Morehouse, 2011). A project-specific ‘learning framework’, as proposed by Collodi et al. (2017), is a useful way to guide the process and provide a tool for facilitating the knowledge co-production. The learning framework should contain the various principles needed for collaborative learning and be agreed upon by all involved. These principles may include committing to taking ownership and responsibility for supporting learning, openly sharing good practice (including challenges, failures and successes) and communicating project learnings outside of the group. Sessions during this phase may take on many formats, including workshops, site visits (to promote experiential learning), city exchange visits (to promote cross-city learning), group discussions, and focus group sessions (Osuteye et al., 2019).

Phases 4 and 5: Outputs and Impact

These two phases are when the importance of the co-produced knowledge is demonstrated, and the beneficial impact is seen (hopefully). The co-produced knowledge is piloted, and its usefulness and validity tested on the ground, depending on the type of output (Watson, 2014). The knowledge can also be published on public platforms. Outputs should be open, easily available, and accessible (Osuteye et al., 2019). It is at this point that the co-produced knowledge can be fed into wider strategic conversations, and options for research can be identified and assessed (Norström et al., 2020). Stakeholders may also look for unaddressed or emerging concerns, and revise plans and approaches. Additional expertise may need to be brought in to fill any gaps identified so adjustments can be made. Outputs may be disseminated in several ways, depending on the type of knowledge co-produced, such as through fact sheets, mobile phone applications (apps), policy briefings, training sessions, various forms of multimedia and research papers.

Conclusion

When done in a phased, considered and reflexive way, knowledge co-production should lead to processes and outputs that inform policy, address complex urban challenges, and put usable, actionable and inclusive knowledge to work. Knowledge co-production also has the potential to be a springboard for city diplomacy, enabling cities to develop lasting relationships and partnerships, collaborate and share knowledge, raise funds, and put in place sustainable, well considered policy and practice. While the co-production of knowledge may be challenging, both the process and the output may offer significant value to all those involved. Cities should take advantage of the current interest of international funders and aid agencies in cities of the Global South, in climate change and resilience, in fighting health challenges such as COVID-19, and (particularly) in methodologies that are trans/interdisciplinary (such as knowledge co-production) which produce actionable outputs and impact.

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Bo-Kaap: City Diplomacy Stakeholders in Urban Regeneration Heritage Precincts

Zinzile Seepie, Ben Mwasinga, Palmira De Almeida and Nkululeko Ntanzu

Introduction

The Western Cape is home to South Africa's oldest city, Cape Town, and one of the oldest surviving neighbourhoods, the Bo-Kaap. Nestled on the slopes of Signal Hill, the Bo-Kaap was formerly known as the 'Malay Quarter' and dates back to the 18th Century. Its unique townscape consists of a variety of architectural styles, ranging from Cape Dutch (1476–c1815) to Edwardian (c1900–1930). However, the Bo-Kaap is more than a melange of architectural styles: it is an integral part of the establishment of Islam at the Cape, and where some of the most respected Muslim founders/scholars are buried, at the Tana Baru.

During the mid-1840s, this working-class neighbourhood boomed after the abolition of slavery. It was a melting pot of cultures, home to former slaves (and their descendants) originally from Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Sri Lanka, China and other parts of Africa, most of whom were Muslim and referred to as 'Cape Malay', as well as artisans and unskilled immigrants who were mainly from Britain and other European countries (Japha and Todeschini, 2000). Uniquely, this part of the inner city was declared a "Malay Group Area", not a "White Area", under the Group Areas Act (No. 77 of 1957). The Bo-Kaap has contributed significantly to Cape Town's cultural diversity and its tourist appeal. Indeed, its significance extends beyond South Africa's borders to the rest of the world, as the precinct is currently being assessed for inclusion in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO's) World Heritage sites, alongside the Egyptian Pyramids and Taj Mahal of India.

Today, however, the Bo-Kaap's cultural identity and heritage are threatened by gentrification, as a result of attention from international tourists, developers and businesses, along with the City's vision for a world-class city. Higher-income social groups are displacing working class residents due to increased commercial development and foreign investment in the local real estate market. Current tourism practices and state policy are deepening the negative effects of gentrification and have created a phenomenon of "tourism gentrification" (Spencer and Bassadien, 2016). This refers to an influx of tourists who later become residents, which drives up property values and rates, making the area unaffordable for the poorer residents who have been living there for generations. In the case of the Bo-Kaap, centuries of history and heritage are under massive threat, and various international and local stakeholders have recognised the precinct's significance and the need to preserve it for future generations.

A contributing factor to the gentrification of neighbourhoods is the City's agenda that includes urban regeneration and is aimed at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) through liberal spatial development models and placemaking tourism. Urban takes different names in different cities, "including 'renewal', 'rejuvenation', 'reinvestment', 'revitalisation', 'renaissance', and, more recently, 'smart growth'" (Winkler, 2009: 365). The tools that cities use for urban regeneration are spatial planning and land use management, with the local spatial plans guiding not only national actors, but also FDI in many cases. The private sector, local and international non-profit organisations (and even international governments) also often have a stake in some strategic projects. Globally, best practices for inner-city regeneration typically involve private-public partnerships (PPPs) working through precinct placemaking and city branding projects. Unfortunately, these large-scale flagship projects rarely reduce inner-city poverty or improve the socio-economic conditions of the original communities. Instead the projects lead to "inflated property values, and higher tax revenues", and the exclusion of poor inner-city residents "from public decision-making processes regardless of the fact that the material legacy of these decisions remain[s] for generations" (Winkler, 2009: 366).

City diplomacy has been associated with developing strategies targeted at attracting "foreign direct investment, providing tax and financial incentives to foreign investors as well as providing direct subsidies (Nganje, 2013: 48). Generally, city diplomacy refers to the formal and informal ties that cities form with "foreign public or private entities", with the aim of promoting cultural, economic, social or political development (Magam, 2018: 14). It is also described as the "decentralization of international relations' management,

choosing cities as the key actors” (Pluijm and Melissen, 2007: 11). This decentralisation has encouraged cities to create and attract investment for development and to be sustainable. The role that local governments play in international relations is specific to their direct interest and domestic competence (Magam, 2018), and often undertaken for economic motives (Nganje, 2013). Nevertheless, it is clear that the autonomy given to local government is subject to national priorities, and so city diplomacy cannot be autonomous but must be seen “as an integral part of a new multi-layered or catalytic diplomacy” (Magam, 2018; Nganje, 2013: 22).

To be successful, multi-layered diplomacy requires the coordination and co-operation of a variety of actors. Thus, when developing structured and coordinated diplomatic efforts, cities should include multiple stakeholders, such as the private sector and civil society, to help ensure “there is no deviation from the common agenda and the benefits of integration are shared by all the citizens of the region” (Nganje, 2014: 3). However, the intention of the City of Cape Town (COCT’s) municipal international relations (MIR) to attract investment into the inner-city seems to be clashing with the protection of the religious, cultural and architectural heritage of the area. Despite the countless policies in place to combat gentrification, the city seems to have a blind-spot for the Bo-Kaap community.

The Bo-Kaap case illustrates the unlikely cohort of stakeholders invested in the precinct and the role of culture, heritage and identity in the built environment. The research for this paper consisted of a literature review, complemented by interviews and meetings with local community members, municipal planners, heritage specialists, and the Dutch Cultural Heritage Agency. After describing the main frameworks and strategies relevant for municipal international relations, the heritage significance of the Bo-Kaap is highlighted, within the context of international, national, provincial and local heritage policies and guidelines. The paper then looks at the links and tensions between diplomacy, heritage and city branding, followed by a discussion on gentrification and its impact on the Bo-Kaap. To illustrate how city diplomacy plays out inconspicuously at municipal level through the built environment, the paper maps the range of stakeholders involved in the urban regeneration of the precinct – a stakeholder mapping seeks to increase universal access to the political process and urban dividend, especially where international interests are concerned. The paper concludes by offering recommendations for an integrated approach that combines heritage and culture with commercial and residential development, to encourage sustainable processes of conservation and urban development.

Municipal International Relations

South Africa’s democracy is enshrined in the Constitution, which “stipulates the distribution of power”, with the aim of ensuring democratic participation, effective service delivery and economic development (Magam, 2018). The Constitution gives municipalities certain powers and functions that may be regulated by national government and provincial governments. National and provincial legislation may also assign additional powers to municipalities, but municipalities are not obliged to accept these delegated powers or functions (Ruffin, 2013). The “grease” that makes this “system of shared rule” run smoothly is intergovernmental relations (Nganje, 2015: 54).

MIR Policy Framework

The 1998 White Paper on Local Government notes that municipalities could benefit from international linkages and co-operation through, for example, learning exchanges, domestic and international public-private partnerships (PPPs), and partnerships with community-based and non-governmental organisations (RSA, 1998). The White Paper also recommends the developing of an MIR policy framework. After consultation with all spheres of government and other stakeholders, in 1999 the Ministry of Provincial and Local Government (MPLG) published *Municipal International Relations: A policy framework for South Africa* (RSA, 1999). The policy defines municipal international relations as “a link between two or more communities from different nation-states, in which at least one of the key actors is a municipality”. It recognises the complex and expanded “range and scope of municipal international relations”, and encourages municipalities to engage in MIR and to involve other local stakeholders. The policy identifies four types of municipal international relations:

- Participation in representative associations of municipalities
- Twinning arrangements
- Membership of global networks
- Municipal marketing and global presence

Western Cape Government International Relations Strategy

The key objective of the Western Cape Government International Relations Strategy (WCGIRS) is to increase trade, tourism and investment. The first of its three strategic goals is to “create an enabling environment to facilitate trade, tourism and attract strategic investment to the Western Cape in order to stimulate economic growth and jobs, thus reducing poverty” (WCPG, 2013: 49). The strategy is specific in its intention for targeted FDI and contains an Official Development Assistance (ODA) section to deal specifically with “funds received from foreign governments and institutions” (ibid.: 65).

The WCGIRS approach to international relations is predominantly economic and as such reflects the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) economic development objectives. African governments established NEPAD in order to combat poverty and socio-economic issues, and to build a partnership between the Global North and Global South, to share knowledge for the benefit of all (Amawu, 2002). The WCGIRS also highlights the importance of partnerships in its implementation framework, stating that “coordinating structures are needed to bring WCG departments, as well as municipal stakeholders together”. Potential partners mentioned include “the private sector, financial institutions and civil society”.

City of Cape Town Strategic International Relations Policy

The policy seeks to “promote Cape Town as a competitive global hub for economic, social and cultural activity” (COCT, 2015: 2) and to integrate the city’s international relations within its broader development agenda. The policy is aligned to the administration’s strategic policy objectives, which include attracting investment, visitors and large events, as well as “shaping the social policy agenda, particularly with regard to matters of redress, reconciliation, delivery and diversity” (ibid.: 3).

The Heritage Significance of the Bo-Kaap

The significance of the Bo-Kaap is recognised internationally and by all spheres of government. Various policies and frameworks are relevant to managing significant heritage sites. The objectives of the UNESCO Action Plan for the Africa Region (UNESCO, 2012) inform South African heritage management and conservation policies across all three spheres of government (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Objectives of the 2012-2017 Action Plan for the Africa Region



Adapted from: UNESCO (2012)

South Africa is a member country of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), a global NGO that is dedicated to conserving and protecting cultural heritage places. As an interdisciplinary, global network, with members from over 150 countries, ICOMOS benefits from exchanges by experts in disciplines that range from architecture to history, archaeology, art history, geography, anthropology, engineering and town planning. ICOMOS members seek to improve “the preservation of heritage, the standards and the techniques for each type of cultural heritage property: buildings, historic cities, cultural landscapes and archaeological sites”.¹⁴

Figure 4.2: Historic Islamic Heritage Buildings in The Bo-Kaap



In South Africa, the entire Bo-Kaap area is identified as a Grade I heritage resource, and 20 sites within the Bo-Kaap are declared national heritage sites. It is subject to the National Heritage Resources Act (No. 25 of 1999), which is the controlling legal framework for heritage conservation in South Africa (RSA, 1999). The Act is applied to heritage resources that are of cultural significance or of value for the community and for future generations. It provides for provinces to establish heritage authorities and for local governments to protect and manage conservation-worthy places and areas.

The Integrated Metropolitan Environment Policy (IMEP) Cultural Heritage Strategy for the City of Cape Town (COCT, 2005) is intended to guide and commit the city to conserving and enhancing the appropriate use of historic sites. Its vision is “a unique historic city where the heritage of its past and present inhabitants is respected, protected and enhanced through appropriate heritage management practices; adherence to sensitive, socially aware and appropriate heritage concepts; and integration with other City responsibilities and policy objectives”. The strategy includes the following policy principles (COCT: 2005: 12–17):

Policy 1: Access

Citizens should enjoy rights of access to public heritage resources as part of the common legacy of the historic City. Access to heritage resources should not be restricted on the grounds of gender, disability or race.

[...]

Policy 4: Community Participation

Community participation in heritage is a vital part of sustainable heritage management. The communities of Cape Town have a key interest in heritage and an essential role to play in identifying and protecting heritage resources. Communities are valuable resources of knowledge, and partnerships between authorities and the public may empower both.

[...]

Policy 12: Integration

To be effective, heritage decisions should be integrated into economic, environmental and planning processes.


[...]

¹⁴ <https://www.icomos.org/en/about-icomos/mission-and-vision/mission-and-vision>

Policy 14: Tangible and intangible heritage

Cultural value resides in both tangible and intangible heritage. Oral traditions, ceremonies, events and knowledge systems are a vital part of heritage. Intangible heritage enriches the experience of the physical environment through memory and knowledge. Living heritage is an integral part of contemporary experience and links social and individual memory to daily life.

Figure 4.4: The Bo-Kaap HPOZ boundaries



Source: COCT (2019)

The neighbourhood also falls within the City of Cape Town's Heritage Protection Overlay Zone (HPOZ), which is a base zoning that determines the permitted land-uses and includes a set of prescribed development rules (COCT, 2019) that are meant to:

- Conserve the unique historic urban landscape of the Bo-Kaap.
- Protect the Bo-Kaap through conscious and considerate management of development.
- Promote heritage tourism to stimulate the economy.
- Promote the embodiment of the 'way of life' of the residents of the Bo-Kaap.

Diplomacy, Heritage and City Branding

It is not uncommon for city diplomacy efforts to leverage the uniqueness of specific cultures or heritage to achieve international interest on global platforms. “[P]ara diplomacy can be used as a strategy [...] to foster peace and preserve cultures and language” (Magam, 2018: 121). Cape Town’s goal is to attract foreign investment and promote the city as a tourism destination, using heritage among other features, as selling points. Its Cultural Heritage Tourism Strategy specifically calls for “cultural heritage tourism products [to be linked] to urban regeneration initiatives” (ED/GE, 2010: 21).

However, heritage conservation and management tend to be less prioritised within South Africa’s urban development context, and technocrats often grapple with issues of political transformation and changing development agendas, in hopes of being a global city. Cape Town displays “global city characteristics”, with urban planners and development practitioners pushing “foreign investment attraction, strategic marketing campaigns, and the hosting of high-profile events” (Gibbs, 2007: 1).

Figure 4.5: Cape Town the Global City: Property, tourism and FDI



The choice of a city by investors and individuals is influenced by its image and, “under these circumstances, city branding becomes an exceptionally important tool for image-building and image-communication” (Prilenska, 2012: 12). City branding approaches vary, from incentivising economic growth, which is common in the USA, to improving the socio-economic wellbeing of citizens in the space, as in Europe (Prilenska, 2012).

The primary component of communication for effective city branding comprises spatial and non-spatial communications.

- Spatial communications translate into interventions aimed at upgrading the public realm through urban design, large-scale development or infrastructure upgrades, and public art. These spatial interventions should also seek to increase the mixture and quality of social amenities and general accessibility of the neighbourhood for its original citizens. The responsibility for many of these interventions sits mainly with the local municipality’s spatial planning and land use management sphere of influence, although interested and affected parties include property developers, investors and the community.
- Non-spatial actions concern institutional and community networks, or city improvement districts, which enable the development of a sense of ownership and active community participation. To support these actions, services and incentives need to be in place to attract attention to the precinct.

The secondary and tertiary components of communication for effective city branding are advertising, promotion and marketing; and word-of-mouth experiences shared by visitors and investors.

Gentrification: The ugly face of a global city

Owing to the impacts of neoliberalism and the fact that nearly all neighbourhoods around it have been gentrified, property in the Bo-Kaap has become very sought after. After all, it is a prime location; picturesque cobbled streets and narrow lanes, and a strategic location for high-level service-workers aiming to “beat the traffic” in the CBD. (Donaldson et al., 2012: 177)

Urban regeneration, characterised by over-reliance on “private sector reinvestment and intensive urban management, to stimulate the local economy and to curb degeneration trends”, is merely a disguise for neo-colonialism and gentrification (Winkler, 2009: 364). There is a real fear that the trend of gentrification in other neighbourhoods such as Woodstock, will also extend to the Bo-Kaap. However, the Bo-Kaap residents hold the sentiment that they will continue to fight for their historic neighbourhood, their culture and social networks, and for the overall well-being of those who have established generational roots on the slopes of Signal Hill.

The CoCT's overall approach to urban development policies has been inspired by neoliberal policy objectives, which tend to assume that urban development is unilinear, encouraging foreign investment and transplanting interventions from the global North and West within the global South (Pino and Ellison, 2012). This neoliberal approach to inner-city regeneration may have unintentionally embedded gentrification into public policy. There again, even the most well-intended urban development policy frameworks such as urban densification, inner-city regeneration and urban heritage conservation may have unintended negative consequences (Donaldson et al., 2012).

Examples of contested developments within the Bo-Kaap include, but are not limited to:

- An exclusive 19-storey, mixed-use commercial and residential block (Buitengracht/Rose Streets).
- The auction of St Monica's old age home (38 Lion Street). This building used to serve as an affordable maternity ward.
- A residential 12-storey apartment block (40 Lion Street).
- Damaged historic cobblestone roads, as a result of increased traffic and construction in the area.


The preservation of the Bo-Kaap is more than just a matter of land-use management and the built environment. The Bo-Kaap has a particular sense of place and its community-setting adds value to its historic built fabric and cultural appeal. This is why the negative effects of gentrification in the Bo-Kaap need to be mitigated by the preservation and management of both its tangible and intangible heritage (Donaldson et al., 2011), followed by a robust/sustainable development and tourism framework that satisfies the aspirations of all the stakeholders involved (Spencer and Bassadien, 2016).

Figure 4.6: Approved development: 100 Buitengracht Street



Source: <https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/de-lille-gives-green-light-for-r1bn-cape-town-development-20170129>

Figure 4.7: Scale of proposed development: 40 Lion Street



Source: <http://www.bridgesnotbarriers.co.za/40lupdates>

The sentiment of the Bo-Kaap community, which is supported by the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA), academics and professionals, is that gentrification of their neighbourhood will continue unless there is an intervention. This type of urban development accompanied with rates and tax increases will economically displace original community residents, leaving their next generation to visit rather than reside within their Bo-Kaap. Residents are opposed to the development of 'high-end' mono-functional housing stock that is not designed to house the current 'community profile', but targeted at more affluent users. Most residents explicitly state that, instead of selling municipal land to developers, the state should develop land for and with the community in mind (culture and heritage).¹⁵ A more holistic approach is needed when developing state-owned land. Mixed-use and mixed-income development, with a focus on affordable housing, would greatly enhance the liveability of the Bo-Kaap, when partnered with the conservation of the built-environment.

Figure 7: Protests against gentrification in the Bo-Kaap



Source: <https://www.groundup.org.za/article/bokaap-blocks-blok/>

The argument for city branding and associated urban redevelopment is that flagship projects will have spin-off effects for local residents (Prilenska, 2012). However, the lure of new and foreign capital investment into the Bo-Kaap has been more about material heritage than preserving the socio-cultural heritage of its community. This begs the questions: Who is intended to benefit from the City's approach to urban regeneration and economic development? Are all stakeholders being carefully considered in all decision-making processes? (Donaldson et al., 2012). To answer these questions, the stakeholders involved in the Bo-Kaap were mapped and then categorised and prioritised.


Bo-Kaap Stakeholder Analysis

A stakeholder mapping tool is concerned with aligning the interests of various stakeholders, which is particularly important when developing urban regeneration precincts in the era of liberal economic policy. If the global aspirations of local municipalities are not checked, they have the potential to create homes for the world's residents at the expense of local communities in the city's strategically located neighbourhoods. The stakeholder mapping exercise will enable the coordination of key stakeholder input in the development of a local spatial development framework (LSDF). It is hoped this will lead to a socially inclusive, UNESCO World Heritage precinct in the inner-city regeneration of the Bo-Kaap.

The first step was to use a problem tree situational analysis tool to find the core problem that needs to be solved, instead of tackling multiple symptoms (Figure 4.8).

¹⁵ Interviews and meetings held with local residents as part of the stakeholder mapping.

Figure 4.8: Problem Tree Analysis



Source: <https://online.visual-paradigm.com/knowledge/root-cause-analysis/how-to-use-five-whys-tree-diagram/>

Four root causes linked to the symptomatic challenges associated with the Bo-Kaap precinct were identified (Figure 4.9). This network was expanded upon to reveal the core problem, which was defined as a **misalignment of stakeholder interests in Municipal International Relations (MIR) at precinct development level.**

Figure 4.9: Root causes of the problem





Table 4.1 contains a description of the role, interests, contribution and risks of each of the stakeholders involved in the development of the Bo-Kaap.

Table 4.1: Stakeholders involved in the Bo-Kaap

	Stakeholder	Contribution	Interests	Risks
Municipal	International Relations Department <i>Showcase Cape Town, including the Bo-Kaap, on global platforms</i>	Secure FDI for the city in alignment with its developmental mandate	Facilitating international investment, visitors and events	FDI pursuits not linked to socio-cultural heritage of historic residents
	City Urban Integration Department <i>Create an effective and efficient planning and building development environment in the inner city</i>	Recoup rates and taxes from land and service delivery	Promoting sustainable development in the city, through equitable service delivery	Impact of higher rates (due to increased property prices) on lower-income population groups (gentrification)
	Arts and Culture Department <i>Incorporate arts and culture into local planning and urban development strategies</i>	Develop public art, cultural planning, cultural precincts and cultural participation	Promoting art and cultural development in precinct planning	Limited power over final precinct plan and development applications
Provincial	Western Cape Department of Economic Development and Tourism <i>Promote the neighbourhood as a noteworthy place to visit for international and local tourists</i>	Market and brand the city, including the Bo-Kaap, as a global destination	Developing local tourism business and economic development	Impact of increase in tourists and tourism businesses on the 'way of life' of residents (without education about culturally acceptable protocols for the neighbourhood)
	Western Cape Department of Cultural Affairs and Sports <i>Manage key museums and cultural heritage sites</i>	Manage the heritage aspects of precinct branding and marketing	Conserving provincial heritage resources within the Bo-Kaap	Lack of influence over the City's FDI goals affecting the Bo-Kaap
National	SAHRA – Agency of the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture <i>Manage and implement the National Heritage Resources Act</i>	Identify, assess, manage and protect heritage resources in South Africa	Coordinating and promoting the management of heritage resources for community development and social wellbeing	Limited ability to conserve all aspects of heritage, with a consequent focus on conserving the architecture of the Bo-Kaap rather than socio-cultural structures
Business/Investors	Cape Town Central City Improvement District <i>Combat capital flight and attract investment back into the inner city</i>	Upgrade urban infrastructure and increase security within the precinct and its surrounds	Creating world class precincts that are attractive to local and global investors and businesses	Policies to attract investment (world class city) that marginalise local businesses with foreign investment in buildings further contributing to gentrification
	WESGRO <i>Assist investors and businesses, as the official tourism, trade and investment promotion agency for Cape Town and the Western Cape</i>	Market and brand the precinct for local and international investors in order to attract FDI and local investment	Attracting international tourists, business and investors	Policies to attract investment marginalising local businesses and foreign investment in buildings further contributing to gentrification
International	UNESCO <i>Develop policies for international cooperation in cultural conservation</i>	Provide global conservation management policies to inform South Africa's National Heritage Resources Act	Assessing the Bo-Kaap as a potential UNESCO World Heritage Site	World Heritage status creating negative, unintentional spin-offs, e.g. increased tourism that erodes the neighbourhood's way of life
	Cultural Heritage Agency of the Netherlands <i>Create favourable conditions for the sustainable conservation of shared heritage in former Dutch colonies</i>	Provide training and workshops in cooperation with international institutes and regional and local stakeholders	Conserving heritage resources through international cooperation and knowledge exchange	Dutch conservation principles and practices not suitable in an African context such as the Bo-Kaap
	ICOMOS <i>Conserve and rehabilitate heritage resources, and promote cooperation in heritage management</i>	Advise on significant conservation matters	Promoting international best practices and standards in conservation management	International conservation principles and practices not suitable in an African context such as the Bo-Kaap
Non-profit	The Bo-Kaap Civic and Ratepayers Association (BCRA) <i>Advocate for an inclusive, equitable, safe, secure and vibrant Bo-Kaap</i>	Mobilise residents around development issues that affect the precinct	Conserving the cultural heritage and character of the community within the precinct	Civil actions and legal opposition against international pressures (tourism, gentrification) affecting the community


The stakeholders were then categorised according to their 'Influence' or 'Power' against their 'Interests' (Figure 4.10). The four stakeholder categories are: Latents (high power, low interest); Promotors (high power, high interest); Apathetic (low power, low interest) and Defenders (low power, high interest). This categorisation informs how best to approach and manage the different stakeholders.

Figure 4.10: The Bo-Kaap stakeholder categories



Once the stakeholders were categorised, their management approach was discerned (Figure 4.11). The four management approaches are: Keep satisfied, Manage closely, Monitor, and Keep informed.

Figure 4.11: Stakeholder management approach (prioritisation)



- The 'Keep satisfied' group represents the most interested and powerful stakeholders, without whose support, development of this precinct will either come to a halt or significantly affect future precinct property prices.
- The 'Manage closely' group comprises representatives of organisations associated with higher levels of risk in the development of the precinct. Their initiatives require close management as they have the potential to destroy the 'way of life' of the original residents and disrespect the community.
- The 'Monitor' group comprises stakeholders whose plans should be well documented and included to strengthen the precinct.
- The 'Keep informed' group are organisations with high levels of interest in the precinct. This group is important and presents opportunities for mutually beneficial partnership projects.

Conclusion

Cape Town's inner city is undergoing significant change and evolution shaped by market forces and developmental imperatives to compete in the global arena (WCPG, 2013). The result is the creation of socio-spatial processes and inner-city interventions that contradict the socio-economic needs of low-income residents. This further entrenches the racial divide and reinforces the drivers of economic displacement of inner-city residents to the urban periphery. In the South African context, this leads to well-located black and brown people being pushed away from economic opportunities and the destruction of mature, established social networks.

The Bo-Kaap has a uniquely Islamic South African character, unlike anywhere else on Earth. While 'conservationism' is important, this unique identity and place-making heritage needs to be enhanced in space, rather than encapsulated in time. City diplomacy has a role to play in developing a heritage management strategy that marries tourism, culture and identity, local economic development, and social-spatial considerations, especially as the UNESCO World Heritage Site assessment is already underway. Further to this, the development of an LSDF by the City's Development Management Department requires an intuitive strategy that involves, from the onset, a comprehensive list of stakeholders currently in the arena as well as those that should be invited.

A gap clearly exists between heritage management and urban development. What is needed is to move towards a more integrated approach that combines heritage and culture with commercial and residential development, to encourage sustainable processes of conservation and urban development. Instead of a top-down approach to inner-city regeneration that emphasises economic competitiveness, a city's regeneration policy should include concepts, such as social mixing, liveability, social cohesion and responsive governance (Winkler, 2009). A clear branding strategy for the precinct, which encapsulates the community heritage and its way of life, should inform all plans for the precinct and ensure cross-sectoral alignment and co-ordination. It would greatly strengthen co-operative efforts to achieve a liveable and diverse inner-city neighbourhood.

Opportunity #1: Strategy for religious tourism

Strengthening religious tourism could offer the precinct culturally appropriate economic development opportunities. This could involve religious communities educating their visitors on acceptable conduct within their neighbourhoods, and marketing their neighbourhood as a unique place to visit. An example is the Jewish communities in the east of Johannesburg who cater to the needs of their global counterparts in tourism and business. Similar initiatives can be found in countries such as the United Arab Emirates, where visitors are educated on acceptable conduct and behaviour within neighbourhood. A clear branding strategy would target the corresponding religious funds and international property developers to invest in the evolution of this precinct with their local counterparts. The potential to develop a world class, efficient inner-city neighbourhood is a necessity of the time, and will require government to work with a range of invested and affected parties.

Opportunity #2: Strategy for the built environment, heritage, local economy and skills development

A clear strategy, which describes the aspirational evolution of heritage and the built environment, could guide the preservation of the precinct's architecture and design, while allowing innovative refurbishment of buildings in their use and intensity of use. It would further specify development guidelines, to ensure architectural consistency in the neighbourhood, so that even higher-rise developments would not compromise, but rather complement and enhance, the aesthetics of the community. Community-focused training on the architectural adaptations of the buildings in the precinct would be critical to allow the community to own the value-add process of their precinct. This upskilling (training on the maintenance of the built environment elements) must extend to the community to ensure that the artisanal skills associated with the precinct are owned and commercialised by the community.

Opportunity #3: Strategy for peer-to-peer training on municipal land value capture and socially reformative economic models

The City must respect the way the first community came to live in the precinct and the pain that this heritage still holds, centuries after the Bo-Kaap was established. This is the birthplace of Islam in South Africa and home to descendants of people stolen from their indigenous lands and brought to the shores of South Africa as slaves. To allow the displacement of this community is epistemic violence and re-triggering of a community which has already overcome the indignity and trauma of landlessness and slavery. It would destroy the notion of equitable and sustainable tourism in Cape Town and displace, years after apartheid, another group of brown people from the inner city. Gentrification is a global phenomenon, but its impact in South Africa compounds the racial inequality of our heritage. The stakeholders described above must participate in peer-to-peer training and development, to explore the evolution of economic models that enable these trends.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC	African Centre for Cities
AFD	French Development Agency
AI	Artificial Intelligence
BCRA	The Bo-Kaap Civic and Ratepayers Association
C40	C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group
CBD	City Business District
CCID	Cape Town Central Improvement District
CFIR	Consultative Forum on International Relations
COCT	City of Cape Town
CUID	City Urban Integration Department
DA	Democratic Alliance
DBSA	Development Bank of South Africa
DCAS	Western Cape Department of Cultural Affairs and Sports
DCoG	Department of Cooperative Governance
DEA	Department of Environmental Affairs
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DTRD	Diplomatic Training, Research and Development
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (United Nations)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GCRO	Gauteng City Region Observatory
HPOZ	Heritage Protection Overlay Zone
ICLEI	International Council for Local Environment Initiatives
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IGCCC	Intergovernmental Climate Change Committee
IMEP	Integrated Metropolitan Environment Policy
IRF	International Relations Forum
LIP	Local Interaction Platform
LSDF	Local Spatial Development Framework
MFMA	Municipal Financial Management Act
MIR	Municipal International Relations
MPLG	Ministry of Provincial and Local Government
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NDP	National Development Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
SACN	South African Cities Network
SAHRA	South African Heritage Resources Agency
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SANBI	South African National Biodiversity Institute
SDF	Spatial Development Framework
SETA	Sector Education and Training Authority
TOR	Terms of Reference
UCT	University of Cape Town
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCC	United Nations Framework on Climate Change
WCGIRS	Western Cape Government International Relations Strategy
Wesgro	Tourism, trade and investment promotion agency for Cape Town and the Western Cape

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